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**DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROL**

1. **INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: THE VALUE OF DIACHRONY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CONTROL**

Control constructions are surely a part of the basic fabric out of which all languages are constructed, for they find expression in languages of the most diverse types. The notion of "control" is to be understood here in its broadest sense, taking in any non-freely interpreted empty category — thus including missing objects as well as missing subjects — as well as any non-freely selected anaphoric element — thus including pronominals in finite clauses that must be coreferent with a nominal in some other, higher, clause, as is the case in sentences such as (1).¹

(1) (a) John, looks like he is sick
    (b) *John looks like it is sick.

At the same time, though, the expression of control constructions is not uniform cross-linguistically, for they are found with infinitivials in some languages, as for instance in English and Ancient Greek, with finite clauses in others, as for instance in Modern Persian, Modern Greek, and several of the Algonkian languages, with compound verb-plus-verb units in others, as for instance also in many Algonkian languages, and so forth.² Moreover, as indicated by at least some of the languages mentioned,² these differences can be found in languages that are genetically related — i.e., members of the same language family — or indeed even between different stages of the same language. Under the usual assumptions of the comparative method, whereby genetically related languages are assumed to have sprung from a common source and then later diverged, this diversity within genetic unity shown by control constructions means that at least one of the languages in question has undergone a change. Therefore, it must be concluded that control constructions are in fact subject to change diachronically, and

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indeed, direct evidence of change in these constructions is available and is presented below in the form of several case-studies from a variety of languages; these case-studies complement the indirect evidence for change in control constructions that comes from application of the principles of the comparative method.

This seemingly trivial observation of the possibility of change in control constructions leads to a more interesting question, i.e., whether observed changes in control constructions can tell anything about the proper synchronic analysis of this phenomenon in general. Before that issue can be addressed, several points concerning diachrony and language change in general need to be brought out as preliminaries to the case-studies.

1.1. The relevance of data from language change for linguistic theory has been accepted by most linguists since the now-famous pronouncement of Kiparsky (1968a: 174) that diachronic evidence could offer a “window on the form of linguistic competence”. Indeed, several subsequent studies purported to demonstrate the value of this “window”, e.g., Kiparsky (1968b), Hooper (1976), Lightfoot (1979), Piggott (1980), and more recently Joseph and Janda (1988), to name just a few, this last work for instance taking the pervasiveness of diachronic morphologization of once-syntactically as well as once-phonologically determined configurations of facts* to be the basis for positing and understanding a principle — an aspect of linguistic theory, i.e., of the design of grammars in general — that guides speakers in these situations, inducing them to opt for morphological solutions.

Despite the fact that Kiparsky himself later, in 1982, expressed some doubts about the utility of this overall enterprise, saying that “language change is not as direct a ‘window’ on linguistic structure as one might have hoped” (1982:viii), there are good theoretical grounds for adhering to the “early Kiparsky" view. Starting from the rather uncontroversial assumption that one goal of linguistic theory is to provide the constraints and limits on the form of synchronic grammars, if one views diachrony as the passage through successive synchronic states, as schematized in (2), it then follows that examining language change can lead to insights into linguistic theory and therefore provide the desired “window” into linguistic competence.

Viewed in this way, the diachrony of a language is nothing more than the passage through possible synchronic states, possible synchronic states that are defined and delimited by the constraints provided by linguistic theory; evidence from language change thus necessarily takes on significance for the understanding of the limits of the notion “possible human language”. Accordingly, the data to be considered in the case-studies and the questions they generate can have real relevance for linguistic theory.

1.2. Second, some general comments on methodology are in order. While it is customary in synchronic linguistics to look for broad overarching generalizations that cover and account for as much data as possible, such generalizations are not always available in the examination of language change. Historical linguistic research has often ended up — necessarily, it can be argued — focussing on particularities, especially on the properties of particular lexical items and on particular lexical instantiations of a given construction, rather than on general principles that are valid for large classes of data.

For example, studies of phonological change have led to the insight that sound change proceeds in a lexically diffuse manner (see Wang (1969), Chen and Wang (1975)), so that it is not enough to state simply that accent shifted from position $x$ to position $y$ under some set of purely phonological conditions; rather, it is often more accurate to say the accent shift occurred first in some (set of) lexical item(s) and then in some other (set of) lexical item(s), and then some other, etc. Similarly, it is well-known that much in the way of morphological change — what has traditionally been termed “analogy”, for instance — also proceeds most typically on a lexical item by lexical item basis, or at
best, a form-class by form-class spread; thus the generalization of the s-plural in English has met with resistance, in different ways, from such nouns as ox or child or deer, and the spread of the dental ("weak") preterite in English has not managed to eradicate the ablaut ("strong") preterite. Even in the realm of syntactic change, such a particularistic approach has proven more insightful; thus, even though Lightfoot (1979) has argued for a categorical reanalysis of a class of verbs in Middle English as modals in early Modern English, predictions made by such a reanalysis of the entire class at once are not fully borne out by the properties of all the individual members of the class (see Warner (1982)), some of which lag behind the others in fully acquiring true modal status (as Lightfoot (1988) himself recognizes). Also, even in word-order shifts which can be described as changes in abstract syntactic categories, specific realizations of these categories can fail to conform to the new patterns; the persistence of Verb-Subject order in the imperative mind you!, for instance, runs counter to the otherwise quite general Subject-Verb order in modern English imperatives with an expressed subject.

Therefore, it would seem that broad sweeping generalizations concerning language change, the diachronic statements that correspond best to the familiar notion of "rule" from synchronic investigations, are perhaps only retrospective generalizations, storable in general terms only once a change is over and done with and has run its course. Since many changes never reach full generalization throughout a class of potential candidates for the change, one way to gain insight into the diachrony of some general phenomenon is to examine the behavior of particular instantiations of the phenomenon, rather than trying to generalize.

1.3. Finally, and partly by way of illustrating the potential value — and pitfalls — of using diachronic evidence in testing linguistic theory in the area of control, it is important to point out that the absence of change in particular control constructions might prove to be as revealing about their analysis as observed changes. That is, it can be asked whether there might be some constant element in control constructions, an aspect of these constructions that is not subject to change. If it is found, such diachronic stability could, under certain assumptions, have important consequences for the analysis of control. In particular, Hock (1986:346–8) has suggested that it may be the case that no "major syntactic processes like the passive ... [and] the syntactic category [as opposed to the process] 'passive' (and its contrast with the 'active') [have] ever been lost" from any language. And, as a corollary to that, when discussing changes in the passive in various Indo-European languages, he states that "there has been a great deal of change, including the 'loss' of whole categories. However, the categories lost are not syntactic but morphosyntactic. That is, they do not involve the syntax of the passive, but its morphological encoding." By this reasoning, if control is a "major syntactic process" or "syntactic category", then it would be expected to show diachronic stability, and maybe only to exhibit change in its morphological expression. That is, such a situation might allow one to locate control within a grammar, and thus would bear on the question of whether control is a syntactic phenomenon or not.

Admittedly there are some problems when it comes to applying this reasoning to the facts of control constructions; for example the notions "major syntactic process" or "syntactic category" are quite nebulous terms whose definition may be highly theory-dependent, though they may be able to be given some substance. Also, as a way of "situating" the locale of the change, e.g., in the syntax versus in the semantics, this notion of Hock's may be less than useful, for one might also be inclined to say that major semantic processes or categories — whatever they may be — also are not lost diachronically. Still, the distinction Hock draws between the morphological encoding of a process and the process itself seems to be significant when examining the diachrony of a construction, as some of the case-studies below demonstrate.

1.4. The view of the relation between synchrony and diachrony outlined in Section 1.1, when coupled with the particularistic approach to language change advocated in Section 1.2 and the concerns voiced in Section 1.3, means that the best strategy for gaining some insights from diachrony into the phenomenon of control is to examine some particular instances of control constructions, with an eye to seeing what can and does change, what cannot and does not change in these constructions, and whether, given that different types of control constructions are surveyed, all types of control show the same diachronic behavior. Accordingly, several examples of the diachronic behavior of various control constructions from a number of languages — English, Greek, Albanian, and Sanskrit — are described and analyzed, some of which (namely the development of a control structure in one English expression, the control properties of the adjective for 'worthy' in various stages of English,
and the diachrony of verbs meaning 'try' in Greek) represent fairly particularized sets of data limited to individual lexical items or lexemes.

Moreover, some interesting results emerge from these particular case-studies for the proper treatment of control in linguistic theory. That is, the semantics of particular control constructions turn out to play a major role in the way the constructions develop diachronically. Thus, as becomes apparent below, these results suggest that control is best treated in the context of the lexical semantics of the verb or predicate in question, a view that has been argued for, on purely synchronic grounds, by several researchers, most notably Comrie (1983), Farkas (1988), and Ladusaw and Dowty (1988), who characterize this position as follows: “control relations . . . are a learned part of the grammar (more exactly, of the semantic interpretation of lexical items and/or compositional interpretive principles)” (p. 67).

These case studies, therefore, do shed some light on the various issues raised above and on the nature of control in general. However, they also make it clear that the many significant problems that confront anyone seriously interested in the phenomenon of control from a synchronic vantage point manifest themselves as well from the diachronic perspective. Thus, the goal here is not to provide a full account of the phenomenon of control based on the evidence of diachronic developments, but rather a more circumscribed one, namely to document various ways in which particular instances of control constructions behave diachronically, and to draw from the data whatever conclusions are warranted for the general analysis of control, however limited they may be.

2. CASE STUDY 1 — AN ENGLISH EXPRESSION

The first case to be considered involves an English expression that shows a long record of attestation in one form as a type of control structure through Middle and early Modern English but which has recently undergone a reanalysis, resulting in a change to a noncontrol structure. The expression in question is *far be it from NP to VP, as exemplified in (3):¹⁰

(3) Far be it from me to question the nature of control constructions.

While relatively fixed and somewhat idiomatic in nature, this expression does show compositional semantics, shows some open — though not entirely unrestricted — elements in it, namely the NP and VP, and moreover is parsable into constituent parts, as is demonstrated below. Thus, examining the developments with this one expression can be revealing, and is in keeping with the need for a particularistic view of language change espoused above.

This expression shows a variant form among some speakers of modern English, and with the benefit of evidence of its usage from earlier stages of English, it is possible to interpret the variation so as to allow for the determination of which variant is the innovation and thus which is indicative of a real change.

The *far be it . . . construction has a pedigree dating back at least to the Early Modern English (EME) period; the earliest available example¹¹ is from Abraham Fleming's A Panoply of Epistles from 1576:

(4) ... Bee it farre from me to utter any such speache.

All such instances of this construction, including its continuation in Modern English, appear to involve an obligatory control structure, with the empty subject of the infinitive, e.g., *to utter in (4), always interpreted as identical with the object of the preposition *from (cf. in Modern English the impossibility of sentences such as *Far be it from me for John to utter such a word). As far as Modern English is concerned, the internal structure of this construction¹² is something like that indicated in (5):¹³

(5) s [NP [it] vP [be A [far PP [from me]] s [PRO vP [to question ...]]]]

with *from me as a prepositional phrase selected by far, and thus with *me as a thematic element, being the object of the selected preposition. That this prepositional phrase structure is correct, with *from me forming a constituent, is shown by the fact that it can be fronted with at least marginal acceptability:

(6) ?From me, be it far to question the analysis of control structures.

It is likely that the structure in (5) is valid as well for earlier realizations of this expression. At the very least, the occurrence of the preposition *from is motivated by the meaning of *far, so that presumably *far originally selected *from as its complement; accordingly, the prepositional phrase would have been an immediate sister constituent of *far.

What makes this construction relevant to the present discussion is
that it also shows in Modern English a variant with a different
ostensible preposition, for, as in (7):\footnote{14}

(7) Far be it for me to question the nature of control con-
structions.

The variant of this construction shown in (7) is likely to be an
innovation away from that in (4), largely because the earliest form of
the construction is as above in (4), and in all its attestations before
recent years (see note 14), this construction has far from NP. Also
though, as noted above, the occurrence of from is motivated by the
meaning of far, suggesting that far from NP forms a constituent.

Given the fact that English regularly uses for to mark the subject of
an infinitive in complement structures, and further that fronting of for
NP in this construction is impossible:

(8) *For me, far be it to question the analysis of control struc-
tures

showing that for and the NP do not form a constituent, the structure of
(7) can be taken as in (9):

(9) s [NP [it] VP [be AP [far] s [COMP [for] NP [me] VP [to question . . . ]]]]
i.e., with a specified subject for the complement clause, marked with
for; as such, it is not a control structure, at least not in the same way
that (5) is. Clearly, then, something has changed between the stage (or
speakers) with (5) and that (or those) with (9), but when one starts to
examine just what has changed with regard to control, things get a bit
difficult to tease apart.

To be sure, the syntax has changed in that the bracketing and con-
stituency are different in the two variants, as the fronting test on from
NP versus for NP (cf. (6) versus (8)) indicates. Moreover, there is a
different prepositional element with that NP, for as opposed to from. In
other respects, however, there really does not seem to be a change.
Especially noteworthy is the fact that the meaning of the two variants is
exactly the same and in the surface syntax there is still only one NP
allowed in the verb phrase (excluding, as a post-verbal subject, the
expletive it), and that NP is immediately preceded by an ostensible
preposition; thus (10a) is ungrammatical in the same way that (10b) is:

(10) (a) *Far be it for me for John to question . . .
(b) *Far be it from me for John to question . . .

With regard to control, whether or not there is a change depends
on the type of analysis one assumes as dictated by one's theory. That is, if
there is a controlled PRO in the ... from NP to VP ... manifestation
but not in the innovative ... for NP to VP ... manifestation, then
clearly, it can be concluded that a construction can change from a
control-type to a noncontrol-type, and that a syntactic reanalysis or
rebracketing is involved in this change.

On the other hand, since the overall meaning of the expression is
unchanged, one might be inclined to say that the control properties — if
strictly a matter of semantics — are unchanged. The possibility of there
being only one NP to be construed with the subordinate verb (cf. (10))
would also suggest no change in semantic control properties.

It can be argued further, though, that the lexical semantics of far as a
matrix predicate have changed.\footnote{15} In particular, the change of far from
NP to far for NP involves as well a shift in thematicity for the NP. In far
from NP, the NP is thematic, as an object of a preposition selected by
far, whereas that status does not obtain in far for NP. This shift away
from thematic status for the NP would be a signal that the meaning of
far per se is somewhat different in the two forms of the construction.
Moreover, this shift is similar to what Higgins (1989, 1991) describes
for the development of some subject-to-subject raising constructions in
English out of earlier control structures, e.g., with promise, and thus the
developments in this expression may be one more instantiation of a
general shift in English away from certain types of thematic construc-
tions.

Thus it is clear that there has been a syntactic change in this
expression and that a change in the lexical semantics of far has
occurred as well. It is not clear, however, what the relationship between
these two changes is, and this is where the basically unresolved nature
of the analysis of control synchronically impinges on a clear determi-
nation of what is going on diachronically. In particular, did the syntactic
reanalysis to a noncontrol structure occur first leading to a change in
the semantics of far as a matrix predicate, or did the semantics of far
shift first, leading to a readjustment of the syntax of its complement?
Put in other terms, is the change in the syntax of control here a primary
change that triggered a change in lexical semantics or is it a secondary
change brought on by the change in the meaning of far?

This example, therefore, is certainly relevant to a discussion of
control in that it documents a way in which there can be movement
away from a control construction in the syntactic sense. However,
without a resolution from the synchronic side of where to locate control, it must be admitted that examining diachrony here does not solve problems but instead contributes added fuel to the fires of discussion.

There is, however, more to say concerning this construction in the context of the diachrony of control. In particular, the earliest apparent example of this expression\(^\text{16}\) is not the 1576 example given above, but rather the following from John Wyclif's *The Holy Bible* from 1382 with a finite *that*-clause as the complement:

\[
(11) \quad \text{Joseph answerde, Fere be it fro me, that Y thus do}
\]

(Literally: “...far be it from me that I thus do”)

\[
\text{(Genesis xlii, 17).}
\]

Assuming that this example is indicative of the general pattern with this expression, it is noteworthy that it shows a type of control, in that *me*, as the object of *fro*, is coreferent with the complement-clause subject, *Y* (i.e., ‘I’), and presumably had to be, since it is hard to imagine what *far be it fro me that you thus do* could even mean. One must consider then what the introduction of nonfinite complementation into this construction — the type illustrated above in (3) and continuing on into Modern English for most speakers, as in (4) — would mean; in *far be it from NP to VP*, there is presumably an empty controlled subject while in *far be it from NP that NP VP*, there is the equivalent of control into a finite clause. Admittedly, control may be defined syntactically in some approaches such that it only refers to constructions with empty NP slots; in that case, one would have to say that the introduction of nonfinite complementation would mean the gain of a control structure.

If, on the other hand, “control” is used in the broad sense indicated herein at the outset, namely to describe the apparently obligatory coreference between the two NPs in the finite complement manifestation of this expression, then the presence of control is stable across time and all that is witnessed in the change between ME and ENE is a change in the morphological spelling out of the complement (a view that might suggest that the infinitival clause is indeed a sentence and not just a *Verb Phrase*); this view would be consistent with taking control to be essentially a semantic phenomenon.\(^\text{17}\)

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3. CASE STUDY 2 — CHANGE IN COMPLEMENTATION WITH WORTHY IN ENGLISH

A somewhat similar example, though one for which the facts seem a little less clear, even in Modern English, comes from the history of the English adjective *worthy* (OE *wyrdig*, ME *wyrd*) when it occurred with a personal subject.\(^\text{18}\) In early stages of English, this adjective, when taking a personal subject, could occur with a *that*-clause as complement, as in the following example from the Old English version of the parable of the Prodigal Son (*Luke* 15:19, 21):

\[
(12) \quad \text{ic ne eom wyrdæ dæt ic}
\]

I/NOM not am worthy COMP I

\[
\text{dī n sunu beo genenned}
\]

your son/NOM be/3SG called/PPL

'I am not worthy to be called your son'

(literally: “I am not worthy that I be called your son”)

It is not clear from this one example whether this construction with *wyrdig* exhibits control properties; however, the range of readily available Old English examples suggests that there is always an occurrence in the complement clause of a noun phrase coreferent with the personal subject of *wyrdig*, so that, for the sake of argument, it can be assumed that the pattern exemplified by (12) was the only type available in Old English.

What is interesting from the perspective adopted here is that in later stages of English, including Modern English, the complementation with *worthy* has changed, so that now only a nonfinite complement, an infinitive with *to* or a gerund, seems to be possible; a Middle English example (again from the OED) and some Modern English examples are given in (13):

\[
(13) \quad \text{(a) ... dæt we may ... be worði in bliss to dwell}
\]

'that we may be worthy to dwell in bliss’

(*The Rule of St. Benet* 228 (c.1400))

\[
\text{(b) I am not worthy to be called your son}
\]

\[
\text{(c) I am not worthy of being called your son.}
\]

It is not entirely obvious what the control properties of this construction are. In particular, while it seems clear that there must be a
controlled referent (i.e., an empty category or understood argument) in the complement clause, as the ungrammaticality of (14a) shows, it is less certain what the status of sentences such as (14b) through (14d) are in which the controlled referent is an object; they sound odd but may be at least marginally acceptable:

(14) (a) * John is worthy for us to see Mary.
    (b) ? John is worthy of our calling him a friend.
    (c) ?? John is worthy for us to call him a friend.
    (d) ?? John is worthy for us to call Ø a friend.

To the extent that sentences like (14b) through (14d) are acceptable, worthy is not an obligatory subject-control predicate, and may instead be parallel in its structure to a predicate like ready. However, to focus just on the clearest cases, inasmuch as the judgments of (14b) through (14d) are not clear-cut, it appears that the most usual form of a complement clause with worthy when it has a personal subject, in both Middle English and Modern English, has an understood subject of a nonfinite complement verb controlled by the subject of worthy.

Working, then, from what is most usual with this adjective, it appears that between Old English and Middle English and on into Modern English, the change in complement type has not affected the control properties; in particular, Middle English examples with infinitival complements, e.g., (13a), seem to have only the control interpretation, and together with the Modern English nonfinite complement type of (13b) at least, these infinitival constructions appear to be the continuation of the Old English finite complement type.

Thus again, as with the case of far be it . . . discussed above, the question that must be confronted is to determine what has really changed with respect to control. And again, it appears that the only real change has been in the morphological spelling-out of the complement clause: finite in Old English but with a controlled overt subject, nonfinite in Middle and Modern English and again with a controlled empty subject; the meaning is the same across the different stages and the control properties remain constant.

4. CASE STUDY 3 — ‘TRY’ IN ANCIENT AND MODERN GREEK

The next case study involves facts from Greek. In Modern Greek, the verb prospáthó ‘try’, as illustrated in (15), at first appears to exhibit syntactic control properties, with a missing overt subject in the complement clause that might be construed as a PRO element:

(15) θα προσπαθήσω na έτσι
    FUT try/1SG SUBJUNC come/1SG
    ‘I will try to come’.

Closer inspection however reveals that the complement verb is fully finite and that moreover a subject can be present in the complement clause, as in (16), suggesting that the absence of the subject in (15) might be a matter of unemphatic subject pronoun drop, thus involving the element pro and not any special type of control phenomenon from the syntactic standpoint:

(16) θα προσπαθήσω na ἐτσι εγώ
    FUT try/1SG SUBJUNC come/1SG I/NOM
    ‘I will try to come’.

Thus if Modern Greek prospáthó is a control verb, it would only be so semantically; from a syntactic point of view prospáthó would show the equivalent of control into a finite clause, i.e., only in the broad sense identified at the outset, and not in the strict sense, inasmuch as there seems not to be a missing subject akin to PRO in the complement clause.

Moreover, Philippaki-Warburton (e.g. in Philippaki-Warburton (1987) and Philippaki-Warburton and Catsimali (1989)) has claimed that Modern Greek, as (16) suggests, in fact does not have the empty category PRO. She gives two arguments for this position.

First, on the theory-internal grounds, PRO should be ungoverned, yet the presence of an AGR node in the complement clause, as indicated by the agreement on the verb in (15), would place PRO in a governed position; such a conflict between the properties of AGR and those of PRO could be avoided if there were no PRO in the complement. Second, the empty subject in the complement of prospáthó has free reference, that is, without control from another subject NP. As the sentences in (17) show, prospáthó in Modern Greek has an apparently unusual feature which seems to correlate with the possibility, due to (16), of taking this verb not to be a control verb in the strict syntactic sense; more particularly, the complement of prospáthó can have a subject that is different from that of the main verb:
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Since the complement verb in the Modern Greek construction — as are virtually all complement verbs in Modern Greek — is finite, marked for person and number of its subject and overtly tensed as well, one might think that there has been a change in control possibilities with ‘try’ between Ancient and Modern Greek and moreover that the change is likely to be linked to the nonavailability of nonfinite complements in the modern language, an option which passed out of the language in the late Medieval period, roughly the 15th or 16th century; it would thus seem that this apparent change could provide some confirmation of aspects of the definition and distribution of PRO, in particular that it is not possible with finite complementation. Indeed, an account of this type with regard to the dichotomy of such structures in Greek was put forth by Philippaki-Warburton (1987) (though given up in her later work — see below) and has been discussed (though ultimately rejected) in Iatridou (1988).

It is important though to be cautious here, for what is evident in the history of this construction may only be an apparent change, not an actual one. There are several reasons for this. First, it has been suggested, by Horrocks (1987), and further supported by Philippaki-Warburton and Catsimali (1989), that Ancient Greek did not have PRO in this context and in fact did not have PRO at all. Though their argument is based largely on the theory-internal considerations that infinitives in Ancient Greek regularly assign accusative case to their subjects and that such a property conflicts, when infinitives have PRO subjects, with the definition of PRO as being unable to receive case, it is possible to cite additional evidence to support this idea, at least as far as the verb ‘try’ is concerned. In particular, peiráto: shows exactly the pattern of Modern Greek prosopátho: allowing a finite complement with a “control” meaning, as in (20a), and a finite complement with a subject different from that of the matrix verb, as in (20b):24

(17) (a) eyó prosopáthisa m’ óli mu ti ḍinamí
I/NOM tried/1SG with all my the- strength
na érθis
SUBJUNC come/2SG
‘I tried with all my might for you to come’

(b) prosopátho na érθi o jánis
try/1SG SUBJUNC come/3SG the- John/NOM
‘I try for John to come’.

Such a situation is not found with empty categories in a language like English, for example, where either the empty category is controlled by another NP or it has arbitrary reference. Thus, Philippaki-Warburton concludes that the structural and referential properties of complement subjects in control sentences in Modern Greek point to the absence of PRO, at least with prosopátho.22

Turning now to Ancient Greek, in that stage of the language, one finds that, at first glance again, at least one of the verbs meaning ‘try’, peiráto: seems to be a control verb and apparently meets the criteria for having PRO in its complement. It governs an infinitive which does not have an overt subject and the interpretation of such constructions — to the extent that one can be sure in dealing with a language known only through texts — always seems to be a “control” interpretation (i.e., not with some indefinite subject but one understood as coreferent with the matrix subject), e.g.:

(18) méte tis ársen / peiráto: diákérsai
nor any- male/NOM try/3SG.IMPV cut-through/INF
emón épos
my- word
‘Nor let any male (god) try to cut through my word!’ (Iliad 8.7–8).

If the syntax of (18), with a complement infinitive, is at all like the syntax of the corresponding English translation, one would expect the structure of (18) to be as in (19), with PRO as the missing subject of the infinitive diákérsai:

(19) [tis ársen peiráto: [PRO diákérsai emón épos].

(20) (a) peíra hápos ken dé:
try/2SG.IMPV COMP MOD now
sēn patrída gaían híkeai
your- home- land/ACC come/2SG.SUBJUNC
‘Try to come (back) to your homeland’ (Odyssey 4.545)
(literally: “Try that you come (back) . . .”)

(20) (b) peíra hápos ken dé:
try/2SG.IMPV COMP MOD now
sēn patrída gaían híkeai
your- home- land/ACC come/2SG.SUBJUNC
‘Try to come (back) to your homeland’ (Odyssey 4.545)
(literally: “Try that you come (back) . . .”)

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(20) (a) peíra hápos ken dé:
try/2SG.IMPV COMP MOD now
sēn patrída gaían híkeai
your- home- land/ACC come/2SG.SUBJUNC
‘Try to come (back) to your homeland’ (Odyssey 4.545)
(literally: “Try that you come (back) . . .”)

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‘Try to come (back) to your homeland’ (Odyssey 4.545)
(literally: “Try that you come (back) . . .”)
(b) peirán d' hôs ke trôes...
try/INF but COMP MOD Trojans/NOM
árkösoi... (Iliad 4.66-7)
be-first/3PL.SUBJUNCT
'...to try (to make it such) that the Trojans are the first ...

Thus, to the extent that (15) through (17) suggested the absence of PRO with 'try' in Modern Greek, so too would (20) point to there being no PRO in Ancient Greek.

If this analysis is correct, then there is no change in the structure for 'try' between Ancient Greek and Modern Greek beyond a change in the morphological expression of the complement verb. A change in complement verb type, however, while a real change to be sure, must be treated as one that is independent of what happened in control constructions, since it occurred as well in constructions with overt and uncontrolled subjects, as shown by the examples in (21) from Medieval Greek with a circumstantial or temporal adjunct to the sentence that can have an infinitive or, later, a finite verb, both with an overt subject (autón in (21a), hoi árhkontes in (21b)):

(21) (a) kai tò aneltheí autón kratoúsi tás
and ART return/INF him/ACC hold/3PL the-
kheíras autoú
hands/ACC his
'And at his returning, they hold his hands'
(literally: "And the him to return,...")
(C. Porphyrogenitou, De Caeremoniis I.148.11 (10th c.))

(b) tò akoúson hoi árhkontes,
ART hear/3PL it the- leaders/NOM
megálos ethaúmasan
greatly were-puzzled/3PL
'On hearing it, the leaders were greatly puzzled'
(literally: "The the leaders hear it, they...")
(Chronicle of Morea 895 (P) (14th c.)).

Control structures in Greek, then, would show diachronic stability, rather than evidence of significant change. Although such a situation would be consistent with Hock’s claim discussed above concerning major syntactic processes across time, it is also what would be expected if control were largely semantic in nature.25

Another reason for being cautious here and declaring this situation to reveal only an “apparent” change has to do with the semantics of the lexical items involved, suggesting, as in the previous case-studies, that lexical semantics are what is crucial in the understanding of control. In particular, the Modern Greek verb prospátho is not the direct lineal descendant of any Ancient Greek verb meaning ‘try’, deriving instead from Ancient Greek prospáthēo: ‘feel passionate love for’; the Ancient Greek verb peirâo: is not continued directly in Modern Greek, so that there has been lexical replacement here. However, prospátho and peirâo: seem similar enough in the relevant ways to allow for a meaningful comparison here.

Nonetheless, the question can be raised with regard to these lexical items of whether peirâo: in the “control” sense, i.e., its use with an infinitival or like-subject finite complement, really means the same as peirâo: in its noncontrol sense, i.e., its use with a non-like-subject finite complement; a similar question is possible concerning Modern Greek prospátho in its use with a like-subject complement versus its use with a non-like-subject complement. What these facts suggest, then, is that it is legitimate to take issue with the attributing of obligatory control properties to the lexical item per se; that is, prospátho and peirâo: as noncontrol verbs seem to mean not ‘try’ but rather something like ‘facilitate’, i.e., ‘I facilitate it so (i.e., aid in causing it to come about) that John comes’,26 which would seem to demand not a subject-controlled subordinate subject slot but instead something else, e.g., a freely selected nominal as subordinate subject.

This interpretation of the meanings of prospátho and peirâo: would lead to the conclusion that there is no real change between Ancient Greek and Modern Greek with regard to the syntax and control properties of ‘try’ (regardless of Philippaki-Warburton’s analyses): in the meaning ‘try’, the verb shows control; in other meanings, it does not. The meaning ‘try’ was associated with an infinitival complement and control semantics in Ancient Greek and gave way to the finite complementation with a controlled subject, after the loss of the infinitive; on the other hand, the meaning ‘facilitate’ in Ancient Greek was associated with a finite complement and gave way to the finite complementation
with a freely referring uncontrolled subject. This scenario, then, would be a reflection of the view mentioned earlier that control is tied to particular meanings of a given lexical item rather than the syntactic properties associated with a lexical item, so that it is the meaning associated with a particular phonetic string representing a single lexical item, not the string itself, that is crucial in the development of these verbs. These results again, therefore, are consistent with the view that control is a matter of lexical semantics and not, strictly speaking, a matter of syntax at all.27

Thus, the examination of the diachrony of the situation here points in the direction of a conclusion reached by others on purely synchronic grounds, concerning the relation between lexical semantics and control. While the diachronic perspective afforded here does not resolve these issues, it does serve to put the spotlight on them; these issues are still very much up in the air when viewed strictly from a synchronic perspective.28 Diachronic evidence therefore is of great value insofar as it can sharpen what the relevant issues are and point towards a particular theoretical position concerning them.

5. CASE STUDY 4 — CONTROL AND LANGUAGE CONTACT

The developments — changes as well as nonchanges — that have been examined so far may fairly be characterized as purely “internal” in nature, i.e., to the extent that the actual causes of these developments can be determined, they seem to be the result of factors that are entirely internal to the respective linguistic systems. For example, in the case of far be it from me to VERB → far be it for me to VERB, it appears that there was a reanalysis of a structurally ambiguous sequence which may have altered the structure of the control expression, while in the case of English worthy or Greek complementation, there was a change in subcategorization, from one complement-type to another that was gaining in frequency in the language and becoming the preferred and prevailing type (a mechanism referred to in Joseph 1983; Chapter 7) as the “snowball effect”), though interestingly the result is finite complementation in Greek but nonfinite complementation in English. Thus it seems that internally-motivated change can have an effect on the syntax of control constructions, leading under some conditions to the loss of a control structure per se (e.g., with the reanalysis of far be it from me . . . to far be it for me . . . or under some accounts of the developments with ‘try’ in Greek), or to the gain of a control structure per se (e.g., under some interpretations of the effect of the extension of nonfinite complementation into use with worthy).

It is well-known, though, that external factors can lead to language change, especially in cases of language contact.29 One such instance in which language contact had an effect on an apparent control construction comes from a consideration of some data from two dialects of Albanian. The evidence for a change in this case is based on an interpretation of a difference in the range of possible interpretations available for a nonfinite sentential adjunct, traditionally called the “gerundive” or “gerund”, in Arvanitika, the Albanian spoken in Greece, and in the Albanian spoken in Albania (basically the Tosk dialect), which can be referred to by its native designation of Shqip.

The adjunct in question, parallel somewhat to English -ing forms in sentences such as Walking down the street, I met John, has the same form in both Shqip and Arvanitika, consisting of the element duke followed by the participle, e.g., duke kënduar ‘singing’ (though Arvanitika also has a variant with tuse). This form always occurs without an overt subject, and so some interpretation for this empty subject is needed; as such, this is a control structure in a broad sense at least, even though it involves control into a clausal adjunct of a sentence and not a clausal argument.

In Shqip the gerundive can be construed as controlled by either the subject of the main clause or the object (the factors governing the choice between the two controllers being irrelevant here), as in (examples from Newmark et al. (1982: 97–98)):

(22) (a) njëriu po afrohej duke
    the-man/NOM PROG approached/3SG
cœur
    walk/GRNDV
    ‘The man was approaching by walking’

(b) pashë në rrugë një tufe kalorësh
    saw/1SG on- road a- bunch/ACC riders/GEN
duke ikur
    go/GRNDV
    ‘I saw a bunch of riders going on the road’
    (i.e., ‘as they were going on the road’)
In Arvanitika, however, according to Tsitsipis (1981:347), to the extent that this form occurs at all — and its use has diminished as Arvanitika enters the first stages of language death — the gerundive only occurs controlled by a subject; thus there are no examples parallel to (22b—c), only ones like (22a), e.g., (Tsitsipis (1981:350)):

(23) nani duke marr mirëducka GRNDV smell remember/1SG
    'Now I remember (it) by smelling' (literally: "... by taking a smell")
    (*... (it) as it smells).

A comparison of Shqip and Arvanitika here means that one of the languages has innovated a different range of control possibilities for the gerundive, and it seems that Arvanitika is the one that has changed for the simple reason that whereas there is no obvious motivation for a change in Shqip, there is a ready explanation for why Arvanitika might have changed, namely through contact with Greek. 30

Greek, as it happens, has a verbal form that is quite parallel to the Albanian gerundive, and this is the nonfinite form in -ondas, as in:

(24) ojánis dulevi trayuondas GRNDV
    the-John/NOM works/3SG sing
    'John works (while singing).

What is interesting about these adjuncts from the point of view of possibility for changes with control structures is that in Greek, the -ondas forms can only be construed with the subject of the main clause; thus in (25), there is no ambiguity:

(25) ojánis sinándise tin maría perpatóndas the-John/NOM met/3SG the- Mary/ACC walk/grndv
    s to drómo on the- the road
    'John met Mary while he/*she was walking on the road'.

It seems likely, therefore, that the innovative restriction of gerundive control in Arvanitika is the result of contact with Greek, through the medium of bilingualism, for most Arvanitika speakers are bilingual in Arvanitika and Greek, with Greek actually being by far the dominant language for the vast majority of speakers. It can be concluded, then, that control phenomena in one language can change under pressure from another language.

The question consequently to be considered is whether the fact that control can be affected by language contact has any significance for issues in the analysis of control. The answer is that it might, if one adheres to a view that only certain aspects of a language or a grammar can be borrowed. Indeed, some scholars have argued that "grammar," i.e., morphology and syntax, is the most resistant part of a language to change through language contact; as Thomason and Kaufman (1988:14—5) point out: "Givon believes that 'it is relatively unlikely for languages to "borrow grammar"," because borrowing grammar would be disruptive 'for the interlocking, highly nonarbitrary part of the system' (1979:26). If such a constraint on linguistic borrowing and more generally on contact-induced change were valid, then the Arvanitika developments with the gerundive might give some support for the view that control is essentially semantic in nature, and thus that Arvanitika has adopted Greek semantics for gerundive interpretation. Such a line of reasoning, though, however promising it may seem, simply cannot be maintained, for Thomason and Kaufman (1988:14—34) go on to demonstrate conclusively that any aspect of a language — grammar as well as phonology and lexicon — is a potential target for change through contact given the right social conditions. In other words, there are no grammatical prerequisites to or constraints on contact-induced change.

Under this view, the main interest of these Arvanitika developments lies in their providing another example of change in control construc-
tions. However, these developments are different in nature from the other ones examined so far. What is at issue here is the range of readings that the gerundive can enter into; thus the change is not a structural one, for the Arvanitika and the Shqip gerundive are morphologically and syntactically identical, but rather constitutes a change in the semantics. Here too, then, the focal point in the change in a control construction is semantic and not syntactic; thus even though the issue here is not lexical semantics as in the earlier case-studies, nonetheless, semantics seem to be crucially involved.

It is possible, though, to go a bit further in evaluating the significance of these developments. One can speculate that what allows for the contact-induced change here is the fact that this change involves control into an adjunct (a gerundive in this case) and not into an argument. Although it is difficult to prove, it would seem to be a reasonable claim to predict that the basic argument structure of a verb would not change in contact situations, i.e., that a control verb like persuade would not change its meaning to that of a noncontrol verb.31 Thus, if a survey of contact situations led to the result that adjunct control is somewhat “volatile” while argument control is not, then evidence from change through contact would provide a further basis, from language change, for distinguishing between the two types of control. Admittedly, since this distinction is well-motivated and well-supported based on synchronic evidence, it would be surprising if the language change evidence indicated otherwise; nonetheless, support for a particular theoretical notion or construct from any quarter is not to be ignored.32

Indeed, it is likely that one need not restrict oneself just to contact-induced changes in evaluating such a claim, for there is evidence — taken up in the next section — to suggest a volatility in adjunct control even with changes that are internally motivated.

6. CASE STUDIES 5 AND 6 — INTERNALLY MOTIVATED CHANGES IN ADJUNCT CONTROL

The change in Arvanitika gerundive control is not simply some sort of aberration found in a contact situation,33 for similar shifts in the range of allowable readings with a clausal adjunct are found in other languages. In Modern Greek, for example, the gerundive form in -ondas (such as trayudóndas above in (24)) derives historically from the accusative (singular) form of the present active participle, e.g., Ancient Greek tragoûndōna ‘(one who is) singing/ACC’, with the addition of what must be the nominative singular (masculine) ending -s. Presumably, therefore, at some point in Post-Classical Greek, a participial form that was “controlled” by an object, i.e., an accusative, nominal came to be construed with a subject, i.e., a nominative, nominal, thus giving the reading now found with only subject control of the gerundive (as illustrated in (25) above). Such a derivation for the Modern Greek gerundive therefore suggests that within the history of Greek, a change in control properties of the participle as a verbal adjunct took place.

Similarly, in Sanskrit, the verbal adjunct usually referred to as the absolutive or gerund shifted from having in passive sentences a preferred reading in which it was controlled by the surface subject, as in (26), to a preferred reading in which it was controlled by the underlying (logical) subject, a surface oblique in the instrumental case, as in (27) (cf. Hock (1986:362–366) for discussion and some references):

(26) niśayā... havyā babhūtha (asmabhīh)
sit-down/GER to-be-invoked are/2SG.PERF us/INST
‘Having sat down, you are to be invoked (by us)’
(= ‘You having sat down..., ≠ “...by us who have sat...
(27) hiranyā svānam upasya agnih
pure-gold/ACC put-on/GER fire/NOM
ādhyeyah (kena cit)
to-be-replenished someone/NOM
‘Having put on a piece of pure gold, the fire should be replenished (by someone)’
(= “Someone having put...”, ≠ “The fire having put...”)

Change in the control properties of verbal adjuncts, then, is not a phenomenon restricted to language contact situations. These examples show that such changes can take place, whether induced by language contact or arising spontaneously. There is thus nothing to be said, based on these changes, regarding the domain of grammar in which control resides, as might be possible if such changes were restricted to contact
situations and if only certain components of a grammar were subject to change through contact.

However, the fact that it is relatively easy to find examples of changes in adjunct control — and the variability in adjunct interpretation evident in English “dangling” modifiers (see footnote 29) provides another ready example — suggests that there really is a difference in the diachronic behavior of adjuncts as opposed to arguments, with arguments showing greater stability than adjuncts. Accordingly, then, linguistic theory should make available some mechanism for the differential treatment of these two types of control synchronically in order for the diachronic facts to be properly accounted for. 34 This conclusion is not a dramatic one, but it is nonetheless consistent with what is known about control constructions from purely synchronic evidence. Thus, here too, a consideration of the diachrony of control constructions highlights an important feature of their synchronic analysis.

7. CASE STUDY 7 — A POSSIBLE DIACHRONIC GENERALIZATION FROM GREEK RAISING

As a last area in which a diachronic view might help to shed some light on theoretical issues concerning control, some further facts from the history of Greek complementation can be taken up. 35 An examination of a set of Greek complement structures reveals a possible generalization that can be made based on how they behave diachronically and more particularly, how they change when the shift in Greek complementation alluded to earlier took place so that nonfinite complementation was replaced by finite complementation. It must be pointed out that the structures in question do not change all at the same time, so there is not a situation in which simultaneous changes give evidence for some analysis or theoretical construct, of the sort described by Lightfoot (1979) with regard to the English modals or by Joseph (1986; 1990: Appendix) with regard to raising and reflexivization in Greek. Nonetheless, an identical change ultimately affects all the constructions in question, and that fact makes this case worthy of consideration. In particular, it allows for a generalization to be made over the three constructions, thereby pointing in the direction of a unified synchronic analysis for them.

The relevant constructions are given in (28), with conventional labelling from the terminology of early transformational grammar:

(28) (a) Subject-to-Object Raising
(b) Subject-to-Subject Raising
(c) Tough Movement (“Object-to-Subject Raising”).

These constructions are taken in some theories to be instantiations of the same basic syntactic process; for example, in Relational Grammar, all three are treated as ascensions, i.e., constructions in which a nominal that is thematically and semantically associated with a complement clause verb takes on a grammatical relation in a higher clause. In other theoretical frameworks, however, they are treated differentially; in the Government and Binding framework, for example, Subject-to-Object Raising is taken as an instance of Exceptional Case Marking, Subject-to-Subject Raising as an instance of NP-Movement, and Tough-Movement as an A-bar Binding construction. Thus the question of the sameness of these constructions is as yet an unresolved issue. Accordingly, the evidence to be presented here from their diachronic development is potentially quite important for shedding some light on their proper analysis.

Each construction in Ancient Greek was quite similar to the corresponding pattern in English, with an infinitive in the complement clause that was missing an argument, either a subject, in the case of (28a, b), or an object, in the case of (28c). Thus, these constructions took the forms indicated in (29), where the English “glosses” stand for the lexical item or items — more accurately, a class of items, for more predicates than just want, seem, and difficult occur in the respective patterns of (29) — that would be found in the Greek and Ø stands for a missing argument with the infinitive. 37

(29) (a) NP1, want/expect/etc. NP1, INFINITIVE
(b) NP1, seem/be-likely/etc. Ø1, INFINITIVE
(c) NP1, be-difficult/easy/etc. (NP1), INFINITIVE Ø1.

When these constructions were affected by the change from nonfinite to finite complementation, the following structures resulted:

(30) (a) NP1, expect NP1, [(COMP) PRONOUN, VERB]
(b) NP1, seem [(COMP) PRONOUN, VERB]
(c) NP1, be-difficult [(COMP) NP1, VERB PRONOUN1].

Some real examples from Modern Greek are given in (31). 38
(31a) *eyó* periméno ton jání, na fíji
I/NOM expect/1SG the- John/ACC SBJNC leave/3SG
afíó, (o fíjos)
he/NOM the-same/NOM
'I expect John (himself) to leave' (literally: "I expect John that he (himself) leave")

(b) *i kléftes, fénonde na skotónun*
the-thieves/NOM seem/3PL SBJNC kill/3PL
ton iðjoktítí tu mayazjí móno aftí, the-owner/ACC the-store/GEN only they/NOM
'Only the thieves seem to be killing the owner of the store' (literally: "The thieves seem that only they are killing the owner of the store")

(c) *ta jeraniká, ínë dískola na ta,*
the-German/NOM.PL are difficult SBJNC them
milísíso sostá
speak/3SG correctly
'German is difficult for you to speak correctly' (literally: "The German are difficult that you speak them correctly").

Although irrelevant to the interpretation of the facts pursued here, it should be noted that Greek is a language with subject-pronoun-drop, so that the most usual form of the raising constructions given above with subject pronouns in the complement clause actually does not have that subject pronoun overtly, i.e.: 

(32a) *eyó* periméno ton jání na fíji
'I expect John to leave'

(b) *i kléftes fénonde na skotónun* ton iðjoktítí tu mayazjí
'The thieves seem to be killing the owner of the store'.

What these constructions have in common is that they involve what may be called "derived" control, i.e., control of a complement clause pronominal element by a main clause element that is not thematically connected with the main clause predicate, in much the same way as the

look like construction in English — if a Raising construction (see notes 1 and 42) — illustrated in (1) above. This is obviously so in the Subject-to-Subject Raising construction — perhaps the least controversial of all three in terms of its analysis — but also in the tough-movement construction. These developments allow for a diachronic generalization to be made, namely that Ancient Greek "derived" control constructions with missing complement arguments developed into control constructions in which a complement pronominal came to be "controlled" (in the relevant sense for the present discussion, i.e., not a free-choice element or arbitrary reference) by a main clause nominal.

This generalization is of theoretical interest for two reasons. First, it shows that all three constructions behaved alike diachronically when the replacement of infinitival complementation reached them. They were not affected by this replacement of complementation possibilities at the same time, but when they were affected, they "responded" in parallel fashion, each developing into a derived control construction with an obligatory copy pronoun. In this way, they differed from other constructions, for example Infinitival Relatives, that had infinitival complementation in Ancient Greek but which did not end up requiring an obligatory pronoun with the shift to finite complementation. Thus, their parallel diachronic development can be taken as an indication that they should be analyzed in parallel fashion synchronically.

Second, the only way for the 'expect' construction in (31a) to be brought in under the generalization is to adopt an analysis involving subject-to-object raising by which nominals such as *ton jání* are taken to be main-clause nonthematic elements that control a thematic complement clause pronominal. Thus, if this is a "linguistically significant generalization", then there is an argument from diachrony for the (currently disfavored) analysis of Greek 'expect'-sentences such as (31a) as being constructions with subject-to-object raising out of a finite clause such that there is a copy of the "raised" nominal in that finite clause. 42

There are admittedly a few points at which this line of argument can be attacked, including whether or not the suggested generalization is in fact a "linguistically significant" one or even a diachronically significant one given that its effects were manifested at different stages and not at all once for the various constructions (see note 40), and the extent to which the Modern Greek data given here is fully representative (see note 38). Still, the overall effect is to show the potential power of using
diachronic developments with control constructions to reveal something important about synchronic linguistic analysis, in this case, pointing the way — under certain assumptions — to a clear account of an otherwise controversial construction.

8. CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion of these several case-studies has brought to light several ways in which diachronic perspectives contribute toward an understanding of control constructions. Most significant is the fact that many of the diachronic developments surveyed point to the importance of lexical semantics for the analysis of control, and are thus consistent with the treatments of control found in works such as Farkas (1988) and Ladusaw and Dowty (1988). Other contributions — the need for the distinction between arguments and adjuncts in control structures and the analysis of a controversial construction in Modern Greek — are less striking perhaps but no less real as contributions. Still, it must be admitted that there are some limitations on the utility of diachronic evidence in this area of investigation, stemming from the fact that there may be little new light to be gained from examining the diachrony of control that is not already shed by the purely synchronic perspectives represented in the literature. On another interpretation, however, this discussion merely presents the most realistic view to take, and it is heartening that the same issues that seem so difficult to tease apart diachronically with regard to control are the same types of problems that have been plaguing those interested in the synchronic analysis of control. Moreover, the case-studies discussed here provide further illustrations of control constructions that can be added to the range of data that need to be dealt with in any adequate theory of control, especially under the view advocated here (see (2) above) that synchronic and diachronic analysis complement each other.

Some points about methodology are in order, by way of conclusion. Most of the examples discussed here — those from English, Greek, and Sanskrit in particular — have involved the observation of a construction or set of constructions, in the case of the English examples not even a general pattern but instead the highly specific syntax of a single lexical item or expression (*far be it...*, *be worthy...*), in a single language as it unfolds through time. Basically, the starting point for a construction and an arbitrary endpoint defined by the presence of some apparent change have been examined, and interpretations of the changes have been advanced on the assumption that a comparison of two such stages is revealing. In the case of the Albanian example, a similar approach was employed, but the starting point was induced through the use of the Comparative Method, comparing Arvanitika with Shqip and making an inference about which pattern was more innovative and which more archaic. This general approach leads to three important methodological observations.

First, as suggested at the outset, syntactic change — indeed all types of change — probably needs to be dealt with in terms of the syntax of individual elements, at most construction-types, rather than overarching patterns (as is customary for example with most word-order change studies). General patterns are great when they are truly general, but speakers probably focus more on smaller chunks of data than linguists usually do (making what Joseph and Janda (1988) call “local generalizations”), and so the construction — and more specifically the lexical items that are manifestations of a particular construction — is probably the right level at which to seek an understanding of syntactic change.43

Second, though its utility in diachronic syntax has sometimes been disputed, the comparative method is in fact useful (as in the Albanian case) when applied appropriately and with caution; the necessary caution here comes with respect to judging which of the Albanian dialects was innovative and which retentive. Presumably, then, other examples relevant for the study of control in diachrony can be found with this methodology; an example that may prove a fruitful area would be the various differences in control structures that Comrie (1985) discusses for German in comparison to English. Assuming that German and English shared a similar control structure type at least at the Proto-West-Germanic stage, then the current differences are the result of change on the part of one or the other (or even both) of the languages.

Finally, such an approach naturally leaves out a consideration of the mechanism of change itself, an understanding of which might be available only through the micro-examination of finely cut successive synchronic layers or, more realistically, through an examination of the outcome of synchronic variation. Some linguists, e.g., Lightfoot (1988), speak of a child's "triggering experience" — the linguistic environment coupled with the "filtering" effect of Universal Grammar — which leads to syntactic change as children develop a grammar for the linguistic data they hear around them; while this view has something to recom-
recommend it as a possible starting point for at least some syntactic innovations, it seems difficult to maintain as a model for all syntactic change and for what is probably the most important aspect of understanding the phenomenon of change in a language, namely the ultimate generalization of innovations through an entire speech community.

That is, the static, "compare-two-stages" type of diachronic syntactic investigation of the sort engaged in here, to the extent that it has been revealing, only gives a small part of the overall picture at best, and certainly leaves out a major part of the study of syntactic change, namely the spread of innovations. It is of course very hard to get a feel for the dynamics of the spread of an innovation when considering data from stages of a language no longer fully accessible, but the importance of keeping this aspect of language change in mind must not be overlooked. Moreover, any detailed synchronic investigation can only sharpen the picture of possible ways in which a given structure can change and develop through time. All in all, then, the examination of control promises to be a case in which diachrony benefits synchrony and synchrony benefits diachrony, with every result thus working to everyone’s ultimate benefit.

NOTES

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1 In this regard, I follow the view of control espoused by Higgins (1989) and implicit in Hale (1989). Admittedly, the predicate look like, as David Dowty has reminded me, can under some circumstances occur in a non-like-subject construction, e.g., in a sentence such as The carpet looks like the dog has been playing in the mud again; still its more usual construction has the matrix subject and subordinate clause subject obligatorily coreferent. Moreover, look like and other predicates like it may be raising predicates (see Rogers (1972, 1974) for some discussion); nonetheless, the coreference relations indicated in the sentences in (1) illustrate a type of control, construed broadly, holding into a finite complement clause.

2 English and Greek (both Ancient and Modern) examples are given below, especially in Section 4. The Modern Persian facts are discussed in Hashempour (1988). Both
Prokosch (1938:63–4) in discussing the rarity of Verner's Law effects in Gothic states: "Verner's Law must have preceded the German accent shift ... but it is ... probable that Hirt ... is right when he ... assumes that Gothic carried out the accent shift sooner than the other Germanic languages, so that only a comparatively small group of rather isolated words were still subject to [Verner's law];" thus, in the branch of Germanic that was to become Gothic, he claims that the shift of accent to the initial syllable occurred in some words but not others, blocking Verner's Law in some words but not others, an account that is tantamount to a diffusionary view of the spread of the change.

In classifying mind you as a Verb-Subject imperative, I am following the classification found in the OED (s.v.) in which this usage reflects an intransitive sense 'pay attention'. It must be pointed out, however, that there is an earlier "quasi-reflexive" construction with mind, e.g., I mind me, you mind you, etc., from which this usage could in principle derive, though the semantics would argue against that; the meaning of the quasi-reflexive is 'remember', which is less appropriate for the sense of the modern mind you! than is the intransitive 'pay attention'. The expression believe you me seems to be another instance in Modern English of an imperative with a post-verbal subject. I would argue, moreover, that even though these are frozen expressions in a certain sense, nonetheless the verbs in them are synchronically analyzable as imperatives, and show compositional nonidiomatic semantics, so that the question of how to analyze the post-verbal pronouns is a legitimate one. Thus I do not subscribe to the view that such expressions are irrelevant for a full synchronic account of the grammar. Lightfoot (1988:310) dismisses the cooccurrence of innovative and older forms saying that "there is no 'prediction' here that ... a speaker with the new FS rule [for 'dative subject' verbs] would never utter a sentence of the old form; speakers may have used the old forms from time to time in the same way that modern speakers say by and large, me thinks, if I were you, and many other less extremely antiquated forms, or even adopt expressions of other dialect groups occasionally", even though an expression such as me thinks, unlike mind you, is distinctly noncompositional in its semantics and thus is a good candidate for having truly been lexicalized and so not subject to any synchronic parsing.

This outcome perhaps occurs less in sound change, where ultimate regularity, i.e., full generalization, of the change is the norm, but it does occur, and is certainly so for change in other domains.

My thanks to my wife, Mary E. Clark, for bringing this example to my attention.

This claim is based only on a search of the Oxford English Dictionary, and so is not necessarily a definitive dating of this construction. I hasten to add that such claims cannot be substantiated for the ENE examples though it certainly seems reasonable to assume that this manifestation of the construction has remained stable as to its structure.

I use PRO here only as a notational convenience, not because of the theoretical baggage it presupposes nor out of a commitment to a theory that operates with such empty categories. There have been several proposals concerning the status of PRO in universal grammar, e.g., that it is not a part of syntax (e.g., by Culicover and Wilkins (1986)), or that it might be best taken as assimilated to pro (e.g., in the "generalized control theory" of Huang (1987, 1989)), and linguists examining individual languages have on occasion independently proposed that particular languages do not have PRO.
The basic facts concerning 'try' in Greek have been discussed at various places in the literature, most notably in Philippaki-Warburton (1987), Philippaki-Warburton and Catsim ail (1989), Philippaki-Warburton and Catsimail (1990), and Philippaki-Warburton (1989). These facts are repeated here, however, as a prelude to the material in this section pertaining to 'try' in Ancient Greek which has not been brought to light in this context before; some of this same material is discussed, in a somewhat revised form, in Joseph (1990).

This analysis is in keeping with the prediction made in Culicover and Wilkins (1986:121, fn. 2) that in languages without infinitives, 'control' would be accomplished 'differently' from the PRO 'mechanism' posited for a language like English.

Philippaki-Warburton (1989) notes that the verb anangazo 'force' shows similar properties to prosapao:

(i) anangasa ton jani na fiji
forced/1SG the- John/ACC SUBJ/UNC leave/3SG
'I forced John to leave' (literally: 'I forced John that (he) leave')

(ii) anangasa ton jani na mii fyune
NEG leave/3PL
'I forced John that they should not leave'.

The non-PRO analysis that she advocates for prosapao should thus be extended to other control verbs.

I say "virtually" because an exception should perhaps be made for the forms found with the verb exo 'have' in what are traditionally called perfect tenses, e.g., yrapisi in exo yrapisi (ts paramithia) 'I have written (the stories)' or yramena in exo yramena (ts paramithia) 'I have (the stories) written', though admittedly such forms may not truly be complements.

The facts in (20) directly falsify the prediction made by Philippaki-Warburton and Catsimail (1989:105) that such sentences should be ungrammatical in Ancient Greek.

This discussion illustrates, by the way, the point made earlier (see note 6) regarding how dependent claims about syntactic change — or language change in general — are on particular frameworks and the analyses they entail.

My thanks to Richard Janda for this particular insight.

It must be noted that there is room for a semantically based generalization here, so that reference to "lexical" should not be taken to imply entirely idiosyncratic behavior. In particular, another verb with a meaning similar to prosapao, namely pasaxo 'try hard, endeavor', has the same noncontrol possibilities as prosapao, with the meaning in noncontrol uses of 'endeavor so that some situation comes about', i.e., similar to the 'facilitate' meaning suggested for noncontrol prosapao. Thus it may be that any lexeme with the meaning 'try' shows control while any lexeme with the meaning 'facilitate' does not, even if the same phonological material is used for each lexeme.

The discussion at the conference for which this paper was prepared, as reflected in the other papers in this volume, indicates the still-unsettled nature of these questions.

This is not to say that other types of external factors do not lead to change. A case in point with regard to control structures is the variability that can be observed with the control properties of so-called "dangling modifiers" in English prose (e.g., Walking down the street, a car hit me), in which prescriptive pressures seem to play a role in the interpretations some speakers put on such sentences.

Tsitiplis (1981:347) is careful to point out that some scholars of Albanian (e.g., Domi (1977)) argue that the "gerundial constructions as object complements were habitual only in the Gëg dialect and later infiltrated into the literary language", which is based on the Tosk dialect. Since Arvanitika is a variety of Tosk, it is possible that Tosk never had object control of the gerundive, and that the comparison between Shqip and Arvanitika discussed above is ill-founded. Nonetheless, it would then be the case, on Domi's account, that Shqip acquired the object control possibility through contact, namely as a dialect borrowing from Gëg, thus showing — in a different way from that indicated here — that control constructions can be affected by the external pressures of contact.

I am indebted to Donka Farkas for this suggestion and for her comments on the claims in this section.

For examples, even though a distinction in morphology between inflectional and derivational morphology is well-motivated synchronically and accepted in most — but not all — theories of morphological structure, the evidence of differential behavior diachronically provides further — not unwelcome — support for this distinction. In particular, levelling within inflectionally related forms (i.e., paradigms) occurs quite commonly without extending to derivationally related forms, as for example when Proto-Greek *kkhthn 'earth/NOM.SG', *kkthom-ôs 'earth/GEN.SG became kkkhthn, kkkhthn-ôs by levelling but the derived adjective, *kkhamalôs 'near/on the ground', was unaffected by the extension of the -ôs- of the nominative throughout the paradigm.

This is not to say that language contact leads to aberrations.

I leave open at this point the question of the exact form that such a mechanism should take, but it could simply involve reference to a difference in structural dominance, e.g., within the verb phrase versus external to the verb phrase, or the argument structure of governing verbs, or the like.

These facts have been discussed elsewhere (e.g., in Joseph (1978/1990, 1980, 1983)), though not from the perspective adopted here. For additional discussion of syntactic changes involving the infinitives in Greek, interpreted according to several current theoretical frameworks, as well as additional data, see Chaski (1988).

See, for instance, Perlmutter and Postal (1983), for an account of ascension rules in syntax; the generalization proposed there — the Relational Succession Law — provides some motivation for treating these constructions in a parallel fashion.

Ancient Greek examples of these constructions are given below (note that (ii) involves both Subject-to-Subject Raising and Tight Movement):

(i) alik pâbi Zeus éthel' Akhaioisín
but somehow Zeus/NOM wanted/3SG Achaeanes/DAT

(ii) thnaton póleíssai genêtathn
death/ACC many/DAT happen/INF

'But Zeus somehow wanted death to befall many Achaeanes'
gives a similar analysis for Javanese. Rogers (1972, 1974) treats at least some manifestations of the English construction with look like (and other such predicates), e.g., There looks like there's going to be a riot, as an instance of Copy Raising (see also note 1).

I realize that I have strayed from this injunction myself in a few cases, in this paper and elsewhere. This assertion is in keeping with the findings of Higgins (1989), who, in tracing the development of (subject-to-subject) raising constructions out of earlier control constructions, finds (ms. p. 3) that "English did not catch raising all at one times across a whole range of predicates. Each predicate has its own development, and there is little sign of interaction between predicates, except where analogical generalization is at work".

BIBLIOGRAPHY


HOWARD LASNIK

TWO NOTES ON CONTROL AND BINDING*

In this paper, I will be concerned with some of the distributional and interpretive properties of certain superficially subjectless non-finite VPs. Within the principles and parameters approach to syntax of Chomsky (1981; 1986) assumed here, these VPs actually do have subjects (phonetically null 'PRO') hence, are predicates of clauses. How this PRO selects an antecedent in a given structure (the theory of Control) is a major research question. And, of course, once PRO is admitted as a possible NP, an explanation of its distribution (only subject, and only of non-finite clauses) becomes another major research question.

The principles relevant to the control of PRO appear, on first inspection, to be rather similar to those involved in the assignment of antecedents to anaphors. For example, an anaphor as subject of an infinitival clause can successfully be bound by the next subject up, as in (1), just as a PRO can be bound in the parallel configuration in (2):

(1) John believes [himself to be clever]
(2) John tries [PRO to be clever]

And as subject of a finite clause, neither is permitted:

(3) * John believes [himself is clever]
(4) * John promises [PRO will attend class]
    cf. John promises [PRO to attend class]

Further, while both are allowed as the subject of a non-finite clause, in most circumstances the antecedent must be the next subject up for both:

(5) * John expects [Mary to believe [himself, to be clever]]
(6) * John expects [Mary to try [PRO, to be clever]]

However, alongside these similarities, there are striking differences: 