

SELECTION BIAS, DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS AND ABILITY EFFECTS IN COMMON VALUE AUCTION EXPERIMENTS

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Abstract

Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner's curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects. These selection effects are *not* identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects. Ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning.

JEL classification: C9, D44, C24, J16.

Key words: common value auction experiments, selection effects, econometric methods, gender and ability effects, learning.

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Common value auctions have been an active area of research in the economics literature. Initial results from Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil lease auctions (often considered the canonical example of a common value auction) suggested that bidders suffered from a winner's curse – winning bidders systematically overbidding and losing money as a consequence (E. C. Capen, R. V. Clapp and W. M. Campbell, 1971). Experiments designed to investigate this claim have shown that inexperienced bidders consistently fall prey to the winner's curse, bidding above the expected value conditional on winning and earning negative average profits as a consequence. It is only with experience that bidders learn to avoid the worst effects of the winner's curse and earn a respectable share of the profits predicted under the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (see John H. Kagel and Dan Levin, 2002, for a review of the experimental literature). The transition from inexperienced bidders suffering persistent losses to experienced bidders earning respectable profits is characterized by large numbers of bidders going bankrupt, with these bankrupt bidders much less likely to return as experienced subjects.¹

These results raise a number of substantive questions regarding bidding behavior in common value auctions. First, the winner's curse involves a type of judgmental error – bidders' failure to account for the adverse selection effect conditional on winning. As such it joins a burgeoning economics literature indicating that bounded cognitive abilities can explain many observed empirical deviations from full rationality. To investigate this issue we study the effects of Scholastic Aptitude and American College Test (SAT/ACT) scores and grade point average on subjects' ability to avoid the winner's curse, along with subjects' major and gender. Ours is one of the first studies to include SAT/ACT scores to control for ability effects in the experimental economics literature.²

The second motivation for the present paper is to better understand the process whereby experienced bidders “learn” to avoid the winner's curse. Bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse in one of two (not mutually exclusive) ways: Less able bidders may simply go bankrupt, exit the market and not return for subsequent experimental sessions – a market selection effect. Alternatively, individual bidders may learn to adjust their bidding so as to avoid the winner's

¹ Claims of a winner's curse in field settings have been subject to considerable dispute, representing as they do out of equilibrium play. Robert Wilson (1992) reviews the literature with respect to OCS auctions concluding that there is considerable evidence consistent with a winner's curse in early OCS auctions.

² See also Daniel J. Benjamin and Jesse M. Shapiro (2005) who use self reported SAT/ACT scores. Note that we use SAT/ACT scores provided by the university, while self-reported (recall) scores are likely to be subject to considerable measurement error. An alternative, closely related, approach is to employ cognitive tests directly related to the question at hand (e.g., Gary Charness and Levin, 2005, and Shane Frederick, 2005).

course. In addition to being of inherent interest, distinguishing between these alternative adjustment processes affects the kinds of learning models one needs to develop to characterize the evolution of behavior over time in common value auctions. It also has potential public policy implications, as legislation on corporate bankruptcy and on procurement contracts is sometimes directly related to these issues. For example, in all European Union countries competition for government procurement contracts has been regulated with the explicit goal of fostering the acquisition of expertise and to minimize the chances of contractors' bankruptcies (CEE Directive n. 37, June 13, 1993). One rationale for these rules is the belief that "market selection", if left unchecked, operates to the detriment of social welfare maximization in some contexts and does not leave time for "individual learning" to take place.

Past studies do not typically distinguish between these different sources of learning. Evidence of individual learning on the part of experienced bidders can be overstated as it may simply reflect more able bidders, who earn more money as inexperienced subjects, being more likely to return as experienced subjects. Further, high bankruptcy rates for inexperienced bidders may severely bias estimates of learning on the part of inexperienced bidders, with the extent and nature of the bias unexplored to date.

To study learning we have subjects participate in two sessions approximately one week apart ("week 1" and "week 2"). Learning can take place: (i) during the first session; (ii) between the two sessions as subjects reflect on their decisions and (iii) during the second session. We employ a variety of techniques to address selection issues both within weeks and between weeks. Within a session there may be a selection bias resulting from bankruptcies. To address it we randomly assigned different initial cash balances to subjects, and induced random shocks to these balances within the experiment. These manipulations also enable us to identify any potential cash balance effects on bidding. Between week 1 and week 2 sessions there may be a selection bias because only a subset of subjects returns for week 2. To address this we provided differential incentives for returning in week 2.³ That is, we introduced into the experimental design instruments that could potentially help to identify selection effects using relatively sophisticated estimators borrowed from the applied econometrics literature (James J. Heckman, 1979,

³ We are treating the individuals who begin the experiment as the population of interest. However, we also compare our sample to the university population they were drawn from. One could worry about differences between student subjects and bidders in field settings. There are a number of studies that examine this issue; see for example Douglas Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989), Glenn W. Harrison and John A. List (2003) and Steffen Anderson et al. (2005).

Keunkwan Ryu, 2001) and that, alternatively, would allow us to obtain unbiased estimates of the bid equation by simply distinguishing between appropriate sub-samples of our data.

We obtain a number of substantive as well as methodological insights in answering these questions. First, not surprisingly, ability as measured by SAT/ACT scores matters in terms of avoiding the winner's curse. However, the nature of these ability effects are different from what one might expect as (i) we find more instances of a statistically significant role for *composite* SAT/ACT scores than for either math or verbal scores alone and (ii) the biggest and most consistent impact of ability comes as a result of those with below median scores being more susceptible to the winner's curse, as opposed to those with very high scores doing exceptionally well. The latter continues to be observed for experienced bidders, so that bidders with below median composite SAT/ACT scores, on average, suffer from a winner's curse even as experienced bidders.

Second, we find clear demographic effects as women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse as inexperienced bidders than men, although this difference disappears for experienced bidders. This finding of a gender effect is the more remarkable because it is obtained while controlling for obvious confounding factors such as ability and college major, factors that are not typically controlled for in investigating gender effects in experimental economics. In addition, economics and business majors are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than other majors, and continue to do worse even as experienced bidders.

In terms of learning, we find that inexperienced subjects are capable of substantial individual learning, even those subjects who start out being most susceptible to the winner's curse. These results suggest that previous studies are likely to have substantially underestimated the amount of individual learning that inexperienced bidders are *capable* of within a session. This point is most clear when estimating learning in women, who in week 1 start bidding rather poorly. If endowed with sufficient cash they do catch up to, and do as well as men by the end of the week 1 session. Further, we find that more able bidders are more likely to return as experienced subjects, with this factor dominating learning between week 1 and week 2. As such previous studies are likely to have substantially *overestimated* the amount of individual subject learning that occurs when moving from inexperienced to experienced bidders. Finally, we find some, albeit much smaller than in week 1, learning within week 2 for individual bidders in our unbiased sample, while finding essentially no learning on the part of experienced bidders in the

biased sample. Selection biases within a session are unlikely to be widespread in experimental economics, as there are few other experimental designs in which bidders go bankrupt.⁴ However, the selection effects identified between sessions may be present in the many studies that employ experienced subjects, as basic economic theory leads one to expect that those subjects who earn more money in an experiment are more likely to return as experienced subjects. Fortunately the modification we make to the experimental design is able to fully eliminate the selection problem of who returns in week 2.

In answering these questions we also obtain a number of methodological insights. First, standard econometric estimators for dealing with selection effects in field data do not identify any kind of selection effects in our data, in spite of having a relatively large sample by experimental standards and well identified econometric models. However, the different experimental treatments built into the experimental design serve to identify, measure, and verify such effects. In retrospect, these results are not surprising. At least as far back as Ronald A. Fisher (1935) statisticians have understood that experimental design (through randomization, for example) could permit the identification of casual effects. On the other hand, econometric sample selection techniques were designed for large sample situations where randomization is not possible. These techniques may fail if sample sizes are too small or economic models are misspecified. Indeed, since Robert J. LaLonde (1986) there has been considerable skepticism about the ability of these techniques to fully address selection bias, and there has been a move towards randomization via social and field experiments.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section I specifies the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid function for the experimental design, along with some measures of when subjects have fallen prey to the winner's curse. Section II outlines the experimental procedures and provides some general descriptive statistics concerning changes in bidding between weeks 1 and 2, and the potential selection effects present in the data. Section III describes our ability and demographic measures. Section IV looks at the effect of these demographic and ability measures on the conditional probability of bankruptcy in each period among inexperienced bidders. Section V discusses selection effects, and demographic and ability effects, for inexperienced (week 1) bidders. Section VI addresses the question of selection effects, as well as ability and

⁴ Of course, any time subjects are exposed to potential losses there is a threat of bankruptcy and selection effects of this sort, so that bankruptcies do occur in other environments; e.g., asset markets (Peter Bossaerts and Charles R. Plott, 2004).

demographic effects, for experienced bidders. Section VII discusses the gender effect identified and relates it to the existing literature on gender effects in economic experiments. The concluding section of the paper summarizes our main results.

I. Theoretical Considerations: First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

In a first-price sealed-bid auction, n bidders compete for a single item. The value of the item, x_0 is the same for all bidders (common value) but unknown to them. The value x_0 was chosen randomly from a uniform distribution with support $[\$50, \$950]$. What each bidder i knows prior to bidding is a private information signal, x_i , drawn independently from a uniform distribution with support $[x_0 - \$15, x_0 + \$15]$.

For risk neutral bidders the symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid function $\gamma(x_i)$ is given by⁵

$$\gamma(x_i) = x_i - 15 + h(x_i) \text{ where} \quad (1)$$

$$h(x_i) = [(30/(n+1))\exp[-(n/30)(x_i - 65)], \quad (2)$$

Equation (1) is the RNNE bid for a bidder with a signal in the interval $65 \leq x_i \leq 935$. In this paper we restrict our attention to this interval (called region 2), where the bulk of the observations lie. The term $h(x_i)$ is positive but quickly becomes negligible as x_i increases beyond 65. Thus for simplicity we ignore it in the discussion that follows, although we do include it in all relevant regressions.

In common-value auctions bidders usually win the item when they have the highest (or one of the highest) signals. Let $E[x_i|X=x_{1n}]$ be the expected value of the signal conditional on it being the highest among the n signal values drawn. We define three benchmarks against which to evaluate bidding: (a) bid your signal; (b) the loss-free bid, and (c) the break-even bid. For signals in region 2

$$E[x_i|X=x_{1n}] = x_0 + [(n-1)/(n+1)]15 . \quad (3)$$

So that if individuals naively bid their signal, they will overbid and can expect to lose money. The loss-free bid strategy with the highest probability of winning is to bid $x_i - 15$. The last, important, benchmark is the break-even bid strategy

⁵ Derivation of the RNNE bid function, as well as its characterization outside of region 2 can be found in Kagel and Levin (1986) and Kagel and Jean-Francois Richard (2001).

$$\tilde{\gamma}(x_i) = x_i - [(n-1)/(n+1)]15, \quad (4)$$

which yields zero expected profits and will periodically generate losses. When the high signal holder always wins the item, any bid above $\tilde{\gamma}(x_i)$ yields an expected loss. For this reason, we label such bids as falling prey to the “winner’s curse.”

We will compare between the benchmark strategies based on the bid factor, $x - \gamma(x)$. For $n=6$ the bid factor for the RNNE is approximately \$15, close to the loss-free strategy. The bid factor for the break-even strategy is \$10.71, about 71% of the RNNE bid factor implied by equation (1).

The RNNE is based on the assumption of risk neutral bidders, all of whom employ the same bid function and fully account for the adverse selection effect conditional on winning the item. The empirical analysis shows that the homogeneity assumption is not tenable as demographic characteristics and “ability” impact on bidding, and there is some residual, unexplained, heterogeneity in bidding, as evidenced by a statistically significant subject effect error term in the regressions. These deviations from the assumptions underlying the theory raise questions regarding the empirical relevance of benchmarks (a) – (c). They are, however, still relevant as: (i) Virtually all subjects are bidding above, rather than below, $x_i - 15$ in region 2, and the best response to such rivals is to bid $x_i - 15$ (Kagel and Richard, 2001); (ii) Within region 2, regardless of what other explanatory variables are included in the empirically specified bid function, the coefficient value for own signal value, x_i , is indistinguishable from 1.0; (iii) Bidding above (4) yields negative expected profits both with strict homogeneity in bidding and in cases where all of one’s rivals are bidding above (4), regardless of the heterogeneity in bid patterns. As such, for inexperienced bidders at least, (4) still provides a reasonable measure for whether individual bidders fall prey to the winner’s curse; (iv) Although the impact of risk aversion on bids in first-price private-value auctions is unambiguous (bidding above the RNNE), it does not necessarily have the same impact in common-value auctions since bidding above $x_i - 15$ creates the possibility of losses. What we can say about risk aversion is that (i) a risk averse bidder clearly does not want to bid above (4) since to do so yields negative expected profits and (ii) from an empirical perspective any deviation from risk neutrality will result in an

intercept for the bid functions estimated (6a and b below) that is greater than \$15 but below $[(n-1)/(n+1)]15$.⁶

To summarize, this section as well as the following empirical sections restrict attention to bidders with signals in the interval $65 \leq x \leq 935$. To avoid the winner's curse an individual must bid less than the break-even bid of equation (4). The break-even bid is closer to the RNNE bid of equation (1), which yields an expected gain, than to their signal (x_i), which yields an expected loss. Because of the risk of losses, bidding above (4) cannot be attributed to risk aversion.

II. Experimental Procedures and Basic Descriptive Statistics

Each experimental session consisted of a series of auctions for a single item of value x_0 . All of the information about the underlying distribution of x_0 and signal values was included in the instructions. At the end of each auction all bids were posted from highest to lowest along with the corresponding signal values (bidder identification numbers were suppressed) and the value of x_0 . Profits (or losses) were calculated for the high bidder and reported to all bidders.

Each experimental session began with two markets with six bidders each. Assignments to each market varied randomly between auction periods. To hold the number of bidders, n , constant in the face of potential bankruptcies, extra bidders were recruited for each session, with bidders randomly rotated in and out of active bidding between auctions.

We employed three different treatments designed to help identify selection effects:

Control treatment: This treatment matches the standard experimental practice for common-value auctions, with all subjects given starting capital balances of \$10 and a flat show-up fee of \$5. All subjects participating in week 1 were invited back for week 2 where all subjects were again given starting capital balances of \$10 and a flat show-up fee of \$5.

Bonus treatment: Starting cash balances were either \$10 or \$15, with half the subjects randomly assigned to each cash balance level. Further, following each auction, active bidders were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a 50% chance of earning \$0 or \$0.50 in order to provide additional exogenous variation in cash balances. In addition, a show-up fee of \$20 was paid only *after* completing week 2's session, with 50% of week 1 earnings held in escrow as well.⁷

⁶ Precise predictions regarding risk aversion exist for second-price and English clock auctions; namely risk averse subjects will bid *below* the RNNE benchmark. This is not observed for either inexperienced or experienced bidders even in the English clock auctions (Levin, Kagel, and Richard, 1996).

⁷ Olivier Armantier (2004) employs these procedures to induce subjects to return between sessions in a common value auction experiment aimed at determining the role of information feedback on learning.

Random treatment: This was the same as the bonus treatment with the exception that (i) bidders were given a \$5 show-up fee in week 1 along with all of week 1's earnings and (ii) when inviting bidders back for week 2, half the subjects (determined randomly) were assigned a show-up fee of \$5, with the other half assigned a show-up fee of \$15. Thus, the only difference between this and the bonus treatment was the incentive for returning in week 2.

Each inexperienced (week 1) session began with two dry runs, followed by thirty auctions played for cash. Earnings from the auctions, and lottery earnings, were added to starting cash balances. Once a bidder's cash balance was non-positive they were declared bankrupt and no longer permitted to bid.⁸ Experienced subject sessions employed an abbreviated set of instructions, a single dry run, and thirty-six auctions played for cash.

Subjects were recruited by e-mail from the general student population at Ohio State University. Just under 93% were undergraduate students, with the remainder either graduate students or of unknown status.

Table 1 shows the number of sessions and subjects (listed in parentheses) in each treatment in weeks 1 and 2. Table 1 also reports some basic descriptive statistics. Three key factors stand out from the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1. First, there is strong improvement in performance going from week 1 to week 2, with average profits per auction going from -\$2.47 (large average losses in week 1) to \$0.75 (small average profits in week 2), while average predicted profits remain unchanged between weeks. This conclusion is confirmed and reinforced by the winner's curse measure ($b > \tilde{\gamma}(x_i)$), as the frequency of the winner's curse drops dramatically both for all bidders and for high bidders. Second, there is severe potential selection bias within week 1 across all treatments, given the large number of bankruptcies reported within week 1. Third, there is relatively strong selection bias between weeks 1 and 2 for the control group and the random group, with 40.0% and 25.9% of week 1 subjects *not* returning for week 2 for these two groups, respectively, versus 4% for the bonus group.

⁸ Because of limited-liability for losses, once cash balances drop below a certain level it is rational, in terms of a one-shot game, to bid modestly above the RNNE assuming that all other bidders employ the RNNE (see, Kagel and Richard, 2001 for estimates of the size of these overbids).

III. Demographic and Ability Measures

The consent form gave us permission to collect demographic data from the University Enrollment Office. It called for providing information regarding gender, SAT and ACT scores, major, and class standing (freshman, sophomore, etc.).⁹

The demographic and ability measures employed in the data analysis are as follows:

Gender: Male/Female.

College major: Three categories were established - business and economics, science and engineering, and a residual category accounting for all other majors.

SAT/ACT scores: These scores result from standardized tests that most high school graduates take when seeking admission to a US college. A set of binary variables was constructed for three ability levels - high, median, and low - based on both the SAT and ACT scores.¹⁰ The cut-off points chosen were below the median, between the median and the 95-percentile, and the 95-percentile or higher. Binary variables were generated for several reasons. First, ACT and SAT scores are not additive measures of ability but rather rank order measures so that binary scores are more appropriate than raw scores. Second, this specification is a simple way to capture possible non-linear impacts of different ability levels. Third, a number of students were missing SAT or ACT scores (39.4% SAT and 25.5% ACT), which would have increased the fraction of observations with missing values. Using both scores this way reduces the number of subjects with a missing value to 13.7% of the sample. Bidders were coded according to their verbal, mathematical, and combined skills. Although the categories used for SAT/ACT scores are somewhat arbitrary, they do provide reasonable measures of high, medium and low ability that we believe are interesting, and the results are robust to small differences in the cut points.

We also explored a number of empirical specifications using grade point average (GPA) in place of, or in conjunction with, SAT/ACT scores. GPA proved to be a far inferior ability measure compared to SAT/ACT scores, rarely achieving statistical significance in any of our specifications. We suspect there are two primary reasons for this. First, we have a number of freshmen and sophomores in our sample for which GPA would be a very incomplete measure of

⁹ We do not have information on race since we did not ask for this information on the release. About 15% of the students enrolled at the Ohio State University main campus are classified as minorities: 7.1% African American, 5.2% Asian American, and 2.3% Hispanic, so that this subject population is a poor choice for studying racial differences. We did not obtain information on the economic background of the subjects as this information is not readily available from the university and self-reported information on this score is likely to be quite inaccurate.

¹⁰ For a description see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACT_%28examination%29 and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAT>

academic performance. Second, there is likely to be a good deal of heterogeneity in grade scales both between colleges and between majors within colleges.

Table 2 gives the sample composition according to these demographic and ability variables for inexperienced bidders, along with the relevant data for the university population from which the sample was drawn. Men comprise 59.7% of the sample, with the breakdown by major being 30.2% economics/business majors, 23.4% engineering and science majors, and 46.4% all other majors. There are more men in the sample than in the university population, as well as a much larger percentage of economics and business majors than the university population (30.2% versus 12.3%). The latter is to be expected given that we recruited from e-mail lists for students enrolled in economics classes. Some 20.2% of the sample are in the top 5% (of the national average) with respect to composite SAT/ACT scores (versus 4.9% for the university), with less than 8.9% scoring below the median (versus 20.9 for the university), and 13.3% not having any SAT/ACT scores (versus 21.1% for the university). The latter are primarily transfers from regional campuses as these students are not required to take these tests when transferring to the main campus. They are likely to have lower SAT/ACT scores if we had their test records, as a number of these regional campus transfers were ineligible to enter to main campus when they originally applied to college. Thus, our sample population includes students with significantly higher ability than the university population as measured by the percentage of students scoring in the top 5% on composite SAT/ACT scores and below median SAT/ACT scores. This cannot be attributed simply to better non-economics and business students signing up for economics classes, as we see similar differences in ability between our sample and the university population for economics and business majors within the sample (see Table A1 in the online Appendix). Freshmen and sophomores comprise 55.5% of the sample versus 48.2% of the university population.

When demographic variables are included in the regressions, the reference bidder is a male subject with an “other” major with SAT/ACT scores between the median and the 95th-percentile. Our analysis focuses on composite SAT/ACT scores. Results employing verbal and mathematics SAT/ACT scores in place of the composite score are reported in an online Appendix but will be referred to in the text.

IV. A Duration Model of Bankruptcy

The question to be addressed here is what are the factors behind the large number of bankruptcies for inexperienced bidders (week 1) reported in Table 1? In particular, are there any demographic or ability factors that we would otherwise be unaware of behind the bankruptcies? A natural format for modeling bankruptcies is a hazard, or duration model, since once a subject goes bankrupt within a given experimental session they are no longer permitted to bid in that session.

We assume that the probability that a person goes bankrupt in period t , conditional on not having gone bankrupt in the previous $t-1$ periods, is given by the discrete-time (logit) hazard function

$$\lambda_i(t|\theta_i, Z_{it}; \delta, \gamma) = 1 / (1 + \exp\{-y_{it}\}) \quad (5a)$$

where

$$y_{it} = Z_{it}\delta + \sum_{k=1}^K \gamma_k \ln(t)^k + \theta_i. \quad (5b)$$

In (5b) Z_{it} is a vector of explanatory variables and t measures the number of auctions the individual has actively participated in (including the current one). We are particularly interested in the coefficient vector δ since Z_{it} includes all of our demographic and ability variables. Z_{it} also consists of a number of control variables, *all of which are determined in the experiment and are out of the subjects' control*. These include the variable *lagcumcash*, defined as subjects' starting cash balance plus any lottery earnings they may have received, but excluding auction earnings.¹¹ Additional control variables include whether a bidder had the highest, or second highest, signal in auction t , since the 'winner' almost always has the highest or second highest signal.¹² We also include the fraction of past periods that a bidder has received the highest signal and the fraction of time they have received the second highest signal. We use the Schwartz

¹¹ In estimating the hazard model and the bid functions below we have the choice of estimating each function conditional on exogenous cash payments (i.e., excluding previous gains or losses) or the endogenous current cash balances. In the bid functions we condition on endogenous cash balances since we want to compare the cash balance coefficients to those found in Ham, Kagel, and Steven Lehrer (2005). Here we condition on exogenous cash payments since we do not have anything to compare a structural coefficient to, and because dealing with an endogenous variable is much more difficult in a hazard model with time changing explanatory variables. (On the latter, see Curtis Eberwein, Ham, and LaLonde 1996.)

¹² We include these controls as they represent time changing heterogeneity, and there is little or no theoretical work on the effect of time changing unobserved heterogeneity in a duration model.

criterion to choose the order of the polynomial. In all specifications this yielded a first order polynomial for $\ln(t)$.

Finally, the term θ_i is a random variable designed to account for unobserved heterogeneity. (Recall that Z_{it} controls for observed heterogeneity.) It takes on the value θ_1 with probability P_1 and the value θ_2 with probability $1 - P_1$ with the terms θ_1 , θ_2 , and P_1 parameters to be estimated. We include unobserved heterogeneity for two reasons. First, if we ignore it, we run the risk of biasing the duration dependence in a negative direction and biasing the absolute value of the δ coefficients towards zero. Second, we can potentially use the unobserved heterogeneity distribution to test for selection bias resulting from bankruptcies in week 1 (Ryu, 2001). We estimate the model by maximum likelihood (for details see the online Appendix).

The results for no demographics and the case where we use demographics are reported in Table 3, with separate estimates reported with and without accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in both cases (columns labeled yes and no, respectively). Focusing first on the demographics, women have a higher probability of going bankrupt in a given period, conditional on having survived to that period.¹³ Students who are in the 95th percentile and above for composite SAT/ACT scores have a significantly lower probability of going bankrupt than the reference group (subjects with scores between the median and the 95 percentile). Also, students below the median have a significantly higher probability of going bankrupt than the reference group, while those with no aptitude score are not significantly different from the reference group. (In comparing these results to those where we use verbal or math aptitude scores alone, the significant effect for those above the 95 percentile disappears – see Table A5 in the online Appendix.) College major does not significantly affect the probability of bankruptcy after having controlled for gender and aptitude scores. Thus ability, as measured by these standard aptitude tests, plays a significant role (in the anticipated direction) in avoiding, or limiting the impact of, the winner's curse. In contrast, the gender effect was totally *unanticipated* but, as will be shown, is one of the strongest results reported. We relate this gender result to the limited literature on gender effects in experimental economics in Section VII below.

¹³ Readers may prefer to look at a probit equation for whether a subject ever goes bankrupt in week 1. Estimates from such an equation are included in the online Appendix in Table A2. The coefficient on the female dummy variable is positive and statistically significant in this probit equation.

The amount of cash from the initial allocation and the lottery that a subject has on hand (lagcumcash) has a very significant negative effect on the probability of going bankrupt. This is largely an accounting as opposed to a behavioral effect. Also, as expected, receiving the high signal or the second highest signal in the auction has a very significant positive effect on the probability of bankruptcy, since when subjects win they tend to lose money (the winner's curse). On the other hand, the fraction of past auctions that a subject received the high signal has a negative effect on bankruptcy, and the fraction of previous periods that the subject received the second highest signal has a negative sign but is not statistically significant. This is consistent with substantial learning on the part of subjects: Those that get hit with losses in a given auction but survive to later periods learn to bid less aggressively. The log duration variable is negative in sign and statistically significant indicating that the longer a subject is able to bid, the less likely she is to go bankrupt. This, in conjunction with the negative coefficient values for the fraction of past auctions with the highest or second highest signal value, indicate that subjects have learned to bid more conservatively from their own past losses as well as from others having fallen prey to the winner's curse.

When we move from the model with no unobserved heterogeneity ($\theta_1 = \theta_2 = \text{the constant}$) to the case where we have unobserved heterogeneity ($\theta_1 \neq \theta_2$), the value of θ_1 does differ somewhat from θ_2 . However, the value of the log-likelihood only increases by 0.4, which leads to accepting the null hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity. As always, care must be exercised when not rejecting the null hypothesis, since these results may also reflect our inability to identify unobserved heterogeneity in a sample of 251 individuals. This issue is of practical importance, since it can be argued that selection bias can be ignored if there is no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in estimates of this sort – for example, Ryu's (2001) correction cannot be implemented. However, Govert E. Bijwaard and Geert Ridder (2005) demonstrate, in the context of a duration model, that there can still be selection bias even after finding no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, when analyzing the week 1 bid function we consider an alternative approach to selection bias due to bankruptcy that exploits our sample design, and indeed find that such bias is important.

V. Analyzing the Bidding Behavior of Inexperienced Subjects

Our goal in this section is to estimate a bidding equation for inexperienced bidders. The dependent variable is the bid factor.¹⁴ In our basic specification the explanatory variables include the nonlinear bidding term $h(x)$ in equation (2) and a learning term equal to $1/\ln(1+t)$, where t measures the number of auctions in which a bidder was active. This specification for learning has the attractive feature that the term becomes smaller as t gets large in a nonlinear fashion. Our specification differs from previous work in that it also includes dummy variables for the various ability and demographic factors, all of which are coded exactly as in the duration model. Thus, the constant represents the bid factor for a male whose ACT or SAT score was between the median and the 95th percentile, and who has an “other” major.

Our second departure from the standard bidding equation involves including cash balances as an endogenous explanatory variable. For the controls, cash balance only changes if the subject wins a previous auction – thus cash balances are entirely determined by lagged bidding behavior for this group. For the random and bonus treatments, cash balances will depend on past bidding, as well as on the (randomized) initial balances and the lottery earnings.

In estimating the bid functions we use random effects instrumental variable estimation to account for (i) the correlations across periods for a given subject and (ii) the potential endogeneity of cash balances. Initial balances and the lottery earnings are obvious instrumental variables for bidders not in the control group. Following Ham et al. (2005) we use the fraction of previous periods that the subject received the high signal and the fraction of previous periods that the subject received the second highest signal as instrumental variables. All of these instrumental variables are statistically significant in the first-stage equation.

We employ two regression specifications. The first is

$$x_{it} - bid_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_i + \beta_2 App_i + \beta_3 Maj_i + \beta_4 C_{it} + \beta_5 (1/\ln(1+t)) + \beta_6 h(x_{it}) + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (6a)$$

where x_{it} denotes signal, F_i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is a woman, App_i denotes a vector of dummy variables based on the subjects’ SAT/ACT score, Maj_i is a vector of dummy variables indicating the subjects’ major, C_{it} denotes cash balances, the term $1/\ln(1+t)$ captures learning, $h(x_{it})$ is the nonlinear term in equation (2), α_i is the individual specific

¹⁴ Alternatively we could use signal as a regressor with bid as the dependent variable. If we do this, we obtain a coefficient on signal of approximately 1.0 with a t-statistic over 1000. The other coefficients do not change.

component of the error term and ε_{it} is an i.i.d. error term.¹⁵ All regressors except C_{it} are assumed to be uncorrelated with α_i and ε_{it} . The second specification accounts for a gender by learning interaction effect

$$x_{it} - bid_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_i + \beta_2 App_i + \beta_3 Maj_i + \beta_4 C_{it} + \beta_5 (1 - F_i)(1/\ln(1+t)) + \beta_6 F_i(1/\ln(1+t)) + \beta_7 h(x_{it}) + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (6b)$$

In what follows we proceed in two steps. First, we test for potential selection effects in these bid functions for inexperienced bidders as a result of the high bankruptcy rates reported (37.4% of all bidders went bankrupt in week 1).¹⁶ We are able to identify clear selection effects in the data based on our experimental design. Second, we report estimates of the bid functions that account for the selection bias and compare these estimates to those of the biased estimates.

V.A. Testing for Selection Bias

There are several ways of proceeding using techniques drawn from the rich econometrics literature dealing with this issue. Our efforts along these lines failed to detect selection effects (see the online Appendix for a review of these efforts). Given these results one alternative is to simply conclude that there is no selection bias even in the presence of the high rate of week one bankruptcies. However, we believe that these findings simply reflect the difficulty of identifying unobserved heterogeneity using standard econometric techniques with our relatively small sample size. Thus, we turn to a simple alternative based on our experimental design.

The alternative approach is based on the following idea: Suppose the sample consists of two sub-samples (created randomly at the beginning of the auction).¹⁷ There is no attrition in the first sub-sample but there is substantial attrition in the second sub-sample. Under the null hypothesis of no selection bias, the estimates of equations (6a) (or 6b) from the two sub-samples should not differ. However, if there is selection bias, the estimates should differ, since the

¹⁵ This specification can be compared directly to the estimate of the structural cash balance effect in private value auctions reported in Ham et al. (2005).

¹⁶ Selection effects will occur unless the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term in the conditional regression on the sample of those that have not yet experienced a bankruptcy. If there is no selection bias the conditional estimates will have the same probability limit as those that would come from an unconditional regression based on a random sample. In the program evaluation literature, conditional effects are often referred to as measuring the effect of ‘treatment on the treated’, while unconditional effects are referred to as measuring the ‘average treatment effect’. See, e.g., Heckman and Edward Vytlacil (2005).

¹⁷ Randomization should insure that the two samples are the same in terms of their characteristics. Of course there is always the possibility of a contamination of the random assignment in its implementation. Following the project evaluation literature, we tested whether the means differed for any of the random subsets in the experiment, finding no evidence to this effect, indicating that we properly implemented the random assignment.

estimates from the first sample are consistent, but the estimates from the second sub-sample are inconsistent (because of selection bias). Alternatively, assume that both samples experience attrition, but that it is much more serious in the second sample. Then using the arguments of Halbert White (1982), we would expect the estimates not to differ if there is no selection bias, but to differ if there is selection bias, since the bias will be much greater in the second sample.¹⁸

Our experimental treatments manipulated cash endowments through variations in the initial cash balance and in lottery earnings, producing three distinct groups from which to form our two sub-samples:

- (i) Low cash endowment, with \$10 initial balance and no lottery; these are fairly standard conditions in common-value auction experiments and correspond to our Control treatment which had a bankruptcy rate of 46.3%.
- (ii) Medium cash endowment, with \$10 initial balance and lottery earnings in the Random and Bonus treatments, which had a bankruptcy rate of 42.3%.
- (iii) High cash endowment, with \$15 initial balance and lottery earnings in the Random and Bonus treatments, with a bankruptcy rate of 20.3%.

The time pattern of the bankruptcy rates is given in Figure 1. It shows a substantial number of subjects going bankrupt over time in the overall sample and in groups (i) and (ii) in particular.

We pool groups (i) and (ii) above to create a *high bankruptcy group*. The two groups have very similar (high) bankruptcy rates and pooling yields essentially the same results as the Control group alone, but with substantially more statistical power (given that combining the two groups essentially doubles the sample size). We will compare the coefficients from this sub-sample with what we will refer to as the *low bankruptcy group*, group (iii) above (the high cash endowment group), since they have a bankruptcy rate of 20.3%. The latter is just at the margin of where empirical researchers would worry about selection bias.¹⁹

The last row of Table 4 contains the p-values for the null hypothesis that the high bankruptcy group and the low bankruptcy group produce the same coefficients under the different specifications – without gender and ability dummies, with them and interacting learning

¹⁸ Our approach is similar to that taken by Marno Verbeek and Theo Nijman (1992) in panel data.

¹⁹ Note that the bankruptcy numbers somewhat overstate the actual level of attrition, since those who go bankrupt contribute observations up until the point that they go bankrupt – see Figure 1.

with gender. In each case we reject the null hypothesis at better than the .01 level.²⁰ These results are the same if we substitute the verbal or mathematical score for the composite score (see Tables A6a and b in the online Appendix).

Since we have conditioned on cash balances, these results are not due to different cash balances between the two groups. Given that selection bias has not been dealt with prior to this, our results suggest biases in estimating learning effects and bid factors in virtually all earlier common-value auction experiments. Finally, note that while selection bias due to bankruptcies is a particularly acute problem in common-value auctions, it has the potential to impact in other experimental environments as well, whenever subjects are exposed to potential losses.

V.B. Bidding Behavior of Inexperienced Subjects Absent Selection Bias

Given the evidence for selection bias, we focus on the results from the low bankruptcy (high initial balance) sub-sample to represent the true bidding equation. Implicitly we are assuming that a bankruptcy rate of 20% does not create serious selection bias, or that the results are less biased than one would obtain using the standard experimental design and practice that ignores selection bias entirely. In considering the results for the unbiased sub-sample, we also find it convenient to directly compute bid factors for the different demographic groups. These are reported in the top panel of Table 5 where we have kept cash balances constant across time to better reflect learning.

The reference group's bid factor²¹ of \$11.20 in period 1 (male, other majors, with SAT/ACT scores below the 95th percentile and above the median) is not significantly above the breakeven bid factor of \$10.71. While several demographic groups are doing substantially worse than this, none are doing significantly better according to the unbiased regression results reported in columns 3 and 5 of Table 4. Referring to Table 4, we see that women are doing much worse than men to begin with, with a period 1 bid factor of \$3.90 for the base group, some \$7 more than for the men. Economics and business majors are doing worse as well, bidding just under \$3 more than for the reference group for both men and women in period 1. (Both of these effects are statistically significant.) Further, subjects with no SAT/ACT scores are doing significantly

²⁰ Use of instrumental variable estimation raises the question of weak instruments (Douglas Staiger and James H. Stock 1997): The relevant Chi-Square statistics are 249.32 and 1073.8 for columns 3 and 4 which are much larger than the critical values of $\chi^2(3)$. The statistics for columns 5 and 6 are very similar. This shows the benefits of building relevant instruments into the experimental design.

²¹ Recall that the bid factor represents how much subjects bid under their signal.

worse than for the reference group bidding some \$4 more to begin with. As noted earlier, transfers to the main Ohio State campus from satellite campuses dominate the no aptitude score group, and are not, in general, as strong academically as students who start at the main campus. This provides some evidence (in addition to that from the duration model in Section IV) that those with lower ability as measured by SAT/ACT score do a poorer job of bidding. Measuring ability using verbal or math scores alone does not change these results – see Table A6a and A6b respectively in the online Appendix.

There is some individual learning going on as evidenced by the statistically significant, negative coefficient value for the $1/\ln(1+t)$ variable in column 3 of Table 4 (a negative coefficient value indicates that the bid factor is increasing over time). Women are learning much faster than men as evidenced the different estimates for the learning term interacted with gender in column 5 of Table 4, as well as the changes in the bid factor between period 1 and 30 reported in panel A of Table 5 (an increase of 6.5 for women versus 1.6 for men). Thus, women start out bidding much worse than men but have closed much of the gap by period 30. One possible explanation for faster learning on the part of women is that since they are bidding so much worse than men to begin with, the losses suffered push them to learn faster. There is evidence both for and against this hypothesis. Evidence in favor of it is the rather limited adjustments in the bid factor for the reference group of men – “other” majors - who break even on average to begin with. Evidence against it is that estimates of experienced subject (week 2) bid functions (reported in section VI.B below) show that economics and business majors, along with students with poorer SAT/ACT scores, continue to bid significantly worse than the reference group. In contrast, women are doing the same or slightly better as experienced subjects. Thus, the large losses probably help to induce more rapid adjustments for women but are not, by themselves, sufficient to account for the very large adjustments reported.

There are a number of possible explanations for the gender effect identified. One possibility is that we are attracting above average men and only average women to the experiment. However, the data in Table 2 contradict this, and we do control for ability as measured by SAT/ACT scores in the regressions. Table 2 shows that we are attracting younger women than men (i.e. a higher number of freshman and sophomores) to the experiment. However, the result for women was unaffected by adding age as a regressor. We discuss the

remaining explanations for this difference between men and women in Section VII below, where we relate our results to other reports of gender effects in the experimental literature.

There are several possible explanations for why economics and business majors are more susceptible to the winner's curse. One possibility is that these students are by nature aggressive in business-type transactions. Although this aggressiveness might help in some situations, it does not help here. Alternatively it could be the result of something they have learned. One possibility is that upper class economics and business majors have become familiar with adverse selection effects as part of their education, and that our analysis has simply failed to identify this. We are skeptical of this as (i) even if students have been exposed to the general idea of adverse selection it is hard to generalize it to this particular situation and (ii) even within the context of common value auction experiments of this sort experienced subjects who have overcome the worst effects of the winners curse fall prey again following changes in treatment conditions (e.g., changing the number of bidders in the market).²² Alternatively, it could be that there is something in the education that economics and business majors receive that is responsible for their more aggressive bidding.

To distinguish between these possibilities we added a dummy variable for freshman interacted with economics/business major. If what economics and business majors have been taught as part of their studies affects their susceptibility to the winner's curse, then we would expect this new variable to be statistically significant since freshmen will have had very limited exposure to such teaching and will not display the characteristics of their upper class counterparts. (The sign of the coefficient will distinguish if what they have been taught helps or hinders their ability to avoid the winner's curse.) If it's a selection effect associated with those choosing to be economics and business majors that drives the more aggressive bidding then we would expect this variable to not be statistically significant. The variable was not significant in any of the bid specifications. As such we conclude that the economics/business effect is a personality effect, rather than a 'little knowledge is a dangerous thing' effect.

One additional explanation for the economics/business major effect is that since these students were more likely to see the email advertising the experiment, we pulled in above average students in majors outside economics and business, while pulling in average

²² See, for example, Kagel and Levin (1986). There is an anecdote worth relating here. In one of the inexperienced subject sessions underlying the data reported there, one MBA subject came into the experiment and inquired "Is this the winner's curse experiment?" She went bankrupt in the fifth auction period!

economics/business majors. This explanation fails because as (i) we control for SAT/ACT scores in the regressions and (ii) in comparing the ability levels of students across majors in our sample relative to the general university population, the data shows that we attracted well above-average ability students in every major (see Table A1 in the online Appendix).

The coefficients on cash balances in the bid function estimates in Table 4 are positive and statistically significant in all of our low bankruptcy specifications, meaning that those with larger cash balances have a larger bid factor (bid closer to RNNE).²³ Calculating the effect of this, other things equal, we find that those with \$15 starting cash balances bid \$0.53 less than those with \$10 starting balances in period 1. Further, someone having earned \$30 (near the maximum of cash balances across subjects) would be bidding \$2.13 less than when they have a \$10 cash balance.²⁴ We surmise from this that although statistically significant, the cash balance effect is by itself not very important economically in terms of its direct impact on the bid factor. Where cash balances seem more important is in keeping subjects in the auction, giving them the opportunity to learn from their mistakes (see the discussion immediately below).

V.C. Additional Observations

It is interesting to note the differences in bidding between the low and high bankruptcy samples since the bankruptcy rates for the latter are typical of past experimental results. Comparing the top and bottom panels of Table 5 we see a number of similarities as well as differences.²⁵ In the high bankruptcy sample, women continue to suffer more severely from the winner's curse than men to begin with, but the differences are not as striking as for the low bankruptcy group. The latter probably results from the fact that worst offenders go bankrupt earlier on in the biased sub-sample. Differences between economics and business majors continue to exist but are no longer statistically significant (see columns 4 and 6 of Table 4). Subjects with below median SAT/ACT scores in the high bankruptcy group have a stronger winner's curse than others as evidenced by the relatively large (in absolute value), statistically significant coefficient value reported in columns 4 and 6 of Table 4. These coefficient values are close to those of the no SAT/ACT score group in the low bankruptcy sample.

²³ This is also the case for first-price sealed-bid private value auctions (Ham et al., 2005). Both this and the size of the effect reported here suggest that this positive relationship is *not* a response to limited-liability for losses.

²⁴ These calculations are based on the estimates in column 5 of Table 4.

²⁵ We use the mean values of cash balances in the low bankruptcy group for all of the calculations in Table 5. Thus these differences do not reflect differences in cash balances between the two groups. We re-estimated Table 5 (and Table 7 below) using the mean value of cash balances for the low bankruptcy group in each period reported. This had a very small effect on the results.

Adjustments to the winner's curse between periods 1 and 30 are much smaller in the high bankruptcy group, particularly for the women (see Table 5, panel B). As noted in the introduction there are two possible biases to the learning observed in the standard experimental design. First, one could expect more of the less able subjects to go bankrupt in the low initial balance sample as they have less cash reserves to keep them in the game, and that this would show up in terms of a larger learning coefficient as the less able bidders went bankrupt. Second, given heterogeneity in initial bid factors and learning, it may be precisely those subjects who have the most to learn that are being eliminated due to bankruptcy in the high bankruptcy group, and indeed we find that this second case dominates in our data. That is, the subjects who would learn the most are being eliminated in the high bankruptcy group due to their lower starting cash balances, so that they do not stick around long enough to learn. The implication is that learning can serve as a substitute for initial abilities in terms of successful bidding in common value auctions, provided subjects have sufficient opportunity to learn.

The inclusion of the demographic and ability variables in the bid function does little to reduce the standard error of the bid function. This can be seen directly in Table 4 comparing the standard errors of the coefficients for the variables included in the no demographics bid function with the same variables in the bid functions with demographics. Thus, including demographic and ability measures in the bid function, while providing a number of interesting insights, does not serve as a substitute for larger sample size in terms of the precision with which the bid function can be estimated.

Our treatment of providing relatively large starting capital balances and lottery earnings provides one device for controlling/minimizing selection effects in the initial inexperienced subject session. Two alternatives offered in the literature have been to (i) employ sellers' markets (Barry Lind and Plott, 1991) and (ii) create "deep pockets" for bidders (James C. Cox, Samuel H. Dinkin, and James T. Swarthout, 2001). With seller's markets everyone earns positive profits, including the winner of the auction, but the winner's curse can still express itself as the opportunity cost of selling items for less than their true value. While this procedure clearly eliminates bankruptcies, to keep costs down valuations and bids are all in terms of experimental dollars, with a relatively low conversion rate into US dollars. This in turn is likely to reduce the sting when bidders succumb to the winner's curse, thereby possibly slowing the learning process. In the deep pockets treatment of Cox et al. subjects were given sufficiently large starting cash

balances so that they would not go bankrupt in any given auction even when bidding above their signal value, and these cash balances were replenished following each auction. To keep cost down subjects were paid in 3 out of the 30 auctions conducted, selected at random at the end of each session. In regressions comparing this treatment with otherwise identical treatments in which subjects were paid following each auction, the deep pockets treatment produces a statistically, and economically, significant *increase* in the magnitude of the winner's curse. Thus, this treatment appears to limit learning/adjusting to the winner's curse, perhaps because the pain of potential losses does not arouse as much attention as that of immediate actual losses (Susan Garvin and Kagel, 1994). Our approach, while possibly more expensive, offers the potential to eliminate, or minimize, selection bias without distorting incentives.

VI. Analyzing the Bidding Behavior of Experienced Subjects

In looking at the behavior of experienced bidders we proceed as in the previous section. First, we check for bias in the estimated bid function, using both standard econometric techniques and experimental treatments designed to identify such effects. We are unable to identify selection effects using standard econometric techniques, but do identify them based on our experimental design. We then report the estimates of the experienced subject bid function, comparing the unbiased estimates with the biased estimates.

VI.A. Addressing Selection Bias for Experienced Subjects

There is a clear potential for selection effects impacting on estimates of the experienced subject bid function since only 75.3% of all subjects return for week 2, with only 60.6% of bankrupt bidders returning. The percentage of returning subjects is substantially lower if we exclude the bonus group with its 96% return rate. As is known from, e.g. Heckman (1979), ignoring potential selection effects will bias the estimates of the intercept as well as the coefficients of the independent variables in the week 2 bid function if there is overlap (or correlation) between the variables in the bid function and the variables that affect the probability of returning.

One standard econometric technique for dealing with selection bias involves using the Heckman (1979) correction procedure and the extension for nonnormal errors by Lung-fei Lee (1982). When implemented for our sample, in no case were the selection terms close to statistical significance at standard confidence levels, independently of whether or not we controlled for

demographics.²⁶ Once again there are several interpretations for this result: (i) there is no selection bias among experienced bidders; (ii) our sample is too small for the Heckman-Lee estimator to be effective (iii) the selection rule or regression is misspecified.

Our experimental design permits the following alternative approach to identifying and correcting for selection bias in week 2: Break the sample into high and low return sub-samples, and test whether the parameter estimates are equal across the sub-samples. Our *high return sub-sample* consists of the bonus group where 96% of all subjects returned in week 2. Our *low return group* consists of the control group, where only 60% of the subjects returned, combined with the low return fee subjects in the random group, who had a return rate of 69.1%. If there is no selection bias, we would expect that low return and high return sub-samples to produce the same coefficients; while if there is selection bias we would expect the two sub-samples to produce different coefficients.

Table 6 contains the results comparing the low and high return sub-samples. The bottom line of the Table contains the p-value testing the null hypothesis that the estimates of the bid function are the same from the two sub-samples. We reject the null hypothesis of no selection bias at the 5% level, whether or not we include demographics or a gender by learning interaction term in the regression. Thus, as with inexperienced bidders, we conclude that adjusting the experimental design before the experiment is undertaken is far superior to using applied econometric methods after the experiment. As noted in the introduction, in retrospect this result is not really surprising. These results also suggest that previous studies of common value auctions are likely to suffer from selection bias. Although this is a particularly acute problem in common value auctions, there is likely to be a potential problem in other experimental environments as well, as basic economic theory would suggest that more successful players (who typically earn higher average profits) are more likely to return for experienced subject sessions.²⁷

VI.B Bidding Behavior of Experienced Subjects Absent Selection Bias

We focus on the results in Table 6 for the high return sub-sample for unbiased estimates of the bid function.²⁸ Consider first the estimates in column 1 where we do not control for

²⁶ See the online Appendix.

²⁷ Selection bias is supported in direct comparisons of week 1 bids which show that those who return do a substantially better job of bidding in week 1 than those who do not return (see Figure A1 in the online Appendix).

²⁸ The strategy of choosing a sample on the basis of an exogenous set of variables, for which the probability of participation is approximately one, to estimate the unconditional regression equation and avoid selection bias is known in the sample selection literature as ‘identification at infinity’ (see Gary Chamberlain, 1986). We are not

demographics. There is a learning effect for this sub-sample with the expected sign and a small cash balance effect. Further, the term $h(x)$ is statistically significant and has the correct sign, although it is still well below the predicted value of -1.0 . These effects are also present when we include demographic variables in column 3.²⁹ The results from column 3 indicate that individuals with an aptitude score below the median do a significantly worse job of bidding in week 2. (We continue to find this result when we use the math score but not when we use the verbal aptitude score.) This is also true for economics and business majors, as was the case in week 1. Note that there is no longer any significant difference between men and women, although now the female coefficient is positive, in contrast to the week 1 results. However, when we interact learning with gender in column 5 we see that the learning term is only significant for women, and it has the expected sign; i.e., women are bidding closer to equilibrium/best responding over time.³⁰

Table 7 computes the bid factors for men and women for different majors at different time periods based on the results from column 5 of Table 6. Women start out with a slightly lower bid factor than men, but by period 30 their bid factor is approximately \$0.50 higher. The week 1 results showed that the gap between men and women was closing as the experiment progressed. These results for experienced bidders suggest that the rest of the gap disappeared between week 1 and week 2, presumably as subjects fully absorbed the lessons from week 1's experience. Indeed, women may even be doing a slightly better job of bidding in week 2.

Table 7 also shows that female business/economics majors have a bid factor that is below the breakeven bid factor of \$10.71 in periods 1 through 20 (and only slightly above it in period 30), while male business/economics majors are below this level for all periods. The non-economics/business majors have bid factors that are substantially above the breakeven bid factor, although these bid factors are considerably below the RNNE bid factor of \$15.00. Bidders with below median SAT/ACT scores have bid factors that are below the breakeven bid factor of \$10.71 for all periods regardless of major.³¹

concerned with attrition within week 2 since bankruptcy is a much smaller problem than in week 1, especially for those outside the control group, which constitute the source of our unbiased week 2 bid function estimates (recall Table 1).

²⁹ The Wald test statistics for the null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments have zero coefficients in the first stage equation are 1242.82 and 685.60 in columns 3 and 4 respectively, both of which are much larger than the critical value $\chi^2(4)$ at any conceivable significance level.

³⁰ The gender coefficient is positive, and the coefficients in column 5 imply that the female bid factor is larger than the male bid factor for $t > 1$, assuming that their other characteristics are the same.

³¹ These results are not shown in Table 7 to save space.

The low return sub-sample – which is the standard for experienced subject data previously reported in the literature (e.g., Garvin and Kagel, 1994, Cox et al., 2001) – confounds individual subject learning effects between weeks with market selection effects. This point is made clear in panel B of Table 7, where we have calculated bid factors for the low return sample. In the penultimate line we see that the estimated *between weeks* increase in bid factors for women are \$5.06 and \$3.35 for economics/business majors and other majors respectively. (This is the difference between the bid factor in week 2, period 1, and the bid factor in week 1, period 30, holding cash balances constant.) The corresponding estimates for the unbiased (high return) sample in panel A are 1.91 and 1.29. This suggests that a little over 60% of the learning between week 1 and 2 in the standard setup is actually due to market selection effects, with the remainder due to individual bidder learning as a result of the opportunity to reflect on the problem. For men, the results in Panel B indicate that in the low return sample, the estimated *between weeks* increase in bid factors are \$3.20 and \$1.49 for economics/business majors and other majors respectively. Comparing this with the results in Panel A for men in the high return sample suggests that for men, as much as 75% or more of the learning attributed to experienced subjects is due to market selection effects, with the remainder due to learning on the part of individual bidders. The essential point here is that the many studies that have subjects returning for additional experimental sessions as experienced players may be subject to similar biases for reasons already discussed. Thus, in order to distinguish between market selection effects versus individual learning effects as a result of the opportunity to reflect on the problem at hand, one needs to correct for any potential selection effects.

VII. Discussion of Gender Effects

Perhaps the most surprising result reported here is that women start out bidding substantially more than men, suffering from a strong and severe winner's curse, but close the gap with men relatively quickly. In this section we briefly relate this result to what is known about gender differences to explain this result. Two known factors that immediately come to mind are (i) women are generally identified as being more risk averse than men (see Catherine C. Eckel and Phillip J. Grossman, 2002, forthcoming for surveys)³² and (ii) men tend to be over represented in the upper tail of mathematical reasoning (David C. Geary, 1996, Camilla Persson

³² However, some studies show limited or no differences (Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury, 2002, Renate Schubert et al., 1999). See Rachel Croson and Uri Gneezy (2004) for a review of the literature on gender differences as it relates to economic experiments.

Benbow and Julian C. Stanley, 1980, 1983). However, neither of these factors can account for the gender effect reported here. First, risk aversion cannot explain succumbing to the winner's curse as the latter is defined as a bidding strategy that insures *negative* expected profits conditional on winning the item. Second, our regression analysis explicitly controls for ability as measured by SAT/ACT composite scores. While the composite score summarizes in one index both mathematical and verbal abilities, these results are robust to including only SAT/ACT mathematical scores. In addition, our regressions include a variable for college major with the category science and engineering picking up subjects who would be most likely to have had more extensive courses in mathematics and deductive reasoning. Thus, even after controlling for these two factors, we identify a significant pure gender effect in our experiment.

Two other possible explanations for this gender effect - overconfidence and aversion to competition - are not supported in the data either. Experimental evidence shows that although men and women both tend to be overconfident, men are generally significantly more overconfident than women (Kay Deaux and Elizabeth Farris, 1977, Mary A. Lundeberg, Paul W. Fox, and Judith Puncchohar, 1994). When facing a difficult task such as bidding in a common value auction, bidders with lower confidence might be expected to adopt the safe strategy of bidding their signal minus \$15, or bidding even lower than that. In contrast, more confident bidders might be expected to place higher, more "competitive" bids. But our data clearly does not show such a differential pattern between men and women, but rather just the opposite of this.

Recent research indicates that women tend to shy away from, or under-perform, in competitive situations compared to men (Gneezy, Muriel Niederle, and Aldo Rustichini, 2003; Niederle and Lise Vesterlund, 2005). One immediate implication of this is to suggest that women should bid more conservatively (lower) than men. But again we do not observe this for inexperienced women, but rather more aggressive bidding initially resulting in a more severe winner's curse than men.

Absent a solid explanation for these gender differences in the literature, we conjecture that the overbidding may reflect a relative lack of experience with strategic interactions on the part of women compared to men, perhaps as a result of women shying away from competition more than men. It is in competitive situations that strategic interactions would come most into play, and a relative lack of familiarity with such interactions might be sufficient to induce more aggressive bidding as a consequence of the failure to fully think through its implications. We

find this conjecture supported by the fact that women stop bidding more aggressively over time and do not differ from men as experienced bidders. Although this may be due to the “shock therapy” associated with their large early losses, note that business and economics majors do not catch up even though they bid overly aggressively as inexperienced subjects. This suggests that other factors are at play for the women in addition to large early losses.

There have been a handful of other studies looking at gender and ability effects in auctions. E. Elisabet Rutstrom (1998) looks for gender and racial effects in second-price and English private-value auctions with subjects bidding for a box of high quality chocolates. She finds no gender effect, but that non-whites bid significantly higher than whites. Since her auction is best modeled as an independent private value (IPV) auction in which bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their value, the differences could simply represent taste differences. Yan Chen, Peter Katuscak, and Emre Ozdenoren (2005) check for gender effects in first- and second-price sealed-bid IPV auctions. They find that women bid significantly more than men in the first-price auctions, but find no differences in the frequency of bidding their valuations in the second-price auctions. Thus, they find no differences between men and women in the ability to recognize and play the dominant bidding strategy in second-price sealed-bid auctions, while noting that the fact that women are known to be more risk averse than men is consistent with them bidding significantly more than men in first-price auctions. Ham and Kagel (2005) report gender differences in a two-stage auction where first-stage bids are not binding but determine a short-list from which binding second-stage bids will be solicited in a sealed-bid private value auction. They find that women are significantly more likely than men to bid higher with lower (less profitable) stage-one values and to bid lower than men with higher (more profitable) stage-one values; and that women are significantly more likely to go bankrupt than men. Once again these results cannot be explained by risk aversion since it is far riskier (in terms of expected profits) to get into stage-two with lower stage-one values. Johanna Goertz (2006) looks at learning in common value auctions drawing from the same sample population as the present experiment in order to see if inexperienced bidders have a more or less severe winner’s curse when competing against experienced bidders. Her bid factor estimates for men and women in the control group of inexperienced bidders are remarkably similar to ours.

In the papers cited in the previous paragraph, there are no explicit controls for ability as measured by SAT/ACT scores, or grade point average, as in the present paper. Chen et al. (2005)

collect information on numbers of courses taken by fields (e.g., science and engineering, economics and business, etc.).³³ Rutstrom (1998) uses self-reported information on income, age, and marital status but finds no significant effects from any of these variables. Ham and Kagel (2005) have no additional demographic or ability data on their subjects, nor does Goertz (2006).

A closely related environment in which gender effects similar to those reported here have been identified is in the “takeover” game (Charness and Levin, 2006).³⁴ This game also involves a potential winner’s curse should subjects ignore the adverse selection effect associated with bidding high enough to meet the owner’s reservation price when attempting to acquire a company. Charness and Levin employ a series of questions testing for statistical sophistication in Bayesian updating in an effort to directly control for the relevant ability characteristics in checking for a gender effect in their task. They find a gender effect similar to the one reported here, with men less likely to commit a winner’s curse than women, and that this gender effect is robust and relatively large in regressions that include the number of correct answers in their quiz for statistical sophistication.

Thus, it appears that the gender effect identified here with respect to the winner’s curse is robust to the details of the game and the types of controls one could employ to account for possible omitted variable bias. Note that none of the above studies, except for Ham and Kagel (2005), investigate differential learning on the part of women and men. They did not find evidence of the type of learning by gender interaction effect observed here, perhaps because the feedback promoting learning was not as clear cut as in the common value auctions.

VIII. Summary and Conclusions

We have investigated selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments. We employed three different treatments and collected demographic and ability data on our subjects with the aid of the University Enrollment Office. As is typical of common value auction experiments, inexperienced bidders suffered from a strong winner’s curse, earning negative average profits and suffering numerous bankruptcies. More experienced bidders did substantially better, earning positive average profits with relatively few bankruptcies. We obtained a number of substantive insights into this learning/adjustment process as well as a number of methodological insights.

³³ Chen et al. (2005) incorporate other extrinsic factors that they believe might affect bidding, discussion of which goes well beyond the scope of this section.

³⁴ Also see Charness and Levin (2005) for closely related results.

First, we find that some bidders are better than others: There are clear ability effects in the data as measured by SAT/ACT scores, as one might suspect. However, the pattern is different than might have been anticipated. The major impact of ability comes from bidders with below median composite test scores performing worse than those with above median test scores in terms of bidding more aggressively and going bankrupt, with the highest ability subjects (those scoring in the 95% or better on composite SAT/ACT scores) doing a bit better than the rest. Further, in terms of statistical significance, we find stronger effects using the composite SAT/ACT score in the hazard estimates and the experienced subject bid functions than either the math or verbal scores alone. This suggests a general comprehension issue underlying better or worse performance in the auctions.

There are two interesting demographic effects. Most surprising, and least anticipated, is that women start out bidding substantially higher than men. However, they learn much faster so that by the end of the inexperienced subject sessions, the differences between men and women have narrowed substantially. Further, women do as well as men as experienced bidders. This gender effect among inexperienced bidders cannot be attributed to risk aversion (as with a winner's curse bidders are earning negative average profits), or to ability (as we control for this with our SAT/ACT scores as well as data on undergraduate major). We have reviewed other potential causes for the gender effect identified and found them lacking as well. Our conjecture is that the overbidding may reflect a relative lack of experience with strategic interactions on the part of women compared to men. It remains to be seen if this effect shows up in other environments as well.

The second demographic effect identified is that economics and business majors tend to bid more aggressively than other majors.³⁵ The explanation for this effect that comes most immediately to mind is that economics and business students have a relatively aggressive mind set in commercial environments that gets in the way of maximizing profits in this environment. Note, we are not arguing that these students get extra utility from winning. Just that they are more aggressive in "business type" settings which may help in a number of situations, but not

³⁵ There are scattered reports of differences between economics/business majors and other students in the literature. Most of these deal with differences in the degree of self-interested behavior. Bjorn Frank and Gunther G. Schulze (2000) review these studies and report a new experiment, which, among other things, suggests that these differences result from selection effects, not training as economics/business majors, similar to what we found here.

here.³⁶ One possible implication of this result is that the winner's curse might be particularly hard to eliminate in a number of field settings where bidders with business and/or economics majors might be expected to be responsible for formulating bidding strategies.³⁷

Aggregate adjustment toward the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is achieved in the different treatments through a mix of market selection and individual learning. When bidders have a low or medium cash endowment, they have less opportunity to learn and go bankrupt much faster. What larger cash balances do is to provide bidders with protection from bankruptcy while permitting them to learn to avoid the winner's curse. As such, learning can serve as a partial substitute for ability in terms of overcoming the winner's curse and as a substitute for market selection effects. This result provides some justification for the common practice of "qualified bid lists" (limiting who can bid on a project). The European Union adopts qualified bid lists to actively limit entry into government procurement auctions in an attempt to foster individual learning and minimize market selection (CEE Directive n.37, June 13, 1993). The common pattern here is to require bidders to have proven themselves in smaller projects before they can move on to large ones of the same type. Although this does limit competition in the short run, it has the benefit of insuring that bidders have the experience necessary to successfully complete the project. In the commercial construction industry, and a host of other environments, letting a contract only to have the winning bidder default or delay completion because of financial distress causes enormous problems for the seller, ranging from badly needed but stalled completion of construction projects to tying up valuable assets in litigation, as bankrupt bidders are loath to give up what they have won in the auction.³⁸

We have also identified clear selection effects in the data, since without special inducements (i.e., the bonus treatment and the high return fee random treatment), less successful bidders are much less likely to return for experienced subject sessions. These selection effects

³⁶ Holt and Roger Sherman (1994) conducted an experiment to distinguish between the joy of winning as opposed to the failure to appreciate the adverse selection effect conditional on winning. They reject the joy of winning argument.

³⁷ We are reminded of an anecdote told to us from the early spectrum auctions where an advisor to a major company urged his client to practice demand reduction as greater profits could be earned by winning fewer licenses at lower prices. The CEO's response was to post a bumper sticker on the advisor's computer that read: "Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing."

³⁸ The latter perils are vividly illustrated by the 1996 FCC auction of a block of spectrum for personal communications services reserved to small business ("C-block"). The bulk of that spectrum was either tied up in bankruptcy courts or returned to the FCC for re-auctioning, hence leaving a valuable asset unused for years because of the inability of auction winners to pay their bids.

lead to a confounding of market learning with individual subject learning. Although this is a particularly acute problem in common value auctions with less successful bidders going bankrupt, it might well be a problem in other experimental environments. The interesting methodological point here is that one is much better off using experimental design to identify and measure these selection effects and unbiased parameter estimates. That is, the power to control the environment yields far superior outcomes relative to more sophisticated statistical techniques. This is, in some sense, good news for experimenters as it means that they do not have to tool up on very advanced econometric techniques to do their analysis, or obtain prohibitively expensive, large samples. They do, however, have to be aware of *potential* sources of estimation bias and take steps in designing their experiments to account for these biases.

As part of our investigation we have compared our subjects to those in the general university population. We found the striking result that our sample of both men and women are of significantly higher ability than the average student in the university population. This result sheds light on a broader question lurking in the background of experimental work in general. Models of economic behavior typically postulate “rational” economic behavior, which is presumably positively related to intellectual ability, for which SAT/ACT scores serve as a reasonable proxy. When we observe behavior in experiments that does not match our models, the question becomes how representative are the results likely to be as compared to those for the general population? To the extent that rational behavior is positively related to intellectual ability as measured by SAT/ACT scores, our experimental sample is drawing from the upper end of the distribution. Although this does not imply that we are dealing with people who are as “smart” or “expert” as one can imagine in a number of field settings (e.g., oil company personnel bidding for oil exploration rights or a signaling game involving firm behavior), for a variety of other applications we are no doubt dealing with a much “smarter” cohort in the lab than the general population (e.g., applications of the winner’s curse to jury decisions or attempts by corporations to use advertising to signal product quality to the general population).

Finally, our experimental manipulations enable us to clearly identify the impact of cash balances on bidding. Inexperienced bidders with larger cash balances bid somewhat less aggressively than those with smaller balances, but the differences in cash balance are not nearly enough to account for bidding above the expected value conditional on winning, which is so prominent among inexperienced bidders. Cash balances have an even smaller role to play in

experienced subjects' bid function. This too is good news for experimenters since it appears that real payoffs are more important than hypothetical payoffs (at least in this environment), but that the changes in the subjects' overall earnings during the course of the experiment have minimal impact on behavior.

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Figure 1: Bankruptcy rate for inexperienced bidders





Figure 2: Bid factor by gender (week 1, Low Bankruptcy Group)



Notes: A bid equal to the signal (private estimate) is represented as zero; The risk neutral Nash equilibrium bid (RNNE) is at about 15; The cut-off point for the definition of the winner's curse (expected zero profits) is at 10.71 and it is marked as a dashed line. There is no correction for selection effects due to bankruptcies or not returning for week 2. Data are for region 2 and markets with 6 bidders only.

Table 1**Experimental Treatments and Descriptive Statistics**

	Number of Sessions (Number of subjects)	Average Auction Profits ^a (S_m)	Average Profits RNNE ^a (S_m)	Percent Auctions x_{1n} Wins ^a	Percent of Bids $b > \tilde{y}(x_i)^a$ (Above Breakeven Bid)		Percentage Bankrupt	Percent Returning from Week 1	Percent Bankrupt in Week 1 Returning
					All Bidders	High Bidders			
Week 1									
Control	6 (95)	-2.84 (0.478)	4.34 (0.281)	55.8	50.1	73.4	46.3	NA	NA
Random	5 (81)	-1.89 (0.448)	4.73 (0.277)	56.7	43.0	67.1	30.9	NA	NA
Bonus	5 (75)	-2.91 (0.566)	3.49 (0.271)	68.9	38.5	57.1	33.3	NA	NA
Combined	16 (251)	-2.47 (0.285)	4.26 (0.163)	59.9	43.9	66.2	37.5	NA	NA
Week 2									
Control	4 (57)	0.79 (0.374)	4.45 (0.277)	79.2	19.8	34.8	19.3	60.0	47.7
Random	4 (60)	1.05 (0.298)	4.27 (0.233)	81.9	14.2	29.3	6.7	74.1	56.0
Bonus	5 (72)	0.48 (0.288)	4.09 (0.204)	79.4	18.7	33.4	13.9	96.0	88.0
Combined	13 (189)	0.75 (0.183)	4.25 (0.135)	80.1	17.6	32.5	13.2	75.3	60.6

^a Auctions with 6 active bidders only NA = not applicable.

Table 2
Sample Composition and University Population
(Percentages)

	All		Male		Female	
Gender	Sample ^a	Population	Sample ^a	Population	Sample ^a	Population
Male	59.7	51.8				
Female	40.3	48.2				
Major						
Econ & Bus	30.2	12.3	69.3	60.1	30.7	39.9
Eng & Science	23.4	25.8	82.8	67.8	17.2	32.2
Other	46.4	61.9	41.7	43.5	58.3	56.5
SAT/ACT Verbal						
Top 5%	17.7	7.0	18.2	6.9	17.0	7.0
Above median but not top 5%	51.2	43.9	53.4	44.0	48.0	43.7
Below median	17.7	28.1	14.2	27.3	23.0	28.9
No score	13.3	21.1	14.2	21.8	12.0	20.3
SAT/ACT Math						
Top 5%	25.0	7.8	35.8	10.6	9.0	4.8
Above median but not top 5%	52.0	49.8	46.0	52.2	61.0	47.2
Below median	9.7	21.3	4.1	15.4	18.0	27.8
No score	13.3	21.1	14.2	21.8	12.0	20.3
SAT/ACT Composite						
Top 5%	20.2	4.9	25.7	5.9	12.0	3.9
Above median but not top 5%	57.7	53.2	54.7	54.5	62.0	51.6
Below median	8.9	20.9	5.4	17.8	14.0	24.2
No score	13.3	21.1	14.2	21.8	12.0	20.3
Grade Point Average						
A	6.5	4.7	6.8	4.0	6.0	5.5
B+ / B	25.8	19.5	27.7	17.5	23.0	21.7
B- or below	12.5	27.6	12.8	30.5	12.0	24.4
Freshman, Sophomore or no GPA	55.2	48.2	52.7	48.0	59.0	48.4

^a Inexperienced (week 1) subjects.

Table3-Estimates of the Conditional Probability of Going Bankrupt for Inexperienced (Week 1) Subjects

	<i>No Demographics</i>		<i>Composite Scores Used</i>	
Initial Balances Plus Lottery Winnings	-0.141 (0.038)***	-0.150 (0.041)***	-0.154 (0.038)***	-0.162 (0.041)***
Received Highest Signal This Period	2.569 (0.313)***	2.589 (0.316)***	2.695 (0.319)***	2.722 (0.324)***
Received 2 nd Highest Signal This Period	2.175 (0.327)***	2.175 (0.329)***	2.303 (0.334)***	2.307 (0.337)***
Female	-	-	0.571 (0.242)**	0.590 (0.254)**
Above 95th Percentile SAT/ACT	-	-	-0.716 (0.375)*	-0.739 (0.388)*
Below Median SAT/ACT	-	-	1.252 (0.331)***	1.272 (0.347)***
No SAT/ACT Score	-	-	0.064 (0.337)	0.183 (3.606)
Fraction Previous Periods Received High Signal	-3.140 (0.988)***	-3.133 (1.002)***	-2.916 (0.974)***	-2.863 (0.991)***
Fraction Previous Periods Received 2 nd High Signal	-1.033 (0.693)	-1.057 (0.714)	-0.718 (0.693)	-0.734 (0.708)
Engineering/Science Major	-	-	-0.225 (0.338)	-0.236 (0.353)
Economics/Business Major	-	-	0.138 (0.270)	0.121 (0.282)
Log Duration	-0.316 (0.126)**	-0.281 (0.134)**	-0.292 (0.128)**	-0.261 (0.137)*
Constant	2.481 (0.516)***	-	-2.806 (0.577)***	-
Theta1	-	-2.668 (0.582)***	-	-2.926 (0.618)***
Theta2	-	-1.690 (0.944)*	-	-1.848 (1.029)*
P-value (Theta1=Theta2)	-	0.679 (0.393)*	-	0.793 (0.317)**
Unobserved Heterogeneity?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Log Likelihood	-366.3	-365.6	-349.0	-348.6
Number of Observations	4981	4981	4981	4981

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;* significant at the 10% level;** significant at the 5% level;*** significant at the 1% level.

Table 4- Bidding Equation for Inexperienced (Week 1) Subjects (Composite Aptitude Scores Used)

	<i>No Demographics</i>		<i>Learning without Gender Interaction</i>		<i>Learning with Gender Interaction</i>	
	<i>Low Bankruptcy Group</i>	<i>High Bankruptcy Group</i>	<i>Low Bankruptcy Group</i>	<i>High Bankruptcy Group</i>	<i>Low Bankruptcy Group</i>	<i>High Bankruptcy Group</i>
Cash Balances	0.1285 (0.0566)**	0.0962 (0.0240)***	0.1209 (0.0561)**	0.0966 (0.0239)***	0.1064 (0.0549)*	0.0953 (0.0238)***
h(x)	0.2386 (0.3196)	0.0783 (0.2401)	0.2337 (0.3181)	0.0706 (0.2391)	0.2174 (0.3133)	0.0835 (0.2387)
1/ln(t+1)	-3.0306 (0.4269)***	-0.8690 (0.2749)***	-2.9907 (0.4246)***	-0.7830 (0.2740)***	-	-
Male*(1/ln(t+1))	-	-	-	-	-1.3624 (0.5560)**	-0.1715 (0.3408)
Female*(1/ln(t+1))	-	-	-	-	-5.6477 (0.6356)***	-1.8044 (0.4214)***
Female	-	-	-3.2186 (0.9688)***	-2.1020 (0.7973)***	-1.0932 (1.0940)	-1.1040 (0.8577)
Above 95th Percentile SAT/ACT	-	-	-0.5589 (1.0286)	1.1837 (0.9669)	-0.4903 (1.0392)	1.1443 (0.9651)
Below Median SAT/ACT	-	-	-0.6999 (1.4911)	-4.4050 (1.3753)***	-0.8991 (1.5032)	-4.3570 (1.3727)***
No SAT/ACT Score	-	-	-5.1348 (1.5101)***	-0.6704 (1.0850)	-4.9508 (1.5227)***	-0.6500 (1.0829)
Engineering/Science Major	-	-	-0.1976 (1.1277)	0.0167 (1.0031)	-0.3472 (1.1393)	-0.0043 (1.0012)
Economics/Business Major	-	-	-2.7001 (1.0765)**	-0.6048 (0.9192)	-2.8859 (1.0861)***	-0.6370 (0.9175)
Constant	8.9864 (1.0562)***	7.6498 (0.5089)***	11.8951 (1.4903)***	8.8545 (0.8889)***	11.4600 (1.5180)***	8.5493 (0.8950)***
Number of Observations	1702	3279	1702	3279	1702	3279
P-value (coefficients same in both sub-samples)	0.00		0.00		0.00	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.

Table 5- Estimated Bid Factors for Inexperienced (Week 1) Subjects

A. Low Bankruptcy Group Estimates				
	<i>FEMALE</i>		<i>MALE</i>	
	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>
Period 1	1.0335 (1.2297)	3.9194 (0.9093)***	8.3091 (0.9873)***	11.1950 (1.1257)***
Period 10	6.8261 (1.0877)***	9.7120 (0.7192)***	9.7064 (0.8197)***	12.5923 (1.0127)***
Period 20	7.3264 (1.0930)***	10.2123 (0.7283)***	9.8271 (0.8223)***	12.7130 (1.0175)***
Period 30	7.5368 (1.0961)***	10.4227 (0.7333)***	9.8779 (0.8243)***	12.7638 (1.0202)***
Period 30 – Period 1	6.5033	6.5033	1.5688	1.5688
B. High Bankruptcy Group Estimates				
	<i>FEMALE</i>		<i>MALE</i>	
	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>
Period 1	5.7280 (0.9621)***	6.3650 (0.8470)***	9.1877 (0.8449)***	9.8247 (0.8865)***
Period 10	7.5787 (0.8905)***	8.2156 (0.7734)***	9.3636 (0.7730)***	10.0006 (0.8207)***
Period 20	7.7385 (0.8939)***	8.3754 (0.7781)***	9.3788 (0.7739)***	10.0158 (0.8218)***
Period 30	7.8057 (0.8958)***	8.4427 (0.7806)***	9.3852 (0.7747)***	10.0222 (0.8226)***
Period 30 – Period 1	2.0777	2.0777	0.1975	0.1975

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates used are taken from column 5 of Table 4 for panel (A) and from column 6 of Table 4 for panel (B). Results are for subjects with a composite ability score between the median and 95%. In each period, cash balances were assumed to take on the mean value for the low bankruptcy group.

*** significant at the 1% level.

Table 6- Bidding Equation for Experienced (Week 2) Subjects (Composite Aptitude Scores Used)

	<i>No Demographics</i>		<i>Learning without Gender Interaction</i>		<i>Learning with Gender Interaction</i>	
	<i>High Return Group</i>	<i>Low Return Group</i>	<i>High Return Group</i>	<i>Low Return Group</i>	<i>High Return Group</i>	<i>Low Return Group</i>
Cash Balance	0.0409 (0.0148)***	0.1062 (0.0198)***	0.0395 (0.0148)***	0.1064 (0.0198)***	0.0390 (0.0147)***	0.1061 (0.0198)***
h(x)	-0.4490 (0.2238)**	-0.1835 (0.1958)	-0.4321 (0.2208)**	-0.1854 (0.1954)	-0.4366 (0.2209)**	-0.1853 (0.1954)
1/ln(t+1)	-0.6116 (0.2979)**	0.1941 (0.2550)	-0.5399 (0.2950)*	0.2164 (0.2547)	-	-
Male*(1/ln(t+1))	-	-	-	-	-0.2883 (0.3682)	0.2070 (0.2931)
Female*(1/ln(t+1))	-	-	-	-	-0.8781 (0.3951)**	0.2277 (0.3874)
Female	-	-	0.4275 (0.9577)	0.2614 (0.5308)	0.7033 (0.9766)	0.2514 (0.5700)
Above 95th Percentile SAT/ACT	-	-	0.0585 (1.0204)	-0.6837 (0.5971)	0.0616 (1.0105)	-0.6837 (0.5965)
Below Median SAT/ACT	-	-	-3.9275 (1.4102)***	-0.2475 (0.9935)	-3.9280 (1.3969)***	-0.2480 (0.9926)
No SAT/ACT Score	-	-	-1.5014 (1.3571)	-0.2850 (0.7475)	-1.4865 (1.3442)	-0.2866 (0.7469)
Engineering/Science Major	-	-	1.0021 (1.1090)	1.7739 (0.6574)***	1.0082 (1.0983)	1.7730 (0.6567)***
Economics/Business Major	-	-	-2.2637 (1.1214)**	1.0682 (0.6216)	-2.2661 (1.1106)**	1.0675 (0.6210)*
Constant	11.2935 (0.4737)***	10.2982 (0.4334)***	11.7665 (1.1547)***	9.5110 (0.6796)***	11.6536 (1.1517)***	9.5204 (0.6820)***
Number of Observations	1996	2360	1996	2360	1996	2360
P-value (coefficients same in both sub-samples)	0.05		0.02		0.02	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*significant at the 10% level;** significant at the 5% level;*** significant at the 1% level.

Table 7- Estimated Bid Factors for Experienced (Week 2) Subjects

A. High Return Sample Estimates				
	<i>FEMALE</i>		<i>MALE</i>	
	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>
Period 1	9.4475 (1.0703)***	11.7136 (0.8638)***	9.5952 (0.9391)***	11.8613 (1.1056)***
Period 10	10.3482 (0.9993)***	12.6143 (0.7800)***	9.8908 (0.8876)***	12.1569 (1.0652)***
Period 20	10.4260 (1.0007)***	12.6921 (0.7822)***	9.9164 (0.8905)***	12.1825 (1.0680)***
Period 30	10.4587 (1.0016)***	12.7248 (0.7836)***	9.9271 (0.8921)***	12.1932 (1.0694)***
Period 1 – Period 30, Table 5.A	1.9107	1.2909	-0.2827	-0.9025
Period 30 – Period 1	1.0112	1.0112	0.3319	0.3319
B. Low Return Sample Estimates				
	<i>FEMALE</i>		<i>MALE</i>	
	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>	<i>Bus/Econ</i>	<i>Other majors</i>
Period 1	12.8641 (0.7082)***	11.7966 (0.6538)***	12.5828 (0.5743)***	11.5153 (0.6211)***
Period 10	12.6306 (0.5969)***	11.5631 (0.5393)***	12.3705 (0.4906)***	11.3030 (0.5531)***
Period 20	12.6104 (0.5988)***	11.5429 (0.5421)***	12.3522 (0.4914)***	11.2847 (0.5545)***
Period 30	12.6019 (0.6002)***	11.5344 (0.5438)***	12.3445 (0.4921)***	11.2770 (0.5555)***
Period 1 – Period 30, Table 5.B	5.0584	3.3539	3.1976	1.4931
Period 30 – Period 1	-0.2622	-0.2622	-0.2383	-0.2383

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates used are taken from column 5 of Table 6 for panel (A) and from column 6 of Table 6 for panel (B). Results are for subjects with a composite ability score between the median and 95%. In each period, cash balances were assumed to take on the mean value for the low bankruptcy group in Table 5.

*** significant at the 1% level.