Today Federal Reserve System aka FRS, Fed M+B 16 Tools of M Control

M+B 17


The Federal RESErve System (FRS)

12 Federal Reserve Banks

A= 1. Boston B: 2. New York C: 3. Philadelphia D: 4. Cleveland E.S. Richmond F. G. Atlanta 6: 7. Chicage H: 8. St. Louis I= 9. Minneapolis J , 10. Kansas City K: 11. Dallas San Francisco 2:12.

+ Board of Governors (FRB)

Washington, D.C.



LEGEND

- Federal Reserve Bank city
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.

Figure 2

This map is totally irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy. However,

no Money and Banking textbook would seem complete without it.

Semce: FR Billetin Nov 94

Each FR Note is issued by 1 of the 12 FR Banko?



E=5 = Richmond, Va.



D = 4 = Clevelard

FR Banks have little Power.

FRB, FOMC more important.

OFRB : FR Board = Board of Governors = BOG. 9 FOMC > Federal Open Market Committel

Board of Governors (BOG) aka FR Board (FRB) 0 7 Members, 14 yr terms expire 1/00, 1/02, etc. · Prosident appoints, Senate continue, · Governors may not be appointed to more than I full term => max term = 27.9 yrs. (eg. Alan Groonspan 18.5 yrs) · FRB sets fre within limits set by Congress $|c| = \frac{c+1}{c+f_R+f_X}$ • FRB comprises 7 of 12 members of FOMC

Table 1

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

In order by end of term

March 2011

Name	Year Appointed	Term Ends Jan. 31	Theoretical Appointing Admin.	Actual Appointing Admin.
Elizabeth A. Duke	2008	2012	Clinton II	GW Bush II
Vacant since 8/08*	?	2014	Clinton II	??
Sarah Bloom Raskin	2010	2016	GW Bush I	Obama I
Vacant after 3/11**	?	2018	GW Bush I	??
Ben S. Bernanke	2006	2020	GW Bush II	GW Bush II
(Chairman)				
Daniel K. Tarullo	2009	2022	GW Bush II	Obama I
Janet L. Yellen	2010	2024	Obama l	Obama I
(Vice Chair)				

Data source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/

Note that only 5 of the 7 seats are actually filled, and of these 5, only 2 were filled on the theoretical 14 year cycle. Although President Obama was only guaranteed one position by the date of this table, he in fact had already filled three, and could still fill two more.

* Peter Diamond (subsequently winner of the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics) was nominated by President Obama for the seat expiring in 2014, but the Senate returned his nomination without action. He has been renominated, but no action has been taken as of 3/23/11.

** Kevin Warsh, who was appointed George W. Bush II in 2006 to the seat expiring in 2018, has announced his intent to resign from the Board at the end of March 2011.

Chairman of FR Board · 4 yr term from continution date · Pres appointe, Sente contiins " Is 1 of the 7 FRB members. Table 2 Selected Federal Reserve Board Chairmen Oct. 2010 Name Term as Chairman Appointing President(s) Marriner S. Eccles 11/4/36 - 4/15/48 FD Roosevelt Wm. McC. Martin, Jr. 4/2/51 – 1/31/70 Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson Arthur F. Burns 2/1/70 - 1/31/78Nixon 3/8/78 - 8/6/79 G. William Miller Carter Carter, Reagan Paul A. Volcker 8/6/79 - 8/11/87 Alan Greenspan 8/11/87 -- 1/31/06 Reagan, Bush41, Clinton, Bush43 Ben S. Bernanke 2/1/06 - 1/31/14* Bush43, Obama

* Second Term as Chairman expires Jan. 31, 2014. Term on Board continues to Jan. 31, 2020.

Source: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/bios/boardmembership.htm>.

• Note that <u>Miller, Volcker and Greenspan</u>'s terms as Chairman fell <u>out of sync</u> with the expiration of a seat on the Board, but that <u>Bernanke's term is back in sync</u>.

Many are bijertian appoint els.

 $B = C + R = C_F + G_F + D_R$

Table 3

Consolidated Federal Reserve Balance Sheet (Traditional)

July 5<u>, 2007</u> (billions of dollars)

	Assets			Liabilities + Net Worth		
5	Securities of US Treasury 790.5 (held outright)		Federal Reserve Notes	CF	781.4 Bulk	
,				Dep osits	_	10,0
L	Loans:		27.4	Reserve	DR	16.7 / Base.
	to dealers as Repos	27.2		Other	Da	36.9
	to banks through			US Treasury	4.6 Do	
	Discount Window	0.2		Foreign Official 3	32.3	
				(incl. Reverse Repos)		
	International Reserves:		51.5	,	• /	
L	Gold Certificates	11.0		Misc. Liabilities		<u>11.3</u>
	Foreign Currency	38.3				
	SDR Certificates	2.2		Total Liabilities		846.3
	Misc. Assets		<u> </u>	Capital Accounts (NW	n NW	<u>34.1</u>
	Total Assets		880.4	Liabilities + NW		880.4

Adapted from Federal Reserve Bulletin Statistical Release H4.1.

Mano: Transmy Curroney (+ (coin) = \$38.5 B.

ירס/ר = B = 5 + L + I + (-- Pa - NW = (790.5) + (27.4) + (51.5) + (38.5) - (36.9) - (34.1) = \$836.9B 1 - + - l = \$829.2B

Traditional Base Equation MERB (pre-2008) Asseto Lieb. l.ties, NW Securities GE FR Currency Loans DR Reserve Dop. Int'l Res. Do Other Dep. NW Balance Sheet Identity A= L+NW > Most of B => S+L+I = (F+PR+PG+NW CF+OR = S+L+I-D-NW In fact, B=C+R=CF+G+DR where CT = Freesury Coursenay = Coin. B= 5+2+I+C+-B-NW => Drains on B Sources of B DB = DS + AL + DI + DCT - AD - ANW

Open Market Operations (OMOs)

Purchases and Sales of Treasury securities by Fed = 25

Executed by NY Fed for system.

"Open Market Dock"

Decision mede by FOMC

Fed's OMO's. (as) <u>sr</u>, B1 - Bond Prices P, Yielde V

54,84 -> Band Prices 4, Yields 1

· Fed could set B via 5, let market set bod prices, yields. (i)

· Fed could set i via bood prices, let market set S. B

But not both .

Dynamic us Defensive OMO's Dynamic - intended to cause SB Defensive - intended to offset DB caused by AL, AI, etc.

SI= + \$78 A Po = + \$1B ANW=+ \$2B -> DB = (+7) - (+1) - (+2) = + #4B if \$5=0 $\Rightarrow \Delta B = 0 \quad ;f \quad \Delta S = -(+4B) = -\frac{8}{4}B$

AL! Net Loans Mosthy than Repos. (Traditionally) Repurchase Agreements (Repos) In effect -· Loan collateralized by a Treasury security Operationally -· Lender buys security from borrower. · Borrower agrees to repurchase next day (if overnight) For sale price plus I day's interest @ repo rate. · Collatoral changes ownership twice.

Bank a Nou bank Close substitute for Fed Kundo transactions FF Rate = Ropo Rate. Non bank 6> Non bank No effect on M, B. Fed => Non banks (Dealors) Changes L, B

Coupon Passes

Pariodic big OMO (as), offset by opposite BL Holdo L in range \$10-\$50B. => Day-to-day AB mostly AL Year-bo-year AB mosty as (in Traditional pre-2008 Fed)

Discount Window · Loans by Fed directly bo Banks, Thirty * Fed Charges banks Discourt Rate · Ordinarly very small portion of "L". -> Sinte 1/2003 Discount rate set 0.5% above FF target. =) only failing banks borrow parcoptible ants. -> 1930 - 2003 Access severely limited except for faiting banks . => barrowings nashigible except during crises -> WWI, 1920's

Vary important

-> 2009-Discounto up to \$35.9 B

Net Worth "NW"

Who owno Fed?

Mamber banks own "stock" (NW) get dividendo


Bart -Have little control. Dividendo restricted to 6% of par value. (trivial)

Fed very profitable. (pre-2008)

Most profibs > Trocsury.

=> Effectively a Public Agency.

Seigniorge under Feel Treasury roas deficit, sells bondo Fad buys book a/non Base M · Receives it from Trons. · Returns int to Treasury. " Treas got perpetual infree loan Treas may as well have printed M. isoff. (as with Civil uner Granbacks) But spending decision separated from AM decision · (Pro-2008!) Pre- 2008 R: RE+RX Pays is 0 => S = DB = 2 AM = 2 M.M. Since 10/08, Rx pays competities i BNot = C+RR only. Rx just represents Financial Internation by Fed The Fad exposed to crediterisk, i-risk on supported portfelio.



8

Between August 2008 and August 2009, the US Monetary base increased from \$843.0 billion to \$1705.4 billion, a 102% increase in just one year. Will this lead to inflation as the banks find borrowers for these funds?

Table 3B

Consolidated Federal Reserve Balance Sheet (Bernanke)

(billions of dollars)							
	Assets		Liabilities + Net Wor	th			
5	Securities of US Treasury (held outright)	657.0	Federal Reserve Notes	871.3	CF		
,	Loans:	318.7	Deposits Reserve	726.3	DR		
2	to dealers as Repos 0.0		Other	334.8	Do		
	to banks 318.7		US Tr <u>easury</u> 271.9		00		
	Discount Window 35.9		Foreign 72.9				
	Term Auction Cred. 282.8		(incl. Reverse Repos)				
I	International Reserves:	202.4	Misc. Liabilities	26.4			
	Gold & SDR Certificates 13.2			1050.0			
	Foreign Currency 73.9 Cent. Bank Liq. Swaps 115.3		Total Liabilities	1958.8			
\frown	Cent. Bank Elq. Swaps 115.5						
(エ)	Junk:	823.8					
\bigcirc	 Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac 559 	9.3					
	 Mort. Backed Secs 462.5 Debt 96.8 						
		5.9					
		8.9					
	⁹ Direct Credit 42.8						
	s Maiden Lane II & III 36.1						
	··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···	9.7					
	 MMMF CP Funding Fac 1 Term Asset-Backed Securities 	4.9					
	•	5.1					
	Misc. Assets	5.5	Capital Accounts (NW)	<u>48.6</u>	NW		
	Total Assets	2,007.4	Liabilities + NW	2,007.4			

July 2, 2009 (billions of dollars)

Adapted from Federal Reserve Bulletin Statistical Release H4.1.

Momo: C- = \$42.4 B

Boundarie B=S+L+I+J+G-Do-NW

Junk Asset J & Risky stuff no one else will buy - at price Feel pays " Mostly Subprime Mortage - Related Now Primary Source of B - \$824B Fannie - Freddie \$559.3 B Dobt \$973 Mort. Backed Securities \$462B Bear Stearns \$ 26B "Maiden Lane I'LLC" AIG \$ 79 B Direct advance + "Maidon Lane II + TII" CP Funding Facility \$120 B MMMF CP Funding Fac. \$15 B Term Asset-Bached Soco Londing Fac \$25 B

Traditional is Bernanke Feel Traditional (pra-2008) Congress decides " How much to spore on what, · who to spend on · Now much to berrow. Fad decides · Now much Treasury Dobt to monetise. Bernanke (Since 2008)

Food docides I Now much to spend, on what O who so spendon F+F, AIG, Bear, but not Lohman. Invokes Emergency Powers 3 13 (3) of Fed. Ros. Act. No specific Act of Congress reguisel.

Liabilities Side

Reserve Deposits · 2007 \$ 16.7 B Paid O int. Mostly Rogaried Reserves 02009 \$ 726 B Mostly Excess Reserves Paid Interest since 10/08. => Food now acto as a Financial Intermediany as well as a traditional Cantual Banks, Is exposed to credit risk, interest rate risk on

corresponding assets.

6 Side control

2009- \$271.93 · Mosty unspent TARP \$? · Offsets ~ \$260 B of Assets (Sor J) o will & Base it sport.

Since 12/07 Term Anction Credit Facility · 28-or 82-day loans to Banks " Andioned to highest bidders ·\$282.8 B 7/09 · Makes L major Source of Base

Functions of F.R. 1. Tax on D. $f_R \uparrow \rightarrow k \downarrow \rightarrow s = \frac{i}{k} \mu m \uparrow$ 2. Makes k less sensitive to c. => M= k B casier to control w/B. 3. Provides banks liquidity only if Re may be used For withdrawals. If not, banks need Rx for antholiands. · 1930's - Rx high even after FR 1 in 1937. · late 19th cent. -Nat'l Banks suspended if f & fR. => frequent suspensions. Ban on lending when fift would make Re avail. for with drawals.