

Bank + Thrift Deposit Insumme + Regulation M+B28



# Bank Suspensions, 1900-1933

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0	1905	1910	1915	1920	1925	1930	
	1903	1910	1313	1920			

Year	Number of Suspensions	Losses as a Percent of Deposits in all Commercial Banks
1921	506	0.21%
1922	366	0.13
1923	646	0.19
1924	775	0.23
1925	617	0.16
1926	975	0.21
1927	669	0.15
1928	498	0.10
1929	659	0.18
1930	1,350	0.57
1931	2,293	1.01
1932	1,453	0.57
1933	4,000	2.15

#### **Commercial Bank Suspensions and Depositor Losses, 1921-1933**

From FDIC: A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the United States, 1998. (Col. 3 from Friedman and Schwartz).

· Althe suspensions were frequent during 1920's, losses to depositors were small. 2

· Even 1930-33 losses were not lage, on ang.

FOIC Fadard Daposit Brance Corp. 1935 · Insures deposits up to \$250,000 (since 2008) por depositor per bank. · Paid for by assessments on barles . 1/12 To normally

· Grand fathered in existing banks (about 14,000), blocked most further entry (by denying insurance) -> End of Free Banking Eva Mostly Unit Bells at the time .

Restricted competition + prosperity +T

- smooth sailing 1943-81

1960s - Ceitings placed on savings interest rates. (Fed Rog Q) Further increases profit margino. Charters rose in value to 10-20% of

doposits. -> Buyers would pay the FDIC to take over failed banks !

1980 DIDMC Act Depository Institutions Deresulation + Monetary Control Act

· Deresulation

· Allowed Now Accts nationide Interest - bearing checkeble Deposits Banks + Thatts.

· Phased out cailings on Sarings, (D interest. by 1986.

o M Centrol

· Imposed unitorm reserve rez. on all banks, thritts.

" Game all banks, thritts access to discount window.

formerly only FR Member CBs.

Failures of FDIC/BIF Insured Banks

250 1982-93 Bank Crisis • Early 80's - Credit Cound 200 -> Farm, Real Estate Failurs · Bil Primes 4 1982 Texes, OK/2. crisis 150 + 1982 - "MBA" countries default Mexico 100 Brazil Regentina · Increased competition post-000MC veduced protition angino, charter values 50 1962 0 1980 1940 1970 1990 1950 1960


"Toe Big to Fail" (TBTF) Versus "Free to Fail" (FTF)

TBTF unofficial policy since 1984 failure of Continental Illinois N.B. · Than #7 bankin US. " Unit Bank under Ill. law. " No branches, small deposit base · Rolied on highly mobile wholesale large (Ds, borrowings for growth Tode over Penn Square Bank's undiversified portfolio of, Okla. oil loans. · Large depositors sensed trankles, ran 5/84 · Fed advanced ~ \$7B discount windows - Until unisured large CDs matured. - Thwarted HOOK dep. insurance coiling. & FOIC took over \$4.5 B bad asset from Fed TBTF gives big banks competitive advantage over small banked, since deposite 100% inside Creates "Moral Hazard" - Incentie to increase visko.






FDIC/BIF Fund as Pct. of Insured Deposits




• FDICIA 1991


FOIC Improvement Act.

· Created multiple capital Zones



< 5% · No brokened deposites






< 2% Receivorship mandated · No payments on subordinated dobt. -> Preceptive receivaship before default!

o FIDICIA Gut'd · Risk- Based deposit insurance promia Highest for wookent banks, thrifts. 1995 - BIF restored to target 1.25 To of insured depesites, promising for good banks minut . Crisis resolved at bank, not public, expense. · Protecting Uninsurad Depositors restricted. · Prohibited if causes loss to Fund. O Except if "severe adverse effects" · But losses require special accessment on other inside banks. End of "Too-Big- to Fail"? but 2008 - Fed, Treasury bailed out Bear Stearns Fannie + Frodelie AI6 Bis BHCs

FDICIA Capital Status of BIF -instead banks

"Undercoptel 106d" 2 4 % capital


To & bandes. Year 5% 1990 3 % 1991 0.5% 1993 0.2% 1992



· Riegle - Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 1994 allows interstate branching outright. · first time since 2nd BUS, 1836! > Better diversitiet in Cenada 30's -> Efficiencias Scale economies -> More composibion -> Fewer small local banks. - One Big Baak?

# Banks in US 1933-1980s almost constant near 14,000 1998 down to 8,774 these controlled by far fower holding co's.

# Branche



Bank Holding Companies

Most US CB's now hold by Holding 6's

Holding Co's dibt is not FDIC insured,

Purposes Double Levernge · Allows operational marger without Financial margers

· Pre - 1994 Skirted ban on interstate branching .

· 1970's 80's Skirbed bans on intra-state branching .

· Allows coordination of commercial, investment banking since 1999 repeal of Glass - Stongall Insured CB makes large loans to risky I.B.

BHCs operate on basiness lines, not legal lines.
 May have 100's of logal entities in dezons of countries.
 Ward to separate which owns what + when.

5+6 Citis's of 1980's

Federal Home Loan Banking Act 1932 Created -· Fadaral St/s 30 yr Fixed Rate Mortsom from O-matricity Passbook Savings =) Severe t- nik. · Faderal Home Loan Banks Sell bonds, land to Stl's · FNLB Board to Regulate S+L's FHLBE. · FSZIC to insure StL'S. (after 1934)

<u>1950-82</u> • i I. I. T. > PV of Assets 4.4.4. PU of Listilies const. => Economic NW 466 even 20. By 1982, Economic NW & S+L'S 2-100 B. => FSLIC Economically insolvent.

Saving Deposit Interest Ceilings (Feel Reg Q) 1960s, 70s effort to restore Thrift profibality No Ceilings -· Most credit intermediated · Deposit rate v D = Loan rate v = vo (abstracting from costs) · Profibs -> 0 (net of normal return to capital) Swm (+0) r = r = ro Dum (+1) Q, Credit

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Deposit Interest Ceiling TD = ro: · Reduces credit supplied bo FI's to Q = 5(= 0) ~ Q0 Demand by borrowers forces the up to Th, where D(FL)= Q · Profits 1 to = (F4\_F0). Q>0

Disintermediation

1960's, 70's

- Savers bypass intermediaries to avoid deposit interest ceilings.
- **\$1,000** T-Bills popular in 60's, 0 Min Denomination  $\uparrow$  to \$10,000 in 1970 to rescue StLS !

# • Money Market Mutual Funds

- Early 70's
- Hold only very short term (~20 days), highly marketable debt securities
  - **T-Bills**

**Corporate Commercial Paper** 

Bank Large CDs

> \$100,000 deregulated early,

negotiable

 $\Rightarrow$  PV very stable

- Allow limited "checks" Payable through CB
- Uninsured, but very safe No R-risk, runproof Regulated by SEC
- Took off 1979-82
- Withstood 25% loss of deposits Jan. 1983, without incident due to MMDA's. Still popular.

House Concurrent Resolution \$290

1982

Placed "Full Faith + Credit of US" bohind Insmod Deposits · > taxpayers, not depositors, would been any losses from S+L closings.

· Prevented runs on insolvent

th-ifts,

· Created "Moral Hazard" problem,

Misinvest mento

- -

Forbrance (1980's)

St L closingo delayed.

Not Worth Cartificate

RAP vs GLAP

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles

(most corps)

Regulatory Acctog Principles

Parmitted to 5+2's in 80's.

=> Insolvent Sthis stayed in business through 80 s.

"Zombie Thrifts"

- Ed Kane

Acted as Ponti Fundo.

1980's

## Thrift NW < 0

## "End Game Strategy" Speculative investments preferred

# Brokered Deposits FSLIC, FDIC insures deposits To \$100,000/depositor/institution

 Brokers direct large sums to most Reckless thrifts, @ \$100,000 each.

1989 -- FSLIC Closed Cost to taxpayers estimated at \$175 Billion (\$750/capita)

· FIRREA 1989 Financial Institution Rotarm, Recovery 2 Enforcement Act. Closed FHLBB 0 O Closed FSLIC " Croated OTS Office of Thingt Supervision O Created SAIF to be operated by BDIC Separately from BIF. (Mersed into DIF in 2006) · Bailed out FSLIC - insured thingt clapesitors Along with uninsured large deposites,

Afts- 19805-O S+L's lost former market share of mortsage intermediation.


a Replaced by

· Commercial Banks Now 6:55050 berrowers from FILL BS! o Fannie Mare + Freddy Mac · Patronized by Sen Ch. Dodd, Rep B. Frank. · Encouraged to make risky loans w/ · low equily · high Payment / Income votios . · Forbearance -· low, even neg. copital late financial statements. · Faleral Reserve Since 2008, acquired \$1.25Tin morbgages, F+F Debt.

## 2008 Banking Crisis .

### FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund

(DIF merges Bank Ins. Fund and Savings Assn. Ins. Funds in 2006) Target level = 1.25% of Insured deposits (permitted range for target 1.15% - 1.50%)



## source: FDIC 2008 Annual Report

### **Bank Failures**

2000-2007	averaged 4/yr
2008	25
2009	124 (as of 11/23)

10/2009 FDIC won't say what current DIF reserve ratio is, but plans to assess banks 3 years' premiums in advance to make up shortfall.

χ.,

**^** ,

Proposal Reforms Paul Volcker -Reinstate Glass. Steagell · Separate insured CBs from risley Indestment Banking. Wm Isaac (Chiv of FDIC, 1981-85) Roinstate Historical Cost Accounting. Under Mark-to-Market Acctg, · fime distabile paper profits as dividends . Then are short on capibal when market values fall. Market For most securities thin. Wistorial cost reflects bank's considered judgement.