Syllabus and Course Outline

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Fall 2015
www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jpeck/Econ5001.htm
Office Hours (440 Arps): Tuesdays 2-3, Wednesdays 10-11

Course Objectives: This course provides a rigorous introduction to the field of Game Theory, by presenting the underlying theory and providing illustrative examples.

Course Requirements:

First Midterm Exam (Tuesday, September 29): 25%
Second Midterm Exam (Thursday, November 5) 25%
Final Exam (Monday, December 14, 12:00 – 1:45 pm): 35%
Homework: 15%

There will be no make up exam for the midterms. Students who have a valid, pre-approved excuse for missing a midterm will have the other midterm count for 35% of the grade and the final exam count for 50% of the grade.

Study groups are allowed on the homework assignments, in which you can discuss the questions and talk about how to solve them. However, you need to write up the answers individually and without help. Homework grades are based on full credit for a good faith effort submitted on time, zero credit otherwise.

Students have the option of submitting a short (about 2 pages) extra credit paper that takes a strategic situation in real life or from some other source (movie, TV, etc.), models the situation as a game, and solves the game. The extra credit score will replace the lowest score received for a homework assignment. Extra credit papers are due on the last day of class.

We will occasionally run some classroom experiments to illustrate the material, using MobLab. Instructions for participating, including downloading the app to your smartphone or tablet will be explained later in the course. Participation is strongly encouraged, but it is optional and it will not be part of the grade.

Other texts (not required):


**Course Outline**

0. **Introduction**

   Watson, Chapter 1.

I. **Defining a Game**

   A. Extensive Form Games (first pass)

      Game trees, information sets, and payoffs. Modeling simultaneity.

      Watson, Chapter 2.

   B. Normal (Strategic) Form Games

      Strategy set, strategy, strategy profile, payoff function, matrix form, relation to the extensive form, examples of normal form games.

      Watson, Chapter 3.

   C. Mixed Strategies and Expected Payoffs

      Beliefs about strategy choices of the other players, mixed strategy, expected payoff.

      Watson, Chapter 4.

   D. Rationality and Common Knowledge

      Interpretation of payoffs as utility, risk aversion and altruism, common knowledge of
rationality, bounded rationality.

Watson, Chapter 5.

II. Solving Normal Form Games

A. Dominance and Best Response

Dominated strategy, weakly dominated strategy, dominant strategy, efficient strategy profile, best response, undominated strategies, tension between individual incentives and efficiency.

Watson, Chapter 6.

B. Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies

Iterated dominance, rationalizable strategy, dominance solvable, strategic uncertainty, coordination problem, location game example.

Watson, Chapters 7,8.

C. Nash Equilibrium

Definition of NE, finding NE of matrix games, interpretations of NE, experimental game theory, the example of the Braess paradox.

Watson, Chapter 9.

D. Oligopoly Games and Voting Games

The Cournot model, the Bertrand model, two- and three-candidate platform competition.

Watson, Chapter 10.

E. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Matching pennies example, general definition, calculating the mixed-strategy NE, an oligopoly entry game, Nash’s theorem.

Watson, Chapter 11.
III. Extensive Form Games

A. Details of the Extensive Form

Initial node, predecessor nodes, successor nodes, terminal nodes, rules for game trees, perfect and imperfect information, actions and strategies, Nash equilibrium, normal form vs. extensive form NE.

Watson, Chapter 14.

B. Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection

Sequential rationality, backward induction in games of perfect information, subgame perfection, the centipede game, the chain-store game, Stackelberg competition.

Watson, Chapter 15.

C. Repeated Games

Definition of a repeated game, finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, grim trigger strategy, the folk theorem, infinitely repeated chain store game.

Watson, Chapter 22.

IV. Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Information

A. Incomplete Information

Extensive form games with chance moves, types and Bayesian normal form representation, incomplete information vs. imperfect information.

Watson, Chapter 24.

B. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Cournot game with cost uncertainty, auctions.

Watson, Chapters 26, 27.

C. Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Information and Sequential Play
Beliefs off the equilibrium path, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the beer and quiche game.

Watson, Chapter 28.

Students with disabilities that have been certified by the Office for Disability Services will be appropriately accommodated, and should inform the instructor as soon as possible of their needs. The Office for Disability Services is located in 150 Pomerene Hall, 1760 Neil Avenue; telephone 292-3307, TDD 292-0901; http://www.ods.ohio-state.edu/