

Department of Economics  
The Ohio State University  
Midterm Questions and Answers—Econ 8712

Prof. James Peck  
Fall 2016

**1. (30 points)**

A decision maker (DM) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizer. There are two states of nature, and the DM assigns a subjective probability to each state. The DM has a Bernoulli utility function over final wealth  $x$  given by the strictly concave function  $u(x) = x^{1/2}$ . This function does not vary with the state. Let  $(x_1, x_2)$  denote the state-contingent allocation in which the DM consumes  $x_1$  in state 1 and  $x_2$  in state 2.

*Suppose the DM is indifferent between the state-contingent allocation (1, 25) and the state-contingent allocation (4, 9). What are the DM's subjective probabilities, and what is the certainty equivalent of the state-contingent allocation (4, 16)? In other words, what constant state-contingent allocation  $(x, x)$  will the DM find indifferent to (4, 16)?*

**Answer:**

Denote the probability of state 1 as  $\pi$ . Because the DM is indifferent between (1, 25) and (4, 9), we have

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(1)^{1/2} + (1 - \pi)(25)^{1/2} &= \pi(4)^{1/2} + (1 - \pi)(9)^{1/2} \\ \pi + 5(1 - \pi) &= 2\pi + 3(1 - \pi) \\ \pi &= \frac{2}{3}.\end{aligned}$$

The DM's subjective probabilities are  $(\frac{2}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$ . The certainty equivalent is the solution to

$$\begin{aligned}x^{1/2} &= \frac{2}{3}(4)^{1/2} + \frac{1}{3}(16)^{1/2} = \frac{8}{3} \\ x &= \frac{64}{9}.\end{aligned}$$

**2. (30 points)**

The following partial equilibrium economy has 1 firm, with the cost function  $c(y) = (y)^2$ . There are 2 consumers, each of whom has an initial endowment of money (numeraire),  $\omega_i^m = 1$  and a zero endowment of the good. Also, each consumer owns a share,  $\frac{1}{2}$ , of each firm's profits. Letting  $x_i$  and  $m_i$  denote consumer  $i$ 's consumption of the good and money, respectively, for  $i = 1, 2$ , consumer  $i$  has the utility function,  $\log(1 + x_i) + m_i$ .

- (a) (20 points) Calculate the competitive equilibrium price and allocation.  
 (b) (10 points) Calculate the Marshallian Surplus associated with output  $X$ , given that this output is efficiently allocated to consumers.

**Answer:**

(a) To find the firm's supply function we equate marginal cost to the price, so the supply function is  $y = \frac{p}{2}$ . Profits are given by

$$py - y^2 = \frac{p^2}{4}.$$

The demand function for consumer  $i$  ( $i = 1, 2$ ) is computed by the marginal rate of substitution condition,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1 + x_i} &= p \\ x_i &= \frac{1}{p} - 1. \end{aligned}$$

Money consumption is determined by the budget equation,

$$m_i = \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{p^2}{4}\right) + 1 - p\left(\frac{1}{p} - 1\right) = \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{p^2}{4}\right) + p.$$

To find the price we equate demand and supply:

$$\begin{aligned} 2\left(\frac{1}{p} - 1\right) &= \frac{p}{2} \\ p^2 + 4p - 4 &= 0 \\ p &= \frac{-4 \pm \sqrt{32}}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Since obviously we want the positive root, we have  $p = 2\sqrt{2} - 2$ . Substituting into the demand and supply functions yields the allocation

$$\begin{aligned} y &= \sqrt{2} - 1 \\ x_i &= \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{2} \\ m_i &= \sqrt{2} - \frac{1}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Note: there are correct answers whose expressions look different, but are equivalent.

(b) The Marshallian Surplus for this problem is given by

$$\log(1 + x_1) + \log(1 + x_2) - X^2,$$

where  $x_1 + x_2 = X$ . Since  $X$  is distributed efficiently, we must have  $x_1 = x_2 = \frac{X}{2}$ , so the Surplus is equal to

$$2\log\left(1 + \frac{X}{2}\right) - X^2.$$

Another way to solve for the surplus is to compute the area between the (inverse) supply and demand curves. Since market demand is  $X(p) = 2\left(\frac{1}{p} - 1\right)$ , the inverse demand curve is

$$P(X) = \frac{2}{X + 2}.$$

The inverse supply curve is marginal cost, so

$$C'(X) = 2X.$$

Using  $t$  as the dummy index in the integrals, Surplus is given by

$$\begin{aligned} & \int_0^X \frac{2}{t+2} dt - \int_0^X 2t dt \\ &= 2\log(X+2) - 2\log(2) - X^2, \end{aligned}$$

which is the same as the above expression.

### 3. (40 points)

Consider the following pure-exchange economy with  $n$  consumers and two goods. Each consumer  $i$  has the utility function

$$u_i(x_i^1, x_i^2) = \log(x_i^1) + \log(x_i^2).$$

Consumer 1 has the initial endowment vector,  $(A, 0)$ , and consumers 2, 3, ...,  $n$  have the initial endowment vector,  $(0, B)$ , where  $A$  and  $B$  are positive numbers.

- (a) (10 points) Define a competitive equilibrium for this economy.
- (b) (20 points) Compute the competitive equilibrium price vector and allocation as a function of the endowment parameters.
- (c) (10 points) Is it possible for a decrease in  $A$  to benefit consumer 1? Justify your answer.

#### Answer:

(a) In defining a C.E., I will normalize prices to be  $(p, 1)$ , and use monotonicity to conclude that budget constraints and market clearing hold with equality.

A C.E. is a price vector,  $(p, 1)$ , and an allocation,  $(x_i^1, x_i^2)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , such that

(i)  $(x_1^1, x_1^2)$  solves

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \log(x_1^1) + \log(x_1^2) \\ & \text{subject to} \\ & px_1^1 + x_1^2 = pA \\ & x_1 \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

(ii) for  $i = 2, \dots, n$ ,  $(x_i^1, x_i^2)$  solves

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \log(x_i^1) + \log(x_i^2) \\ & \text{subject to} \\ & px_i^1 + x_i^2 = B \\ & x_i \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

(iii) markets clear:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^1 &= A \\ \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^2 &= (n-1)B. \end{aligned}$$

(b) The demand function for consumer 1 is characterized by the budget equation and the marginal rate of substitution condition,

$$\frac{x_1^2}{x_1^1} = p,$$

yielding

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^1 &= \frac{A}{2} \\ x_1^2 &= \frac{pA}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

For  $i = 2, \dots, n$ , the demand function for consumer 2 is characterized by the budget equation and the marginal rate of substitution condition,

$$\frac{x_i^2}{x_i^1} = p,$$

yielding

$$\begin{aligned} x_i^1 &= \frac{B}{2p} \\ x_i^2 &= \frac{B}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Market clearing for good 2 implies

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{pA}{2} + (n-1)\frac{B}{2} &= (n-1)B \\ p &= \frac{(n-1)B}{A}.\end{aligned}$$

Substituting the price into the demand functions yields the equilibrium allocation,

$$\begin{aligned}x_1 &= \left(\frac{A}{2}, \frac{(n-1)B}{2}\right) \\ x_i &= \left(\frac{A}{2(n-1)}, \frac{B}{2}\right) \text{ for } i = 2, \dots, n.\end{aligned}$$

(c) Looking at the equilibrium consumption for consumer 1, it is clear that a decrease in  $A$  decreases his/her consumption of good 1, and it does not affect his/her consumption of good 2. Therefore, consumer 1's utility cannot increase if  $A$  decreases.