

# (Pre-)Algebras for Linguistics

## 7. Modelling Meaning and Reference

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Linguistics 680:  
Formal Foundations

Autumn 2010

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- A source of confusion: the terms Frege used were *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, usually glossed by German-English dictionaries as ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’.
- In general, the reference of an expression can be **contingent** (depend on how things are), while the meaning is independent of how things are (examples coming soon).

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- But that distinction can no longer be ignored when one examines the interdependence between the meaning of an expression and the **context** in which it is uttered.
- This interdependence is the topic of the Winter/Spring 2011 Interdisciplinary Seminar on the Syntax/Semantics/Pragmatics Interface (Linguistics 812).



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- Names are controversial! Vastly oversimplifying:
  - **Descriptivism** (Frege, Russell) the meaning of a name is a **description** associated with the name by speakers; the reference is what satisfies the description.
  - **Direct Reference Theory** (Mill, Kripke) the meaning of a name **is** its reference, so names are **rigid** (their reference is independent of how things are.)

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- Grammar says nothing about reference.
- Instead, a separate, nonlinguistic, theory tells how the **extension** of a meaning depends on how things are.
- An expression's reference is just its meaning's extension.
- So reference also depends on how things are.

# Review of Propositions

We have a set  $P$  of **propositions** with the **entailment** preorder  $\sqsubseteq$  and the following operations:

- $\sqcap$  a glb operation, the meaning of *and*
- $\rightarrow$  a residual operation for  $\sqcap$ , the meaning of *implies*
- $\sqcup$  a lub operation, the meaning of *or*
- $\neg$  a complement operation, the meaning of *no way*
- $\top$  a top, a necessary truth
- $\perp$  a bottom, a necessary falsehood

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- c. **t** and **f** as top and bottom respectively
- d. operations given by the usual truth tables:  $\wedge$  (glb),  $\vee$  (lub),  $\supset$  (residual of  $\wedge$ ), and  $\sim$  (complement).

# A Theory of Meanings and Extensions (1/5)

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- I The **individuals** (things that can be meanings of names).
- W The **worlds** (ultrafilters of propositions)
- 1 The **unit set**  $\{0\}$ .

It's conventional to call the member of this set  $*$ , rather than 0, since the important thing about it is that it is a singleton and not what its member is.

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- c. If  $A$  and  $B$  are semantic domains, so is  $A \rightarrow B$ , the set of functions (arrows) with domain  $A$  and codomain  $B$ .
- d. Nothing else is a semantic domain. (In particular,  $W$  and  $B$  are not involved in the definition of semantic domains.)

Later we will see that an expression meaning is always a member of a semantic domain (which one depending on the syntactic category of the expression).

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The meaning of the sentential adverb **obviously** will be a function **obviously'**:  $P \rightarrow P$ . For each proposition  $p$ , we think of **obviously'**( $p$ ) as the proposition that  $p$  is obvious.

# A Theory of Meanings and Extensions (4/5)

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- e. If  $A$  and  $B$  are semantic domains, then  $\text{Ext}(A \rightarrow B) = A \rightarrow \text{Ext}(B)$ .



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- For all  $a \in A$ ,  $b \in B$ , and  $w \in W$ ,  $\langle a, b \rangle @w = \langle a@w, b@w \rangle$ .

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- d. For all  $a \in A$ ,  $b \in B$ , and  $w \in W$ ,  $\langle a, b \rangle @w = \langle a@w, b@w \rangle$ .
- e. For all  $f \in A \rightarrow B$  and  $w \in W$ ,  $f@w$  is the function from  $A$  to  $\mathbf{Ext}(B)$  that maps each  $a \in A$  to  $f(a)@w$ .

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The assignment of meanings to expressions is done by the grammar (next lecture).

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**donkey** is the function from individuals to truth values that maps each individual  $i$  to **t** if the proposition **donkey'**( $i$ ) is in  $w$ , and to **f** otherwise. (Informally speaking, this is (the characteristic function of) the set of individuals that are donkeys at  $w$ .)

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**obviously** is the function from propositions to truth values that maps each proposition  $p$  to **t** if the proposition **obvious'**( $p$ ) is in  $w$ , and to **f** otherwise. (Informally speaking, this is (the characteristic function of) the set of all propositions which are obvious at  $w$ .)

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Example: the extension of an individual property (e.g. **donkey'**) is (the characteristic function of) a set of individuals.

Example: the extension of a property of propositions (e.g. **obvious'**) is (the characteristic function of) a set of propositions.