Philosophical Applications

Author	Title	Year	Journal/Proceedings	Reftype	DOI/URL
Balcerak Jackson, B.	Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Erkenntnis Vol. 79(S1), pp. 31-54	article	DOI
Abstract: One way to challenge the substantiveness of a particular philosophical issue is to argue that those who debate the issue are engaged in a merely verbal dispute. For example, it has been maintained that the apparent disagreement over the mind/brain identity thesis is a merely verbal dispute, and thus that there is no substantive question of whether or not mental properties are identical to neurological properties. The goal of this paper is to help clarify the relationship between mere verbalness and substantiveness. I first argue that we should see mere verbalness as a certain kind of discourse defect that arises when the parties differ as to what each takes to be the immediate question under discussion. I then argue that mere verbalness, so understood, does not imply that the question either party is attempting to address is a non-substantive one. Even if it turns out that the parties to the mind/brain dispute are addressing subtly different questions, these might both be substantive questions to which their respective metaphysical views provide substantive answers. One reason it is tempting to reach deflationary conclusions from the charge of mere verbalness is that we fail to distinguish it from the claim that a sentence under dispute is, in a certain sense, indisputable. Another reason is that we fail to distinguish mere verbalness from a certain sort of indeterminacy. While indisputability and indeterminacy plausibly capture forms of nonsubstantiveness, I argue that mere verbalness is insufficient to establish either indisputability or indeterminacy.
BibTeX: @article{BalcerakJackson2014, author = {Brendan Balcerak Jackson}, title = {Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2014}, volume = {79}, number = {S1}, pages = {31--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9444-5} }
Bowker, M.	Ineliminable underdetermination and context-shifting arguments [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2019	Inquiry, pp. 1-22	article	DOI
Abstract: The truth-conditions of utterances are often underdetermined by the meaning of the sentence uttered, as suggested by the observation that the same sentence has different intuitive truth-values in different contexts. The intuitive difference is usually explained by assigning different truth-conditions to different utterances. This paper poses a problem for explanations of this kind: These truth-conditions, if they exist, are epistemically inaccessible. I suggest instead that truth-conditional underdetermination is ineliminable and these utterances have no truth-conditions. Intuitive truth-values are explained by the effect that all the most reasonable interpretations have on the common ground: An utterance is intuitively true when it is true on all interpretations that answer the question under discussion.
BibTeX: @article{Bowker2019, author = {Mark Bowker}, title = {Ineliminable underdetermination and context-shifting arguments}, journal = {Inquiry}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, year = {2019}, pages = {1--22}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2019.1688176} }
Buchanan, R. and Schiller, H.I.	Pragmatic Particularism [Abstract] [Comment] [BibTeX]	2021	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	article	DOI
Abstract: For the Intentionalist, utterance content is wholly determined by a speaker’s meaning-intentions; the sentence uttered serves merely to facilitate the audience’s recovering these intentions. We argue that Intentionalists ought to be Particularists, holding that the only “principles” of meaning recovery needed are those governing inferences to the best explanation; “principles” that are both defeasible and, in a sense to be elaborated, variable. We discuss some ways in which some theorists have erred in trying to tame the “wild west” of pragmatics and context-sensitivity – including recent work that makes essential appeal to the information structure of a discourse – and in so doing, offer a general recipe for defending the Particularist picture of utterance content and its recovery that we favor.
Comment: This directly argues that the QUD framework, and overall theoretical approach, is ill-suited to an intentionalist thesis about sentence meaning. The authors embrace the `wild west' of pragmatics.
BibTeX: @article{Buchanan2021, author = {Ray Buchanan and Henry Ian Schiller}, title = {Pragmatic Particularism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2021}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12801} }
Büring, D.	Focus and Intonation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language	incollection	DOI
Abstract: Intonation describes the way the fundamental frequency of the voice, also called its pitch or F°, changes over the course of an utterance. A slightly broader term is Prosody, which covers not just intonation but also additional aspects of phonetic realization such as pauses, lengthening of segments, perhaps loudness, and spectral tilt; intonation in particular, and perhaps prosody in general, roughly corresponds to the colloquial term ‘inﬂection’. Certain aspects of prosody (and intonation) are grammatical in nature and as such represented in a phonological representation, called Prosodic Structure. At a minimum, prosodic structure will encode prosodic constituent structure, relative metrical strength or stress of syllables, and location and nature of certain tonal (or ‘intonational’) events (see Ladd, 1996).
BibTeX: @incollection{Buering2012, author = {Daniel Büring}, title = {Focus and Intonation}, booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2012}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203206966-16} }
Carrus, S.	Slurs: At-issueness and Semantic Normativity [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2017	Phenomenology and Mind(12), pp. 84-97	article	URL
Abstract: In the first part of the article, we present the main approaches to analyze slurs’ content and we investigate the interaction between an assertion containing a slur and a denial (‘It’s not true that P’ / P is false’) showing to what extent a “neutral counterpart account” works better than a “dual account”. Additionally, the analysis offers the opportunity to discuss the usefulness of the notion of “at-issueness” for a debate on the lexical semantics of slurs. In the second part, we use our apparatus to analyze a real case of non-standard use of ‘frocio’ (‘faggot’). Our conclusion is that even if a family resemblance conception of category membership could account for these uses, it cannot account for the related semantic normativity problem.
BibTeX: @article{Carrus2017, author = {Carrus, Simone}, title = {Slurs: At-issueness and Semantic Normativity}, journal = {Phenomenology and Mind}, year = {2017}, number = {12}, pages = {84--97}, url = {https://www.torrossa.com/gs/resourceProxy?an=4219102&publisher=FF3888#page=86} }
Carter, E.	Objectivity, Language, and Communication [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	School: The Ohio State University	phdthesis	URL
Abstract: This dissertation is a study of objectivity, language, and communication. While most of us take for granted that scientific discourse is objective, when it comes to other discourses, our inclinations are different. For example, we take for granted that humor discourse is not objective. While these attitudes about objectivity are commonplace, they raise questions about the factors that influence objectivity. The primary thesis that I defend is that a discourse's status with respect to objectivity is influenced by how a speaker uses that discourse, especially what a speaker takes for granted about the information that everyone in a conversation shares. When we talk to one another, we take for granted that there is a question that everyone is discussing. However, when a speaker uses an objective discourse in a conversation, someone in a disagreement over the question under discussion must be inattentive, biased, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. We take other things for granted in a conversation too, especially about the attitudes that the conversation serves to coordinate. A speaker who uses an objective discourse takes for granted that the discussion serves only to coordinate either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. While conversational requirements are a mark of objective discourse, conversational latitude is a mark of non-objective discourse. Objectivity requires that a speaker take for granted that the discussion addresses a question that does not allow for cognitively faultless disagreement. Objectivity also requires that a speaker take for granted that the conversation only serves to influence either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. However, given that we are dealing with a discourse that is not objective, things are different. When a speaker uses a discourse that is not objective, a speaker might take for granted that there is a question is under discussion that gives rise to cognitively faultless disagreement. In addition, a speaker might take for granted that conversation serves to coordinate attitudes other than either knowledge or belief. For example, when a speaker uses a discourse that is not objective, a speaker might take for granted that conversation functions to coordinate desires, hopes, or even feelings.
BibTeX: @phdthesis{Carter2011, author = {Eric Carter}, title = {Objectivity, Language, and Communication}, school = {The Ohio State University}, year = {2011}, url = {http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1308311590} }
Carter, S.	A Suppositional Theory of Conditionals [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2021	Mind	article	DOI
Abstract: Suppositional theories of conditionals take apparent similarities between supposition and conditionals as a starting point, appealing to features of the former to provide an account of the latter. This paper develops a novel form of suppositional theory, one which characterizes the relationship at the level of semantics rather than at the level of speech acts. In the course of doing so, it considers a range of novel data which shed additional light on how conditionals and supposition interact.
BibTeX: @article{Carter2021, author = {Sam Carter}, title = {A Suppositional Theory of Conditionals}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2021}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa071} }
Fleisher, W.	Endorsement and Assertion [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2019	Noûs	article	DOI
Abstract: Scientists, philosophers, and other researchers commonly assert their theories. This is surprising, as there are good reasons for skepticism about theories in cutting-edge research. I propose a new account of assertion in research contexts that vindicates these assertions. This account appeals to a distinct propositional attitude called endorsement, which is the rational attitude of committed advocacy researchers have to their theories. The account also appeals to a theory of conversational pragmatics known as the Question Under Discussion model, or QUD. Hence, I call the theory the EQUD model. Motivating this account is a recognition that the speech act of assertion has two roles to play in research contexts. The first is the advocacy role, in which researchers assert a theory in order to advocate for it. The second is the evidential role, which is used to add to the common stock of information available to a field of inquiry. The EQUD model provides an account of warranted assertion for both these roles in research contexts. This success provides support for the theory of endorsement. It also provides support for information updating accounts of assertion.
BibTeX: @article{Fleisher2019, author = {Will Fleisher}, title = {Endorsement and Assertion}, journal = {Noûs}, year = {2019}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12315} }
Fusco, M.	Free choice permission and the counterfactuals of pragmatics [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Linguistics and Philosophy Vol. 37(4), pp. 275-290	article	DOI
Abstract: This paper addresses a little puzzle with a surprisingly long pedigree and a surprisingly large wake: the puzzle of Free Choice Permission. I begin by presenting a popular sketch of a pragmatic solution to the puzzle, due to Kratzer and Shimoyama, which has received a good deal of discussion, endorsement and elaboration in recent work :535–590, 2006; Fox, in: Sauerland and Stateva Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, 2007; Geurts, Mind Lang 24:51–79, 2009; von Fintel, Central APA session on Deontic Modals, 2012). I then explain why the general form of the Kratzer and Shimoyama explanation is not extensionally adequate. This leaves us with two possibilities with regard to the original solution-sketch; either the suggested pragmatic route fails, or it succeeds in a particularly strange way: Free Choice permission is rendered a kind pragmatic illusion on the part of both speakers and hearers. Finally, I discuss some ramifications.
BibTeX: @article{Fusco2014, author = {Melissa Fusco}, title = {Free choice permission and the counterfactuals of pragmatics}, journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2014}, volume = {37}, number = {4}, pages = {275--290}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-014-9154-8} }
Glanzberg, M.	About Convention and Grammar [BibTeX]	2018	Vol. 2018Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics, pp. 230-260	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{Glanzberg2018, author = {Glanzberg, Michael}, title = {About Convention and Grammar}, booktitle = {Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2018}, volume = {2018}, pages = {230--260} }
Green, M.S.	Quantity, Volubility, and Some Varieties of Discourse [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1995	Linguistics and Philosophy Vol. 18(1), pp. 83-112	article	URL
Abstract: Grice's Quantity maxims have been widely misinterpreted as enjoining a speaker to make the strongest claim that she can, while respecting the other conversational maxims. Although many writers on the topic of conversational implicature interpret the Quantity maxims as enjoining such volubility, so construed the Quantity maxims are unreasonable norms for conversation. Appreciating this calls for attending more closely to the notion of what a conversation requires. When we do so, we see that eschewing an injunction to maximal informativeness need not deprive us of any ability to predict or explain genuine cases of implicature. Crucial to this explanation is an appreciation of how what a conversation, or a given stage of a conversation, requires, depends upon what kind of conversation is taking place. I close with an outline of this dependence relation that distinguishes among three importantly distinct types of conversation.
BibTeX: @article{Green1995, author = {Mitchell S. Green}, title = {Quantity, Volubility, and Some Varieties of Discourse}, journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy}, year = {1995}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {83-112}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25001579} }
Green, M.S.	Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2000	Linguistics and Philosophy Vol. 23(5), pp. 435-473	article	URL
Abstract: Illocutionary force and semantic content are widely held to occupy utterly different categories in at least two ways: (1) any expression serving as an indicator of illocutionary force must be without semantic content, and (2) no such expression can embed. A refined account of the force/content distinction is offered here that (a) does the explanatory work that the standard distinction does, while, in accounting for the behavior of a range of parenthetical expressions, (b) shows neither (1) nor (2) to be compulsory. The refined account also motivates a development of the "scorekeeping model" of conversation, helps to isolate a distinction between illocutionary force and illocutionary commitment, and reveals one precise respect in which meaning is only explicable in terms of use.
BibTeX: @article{Green2000, author = {Mitchell S. Green}, title = {Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content}, journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {23}, number = {5}, pages = {435-473}, url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/25001787} }
Grindrod, J. and Borg, E.	Questions Under Discussion and the Semantics/Pragmatics Divide [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2019	The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 69(275), pp. 418-426	article	DOI URL
Abstract: The ‘question under discussion’ (or ‘QUD’) framework is a pragmatic framework that draws on work in the semantics of questions to provide an appealing account of a range of pragmatic phenomena, including the use of prosodic focus in English and restrictions on acceptable discourse moves. More recently, however, a number of proposals have attempted to use the framework to help to settle issues at the semantics/pragmatics boundary, fixing the truth-conditions of what is said by a speaker (which many theorists take to be a semantic matter). In this discussion piece, we suggest that this kind of putative extension of the work to be done by the QUD framework is illegitimate, as the framework ultimately seems to depend on a prior grip on semantic content. To see this, we first outline the QUD framework and then raise our concern.
BibTeX: @article{Grindrod2019, author = {Grindrod, Jumbly and Borg, Emma}, title = {Questions Under Discussion and the Semantics/Pragmatics Divide}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {2019}, volume = {69}, number = {275}, pages = {418-426}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy058}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy058} }
Hoek, D.	Conversational Exculpature [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2018	The Philosophical Review Vol. 127(2), pp. 151-196	article	DOI URL
Abstract: Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5 ′11.99″ and 6 ′0.01″ tall, and why we can say “Ellen has a hat like the one Sherlock Holmes always wears” without implying Holmes exists or has a hat. This article presents a simple formalism for understanding this pragmatic mechanism, specifying how, in context, the result of such subtractions is determined. And it shows how the resulting theory of conversational exculpature accounts for a varied range of linguistic phenomena. A distinctive feature of the approach is the crucial role played by the question under discussion in determining the result of a given exculpature.
BibTeX: @article{Hoek2018, author = {Hoek, Daniel}, title = {Conversational Exculpature}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, year = {2018}, volume = {127}, number = {2}, pages = {151-196}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-4326594}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-4326594} }
Hyska, M.A.	Discourse-level information structure and the challenge of metadiscursives [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	School: University of Texas at Austin	phdthesis	URL
Abstract: In Information Structure: Towards an integrated formal theory of pragmatics (2012), Craige Roberts offers a modeling apparatus designed for use in giving a unified analysis of diverse pragmatic phenomena. As part of her account, Roberts offers precise conditions on what an utterance must be like in order for it to count as felicitous in any particular context. A key condition is that, in order to be felicitous, an utterance must count as an answer to what Roberts calls “the question under discussion.” I demonstrate that this account generates some false predictions regarding the class of utterances I will call “metadiscursives,” as well as that of epistemic reports. I will then consider several possible alterations to Roberts’ view that would preserve the spirit of her project and render the account invulnerable to my objections.
BibTeX: @phdthesis{Hyska2015, author = {Megan Alexandra Hyska}, title = {Discourse-level information structure and the challenge of metadiscursives}, school = {University of Texas at Austin}, year = {2015}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/2152/46665} }
Keiser, J.	The ``All Lives Matter'' response: QUD-shifting as epistemic injustice [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2021	Synthese	article	DOI
Abstract: Drawing on recent work in formal pragmatic theory, this paper shows that the manipulation of discourse structure—in particular, by way of shifting the Question Under Discussion mid-discourse—can constitute an act of epistemic injustice. I argue that the “All Lives Matter” response to the “Black Lives Matter” slogan is one such case; this response shifts the Question Under Discussion governing the overarching discourse from Do Black lives matter? to Which lives matter? This manipulation of the discourse structure systematically obscures the intended meaning of “Black lives matter” and disincentivizes future utterances of it.
BibTeX: @article{Keiser2021, author = {Jessica Keiser}, title = {The ``All Lives Matter'' response: QUD-shifting as epistemic injustice}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2021}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03171-y} }
Khoo, J.	Probabilities of conditionals in context [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Linguistics and Philosophy Vol. 39(1), pp. 1-43	article	DOI
Abstract: The Ramseyan thesis that the probability of an indicative conditional is equal to the corresponding conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent is both widely confirmed and subject to attested counterexamples (e.g., McGee, in Analysis 60(1):107–111, 2000; Kaufmann, in J Philos Logic 33:583–606, 2004). This raises several puzzling questions. For instance, why are there interpretations of conditionals that violate this Ramseyan thesis in certain contexts, and why are they otherwise very rare? In this paper, I raise some challenges to Stefan Kaufmann’s account of why the Ramseyan thesis sometimes fails, and motivate my own theory. On my theory, the proposition expressed by an indicative conditional is partially determined by a background partition, and hence its probability depends on the choice of such a partition. I hold that this background partition is contextually determined, and in certain conditions is set by a salient question under discussion in the context. I argue that the resulting theory offers compelling answers to the puzzling questions raised by failures of the Ramseyan thesis.
BibTeX: @article{Khoo2016, author = {Justin Khoo}, title = {Probabilities of conditionals in context}, journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy}, publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, year = {2016}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {1--43}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-015-9182-z} }
Kissel, T.K.	Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2018	Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 96(3), pp. 578-591	article	DOI
Abstract: This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.
BibTeX: @article{Kissel2018, author = {Teresa Kouri Kissel}, title = {Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, year = {2018}, volume = {96}, number = {3}, pages = {578--591}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1399151} }
Koev, T.	Strong beliefs, weak commitments [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2019	Vol. 23(2)Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung	inproceedings	DOI
Abstract: The standard Hintikkan semantics views believe as a universal quantifier over possible worlds (Hintikka, 1969). This semantics (i) fails to capture the fact that believe is gradable (cf. partially believe or fully believe) and (ii) makes no predictions about the degree of certainty of the belief agent toward the prejacent. To remedy these problems, I propose a scalar semantics along the lines of Kennedy and McNally’s (2005) analysis of gradable adjectives, arguing that believe is a maximum-degree predicate. While belief attributions are sometimes interpreted as hedges (e.g., I believe it’s raining can be taken as a statement of uncertainty), I point out that such uses are restricted to contexts in which the belief component is not relevant to the question under discussion. Following up on a suggestion made in Chemla (2008), I propose that the weak sense of believe arises as an antipresupposition, a scalar inference derived through competition with a presuppositionally stronger know-competitor. Contra Hawthorne et al. (2016), I argue that the intuition of weakness is due not to reduced modal force but rather to the subjectivity of modal content, amounting to a situation in which the agent has full subjective confidence in the prejacent but fails to publicly commit to it.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Koev2019, author = {Todor Koev}, title = {Strong beliefs, weak commitments}, booktitle = {Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung}, year = {2019}, volume = {23}, number = {2}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.18148/sub/2019.v23i2.595} }
Lassiter, D. and Goodman, N.D.	Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Synthese Vol. 194(10), pp. 3801-3836	article	DOI
Abstract: We derive a probabilistic account of the vagueness and context-sensitivity of scalar adjectives from a Bayesian approach to communication and interpretation. We describe an iterated-reasoning architecture for pragmatic interpretation and illustrate it with a simple scalar implicature example. We then show how to enrich the apparatus to handle pragmatic reasoning about the values of free variables, explore its predictions about the interpretation of scalar adjectives, and show how this model implements Edgington’s (Analysis 2:193–204,1992, Keefe and Smith (eds.) Vagueness: a reader, 1997) account of the sorites paradox, with variations. The Bayesian approach has a number of explanatory virtues: in particular, it does not require any special-purpose machinery for handling vagueness, and it is integrated with a promising new approach to pragmatics and other areas of cognitive science.
BibTeX: @article{Lassiter2015, author = {Daniel Lassiter and Noah D. Goodman}, title = {Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation}, journal = {Synthese}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2015}, volume = {194}, number = {10}, pages = {3801--3836}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0786-1} }
Lewis, K.S.	Metasemantics without semantic intentions [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2020	Inquiry, pp. 1-29	article	DOI
Abstract: The most common answers to metasemantic questions regarding context-sensitive expressions appeal primarily to speakers' intentions. Having rejected intentionalism in Lewis [(2020. “The Speaker Authority Problem for Context-Sensitivity (Or: You Can't Always Mean What You Want).” Erkenntnis 85: 1527–1555.], this paper takes a non-intentionalist perspective in answering the metasemantic question: how does a context determine the value of context-sensitive expressions? It focuses on the case of gradable adjectives, i.e. expressions like ‘tall’, ‘expensive’, and ‘rich’, which require a contextually determined standard in the unmarked positive form, as in ‘Pia is tall’. I argue that this standard is determined by a salient comparison class, which, when embedded in the relevant facts, provides input into statistical reasoning which outputs a standard in accordance with conversational domain goals.
BibTeX: @article{Lewis2020, author = {Karen S. Lewis}, title = {Metasemantics without semantic intentions}, journal = {Inquiry}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, year = {2020}, pages = {1--29}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2020.1847184} }
McCready, E.	Salience and Questions Under Discussion [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012		unpublished	URL
Abstract: The idea of questions under discussion is highly useful. Still, it remains unclear exactly how speakers can go about determining what question is at issue. This paper proposes a way to recover the question under discussion, conceptualized as a decision problem, by first determining a set of salient questions by using tools from contextualist epistemology, and then selecting one question from that set via a notion of maximal utility change.
BibTeX: @unpublished{McCready2012, author = {Eric McCready}, title = {Salience and Questions Under Discussion}, year = {2012}, url = {https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jY4YzViN/salienceQUD.pdf} }
Plebani, M. and Spolaore, G.	Subject Matter: A Modest Proposal [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2020	The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 71(3), pp. 605-622	article	DOI URL
Abstract: The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper, we elaborate upon David Lewis’ account of subject matter. Lewis’ proposal is simple and elegant but lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis’ but also includes an attractive characterisation of sentential subject matter.
BibTeX: @article{Plebani2020, author = {Plebani, Matteo and Spolaore, Giuseppe}, title = {Subject Matter: A Modest Proposal}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {2020}, volume = {71}, number = {3}, pages = {605-622}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa054}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa054} }
Rourke, J.	A counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Philosophical Studies Vol. 162(3), pp. 637-643	article	DOI
Abstract: Many epistemologists treat knowledge as a binary relation that holds between a subject and a proposition. The contrastive account of knowledge developed by Jonathan Schaffer maintains that knowledge is a ternary, contrastive relation that holds between a subject, a proposition, and a set of contextually salient alternative propositions the subject’s evidence must eliminate. For the contrastivist, it is never simply the case that S knows that p; in every case of knowledge S knows that p rather than q. This paper offers a counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge. Part 1 summarizes the contrastive theory developed by Schaffer in a series of recent papers. Part 2 presents an example from a class of cases characterized by compatibility between the proposition p and each of the alternative propositions that occupy q. In such cases the alternative propositions that partially constitute the ternary contrastive relation play no role in the acquisition of knowledge. Part 3 considers and rejects potential responses to the counterexample. The paper concludes that the contrastive theory is not a general account of knowledge.
BibTeX: @article{Rourke2013, author = {Jason Rourke}, title = {A counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2013}, volume = {162}, number = {3}, pages = {637--643}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9786-2} }
Schaffer, J. and Knobe, J.	Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed [Comment] [BibTeX]	2012	Noûs Vol. 46(44), pp. 675-708	article	URL
Comment: Schaffer and Knobe are responding to experimental evidence that intuitions about knowledge ascriptions are not reliable. They use a QUD framework to create experiments which test whether performance errors are due to unreliable intuitions or due to pragmatic interpretations.
BibTeX: @article{Schaffer2012, author = {Jonathan Schaffer and Joshua Knobe}, title = {Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed}, journal = {Noûs}, year = {2012}, volume = {46}, number = {44}, pages = {675-708}, url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/41682692} }
Schaffer, J.	Causal Contextualisms [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Contrastivism in Philosophy	incollection
Abstract: Causal statements are commonly made in some context, against a background which includes the assumption of some causal ﬁeld. A causal statement will be the answer to a causal question, and the question ‘What caused this explosion?’ can be expanded into ‘What made the difference between those times, or those cases, within a certain range, in which no such explosion occurred, and this case in which an explosion did occur?’ Both causes and e ects are seen as di erences within a field. (Mackie 1974, 34-35) Causal claims are context sensitive. For instance, if the engineer finds that the poor road conditions contributed to the accident, then it would be acceptable for her to say: 1. The poor road conditions caused the accident Yet if the detective wants to focus on the drunk driver, then it would seem acceptable for him to deny 1 and instead say: 2. The poor road conditions didn’t cause the accident, it was the drunk driver So much is commonplace. As Lewis notes: We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it ‘the’ cause, as if there were no others. Or we single out a few as the ‘causes’, calling the rest mere ‘causal factors’ or ‘causal conditions’. . . We may select the abnormal or extraordinary causes, or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or just those we want to talk about. (1986, 162) Yet, despite extensive studies of context sensitivity for other aspects of language such as knowledge ascriptions, there has been little discussion of the context sensitivity of causal claims. I will address three questions. In section 1, I will address the question of whether the context sensitivity of causal claims is partly semantic, or wholly pragmatic. I will argue-in a way familiar from arguments for epistemic contextualism-that the context sensitivity of causal claims is partly semantic since it does not fully fit the pragmatic mold. In section 2, I will consider the question of whether causal claims are sensitive to contrasts, defaults, and/or models. I will argue that treating causal claims as sensitive to contrasts (for both cause and e ect) does all the needed work. Finally in section 3, I will face the question-naturally arising from my answers to the first two questions-of how semantic sensitivity to contrasts might be implemented within an overall plausible semantic framework. This will turn out to be something of a puzzle. Accordingly, I must conclude that we do not yet have a clear understanding of context sensitivity as it arises for causal claims.
BibTeX: @incollection{Schaffer2013, author = {Jonathan Schaffer}, title = {Causal Contextualisms}, booktitle = {Contrastivism in Philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2013} }
Schaffer, J. and Szabó, Z.G.	Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Philosophical Studies Vol. 168(2), pp. 491-543	article	DOI
Abstract: Knowledge ascriptions seem context sensitive. Yet it is widely thought that epistemic contextualism does not have a plausible semantic implementation. We aim to overcome this concern by articulating and defending an explicit contextualist semantics for 'know,' which integrates a fairly orthodox contextualist conception of knowledge as the elimination of the relevant alternatives, with a fairly orthodox "Amherst" semantics for A-quantification over a contextually variable domain of situations. Whatever problems epistemic contextualism might face, lack of an orthodox semantic implementation is not among them.
BibTeX: @article{Schaffer2014, author = {Jonathan Schaffer and Zoltán Gendler Szabó}, title = {Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2014}, volume = {168}, number = {2}, pages = {491--543}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0141-7} }
Scharp, K.	Replacing Truth [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013		book
Abstract: The book proposes a theory of the nature and logic of truth in which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. The book opens with an overview of work on the nature of truth (e.g. correspondence theories, deflationism), work on the liar and related paradoxes, and a comprehensive scheme for combining these two literatures into a unified study of the concept truth. Truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and the book proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can do truth’s job without giving rise to paradoxes. It offers a pair of replacements, which it dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory of them and a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory. As for the nature of truth, it develops Davidson’s idea that it is best understood as the core of a measurement system for rational phenomena (e.g. belief, desire, and meaning). The book finishes with a semantic theory that treats truth predicates as assessment-sensitive (i.e. their extension is relative to a context of assessment), and a demonstration of how this theory solves the problems posed by the liar and other paradoxes.
BibTeX: @book{Scharp2013, author = {Kevin Scharp}, title = {Replacing Truth}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2013} }
Schiller, H.I.	Illocutionary Harm [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2021	Philosophical Studies Vol. 178, pp. 1631-1646	article	DOI
Abstract: A number of philosophers have become interested in the ways that individuals are subject to harm as the performers of illocutionary acts. This paper offers an account of the underlying structure of such harms: I argue that speakers are the subjects of illocutionary harm when there is interference in the entitlement structure of their linguistic activities. This interference comes in two forms: denial and incapacitation. In cases of denial, a speaker is prevented from achieving the outcomes to which they are entitled by their speech (where such entitlements are based on their meeting certain conditions). In cases of incapacitation, a speaker’s standing to expect certain outcomes is itself undermined. I also discuss how individual speakers are subject to interference along two dimensions: as exercisers of certain non-linguistic capacities (such as knowledge and authority), and as producers of meaningful speech.
BibTeX: @article{Schiller2021, author = {Henry Ian Schiller}, title = {Illocutionary Harm}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2021}, volume = {178}, pages = {1631-1646}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01504-0} }
Schoubye, A.J. and Stokke, A.	What is Said? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Noûs Vol. 50(4)	article	DOI
Abstract: It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning (what is said) using the notion of a question under discussion. This account (i) explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined (yet seem truth conditionally incomplete), (ii) provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences (in general) can come to have enriched meanings in context, and (iii) shows why various alternative views, e.g. so-called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.
BibTeX: @article{Schoubye2016, author = {Anders J. Schoubye and Andreas Stokke}, title = {What is Said?}, journal = {Noûs}, year = {2016}, volume = {50}, number = {4}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12133} }
Shirref, P.	What We Can Do with Words:Essays on the Relationship Between Linguistic andNon-Linguistic Theorizing [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2017	School: University of Michigan	phdthesis	URL
Abstract: The essays that make up my dissertation share a methodological approach that aims to explore the philosophical implications of linguists' accounts of ordinary language use. In particular, all of them focus on epistemic natural language and the implications that linguists' accounts of such language has for epistemology. The first essay focuses on the debate about the norms that govern assertion and shows the ways in which research on natural language evidentiality has direct bearing. This essay uses existing cross-linguistic data about assertions in Quechua and Cheyenne to argue that assertions and the norms that govern them are more complex than allowed for in extant views. What makes Quechua and Cheyenne important is that they allow speakers to assert sentences the content of which they do not believe, or even believe to be false, as long as the sentence contains the right evidential marker. This is a problem for the current theories as they all take belief in the proposition being expressed as a minimal requirement for a speaker to felicitously assert. Given the data, I argue that we should see evidential markers as modifying the norm that is in place governing felicity of the current content. I go on to present three implementations of a context-sensitive norm and argue that only the ones that are evidence-based or completely contextual can properly capture the entire set of linguistic data. In the second essay I argue that epistemic uses of 'should' can be modelling using the standard Kratzerian modal canon. In Kratzer's system, modals induce quantification over some partially ordered, restricted class of worlds. The relevant partially ordered, restricted class of worlds is generally fixed by two ingredients: a modal base and an ordering source. Modelling epistemic uses of 'should' requires us to rethink and expand what has traditionally been thought of as making up an epistemic modal base. Traditionally it has been thought that epistemic modal bases just include information about probabilities but this thought needs to be updated in order to bring epistemic 'should' into the fold. I argue that there are good theoretical reasons for having as uniform a semantics as possible then show that the context-sensitive semantic model that I develop meets all empirical demands. I end the essay by arguing that this updated way of thinking about epistemic modals bases has implications for epistemology. The final essay outlines the broad type of methodological approach mentioned above that guides the research throughout the dissertation. In it, I argue that the results of linguistics' theorizing about semantics, especially within the epistemic domain, ought to be seen as an accurate guide to reality. Looking to the way that language evolves over time and what it takes for information to become encoded into language is what drives this result. Buttressing the evolutionary explanation with results from the Condorcet Jury Theorem gives us more reason to believe that language is an accurate, albeit defeasible, guide to reality. If these results hold, they not only have broad implications for how we ought to be conducting our epistemological theorizing but our philosophical theorizing in general.
BibTeX: @phdthesis{Shirref2017, author = {Patrick Shirref}, title = {What We Can Do with Words:Essays on the Relationship Between Linguistic andNon-Linguistic Theorizing}, school = {University of Michigan}, year = {2017}, url = {https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/140955} }
Siu, C.	Tipper is ready but he is not strong enough: minimal proposition, question under discussion, and what is said [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2019	Philosophical Studies Vol. 177(9), pp. 2577-2584	article	DOI
Abstract: A standard objection to Cappelen and Lepore’s (Insensitive semantics: a defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism, Blackwell, Oxford, 2005) Semantic Minimalism is that minimal propositions are explanatorily idle. But Schoubye and Stokke (Noûs 50:759–793, 2016) recently proposed that minimal proposition and the question under discussion of a conversation jointly determine what is said in a systematic and explanatory way. This note argues that their account both overgenerates and undergenerates.
BibTeX: @article{Siu2019, author = {Charlie Siu}, title = {Tipper is ready but he is not strong enough: minimal proposition, question under discussion, and what is said}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, year = {2019}, volume = {177}, number = {9}, pages = {2577--2584}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01328-7} }
Snedegar, J.	Negative Reason Existentials [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Thought: A Journal of Philosophy Vol. 2(2), pp. 108-116	article	DOI
Abstract: (Schroeder 2007) presents a puzzle about negative reason existentials—claims like ‘There's no reason to cry over spilled milk’. Some of these claims are intuitively true, but we also seem to be committed to the existence of the very reasons that are said not to exist. I argue that Schroeder's own pragmatic solution to this puzzle is unsatisfactory, and propose my own based on a contrastive account of reasons, according to which reasons are fundamentally reasons for one thing rather than another, instead of reasons for things simpliciter, as has been traditionally held.
BibTeX: @article{Snedegar2013, author = {Justin Snedegar}, title = {Negative Reason Existentials}, journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy}, publisher = {Wiley}, year = {2013}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {108--116}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.70} }
Tessler, M. and Goodman, N.D.	Some arguments are probably valid Syllogistic and reasoning as communication [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	UC Merced Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society	inproceedings	URL
Abstract: Syllogistic reasoning lies at the intriguing intersection of natural and formal reasoning, of language and logic. Syllogisms comprise a formal system of reasoning yet use natural language quantifiers, and invite natural language conclusions. How can we make sense of the interplay between logic and language? We develop a computational-level theory that considers reasoning over concrete situations, constructed probabilistically by sampling. The base model can be enriched to consider the pragmatics of natural language arguments. The model predictions are compared with behavioral data from a recent meta-analysis. The flexibility of the model is then explored in a data set of syllogisms using the generalized quantifiers most and few. We conclude by relating our model to two extant theories of syllogistic reasoning – Mental Models and Probability Heuristics.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Title2014a, author = {Michael Tessler and Noah D Goodman}, title = {Some arguments are probably valid Syllogistic and reasoning as communication}, booktitle = {UC Merced Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society}, year = {2014}, url = {https://escholarship.org/content/qt5nm2h7pv/qt5nm2h7pv.pdf} }
van Elswyk, P.	What the metasemantics of know is not [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2020	Linguistics and Philosophy Vol. 43(1), pp. 69-82	article	DOI
Abstract: Epistemic contextualism in the style of Lewis (in Aust J Philos 74:549–567, 1996) maintains that ascriptions of knowledge to a subject vary in truth with the alternatives that can be eliminated by the subject’s evidence in a context. Schaffer (in Philos Stud 119:73–103, 2004, in Oxford Stud Epistemol 1:235–271, 2005, in Philos Phenomenol Res 75:383–403, 2007, in Philos Issues 18(1):1–19, 2008, in: Schaffer, Loewer (eds) A companion to David Lewis, pp 473–490. Wiley, Hoboken, 2015), Schaffer and Knobe (in Noûs 46:675–708, 2012), and Schaffer and Szabó (in Philos Stud 168(2):491–543, 2014) hold that the question under discussion or QUD always determines these alternatives in a context. This paper shows that the QUD does not perform such a role for know and uses this result to draw a few lessons about the metasemantics of context-sensitivity.
BibTeX: @article{vanElswyk2020, author = {Peter van Elswyk}, title = {What the metasemantics of know is not}, journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy}, publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, year = {2020}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, pages = {69--82}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-019-09263-w} }
van Elswyk, P.	Deceiving without answering [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2020	Philosophical Studies Vol. 177(5), pp. 1157-1173	article	DOI
Abstract: Lying is standardly distinguished from misleading according to how a disbelieved proposition is conveyed. To lie, a speaker uses a sentence to say a proposition she does not believe. A speaker merely misleads by using a sentence to somehow convey but not say a disbelieved proposition. Front-and-center to the lying/misleading distinction is a conception of what-is-said by a sentence in a context. Stokke (Philos Rev 125(1):83–134, 2016, Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) has recently argued that the standard account of lying/misleading is explanatorily inadequate unless paired with a theory where what-is-said by a sentence is determined by the question under discussion or QUD. I present two objections to his theory, and conclude that no extant theory of what-is-said enables the standard account of the lying/misleading distinction to be explanatorily adequate.
BibTeX: @article{vanElswyk2020a, author = {Peter van Elswyk}, title = {Deceiving without answering}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, year = {2020}, volume = {177}, number = {5}, pages = {1157--1173}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01239-7} }
Yalcin, S.	Belief as Question-Sensitive [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 97(1), pp. 23-47	article	DOI
Abstract: I begin by reviewing a version of the familiar possible worlds model of belief and belief content. The picture is incomplete in ways that lead to the problem of logical omniscience. I will suggest that the addition of the aforementioned kind of sensitivity helps to fill in the picture in ways that start to address the problem. I then describe some (optional) applications of this picture of belief for modeling concepts and for modeling inquiry into, and disagreement about, which distinctions are natural or structure-tracking, and about which distinctions are “fully factual” or real. My larger aim is to explore the extent to which the idea of belief as question-sensitive state can be motivated by considerations in the philosophy of content, considered largely in abstraction from issues in natural language semantics about belief ascription. By the end we certainly will not have fully resolved the problems of logical omniscience, but we will have made some headway.
BibTeX: @article{Yalcin2016, author = {Seth Yalcin}, title = {Belief as Question-Sensitive}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, publisher = {Wiley}, year = {2016}, volume = {97}, number = {1}, pages = {23--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12330} }